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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report examines the problem of concentrated poverty in the State of New Jersey. Both the
individual and the long-term economic consequences of concentrated poverty are welldocumented in social science research. The report adds to that knowledge by examining the
practical, budgetary consequences faced by urban centers that are characterized by high poverty
levels. The report focuses on four cities, which are represented in the New Jersey Urban Mayors
Association (NJUMA) — Bridgeton, Passaic, Perth Amboy, and Trenton. While these regions
vary considerably, they all share one important fact: their poverty rates are double or triple the
New Jersey average. Clearly, these cities know all too well the struggles that come with
concentrated poverty.
Poverty in New Jersey is often highly concentrated, particularly in urban areas.
New Jersey is ranked as one of the wealthiest states in the country, yet this average wealth
ignores two important realities. First, poverty tends to be concentrated, so that a large portion of
the State’s population lives in areas with poverty rates above 20%. Second, the official poverty
threshold bears no relation to the basic cost of living in New Jersey, so that households with
incomes up to two and a half times the poverty level still struggle just to make ends meet. By this
measure, in 2014 a remarkable 2.8 million New Jersey residents lived under this true measure of
poverty, including 800,000 children. Both the breadth and the concentration of poverty create
serious challenges, particularly in urban areas.
Distribution of Poverty by Classification
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Residents in poor urban areas present significant service needs.
Due to the limits of public and affordable housing even in low-income areas, citizens of NJUMA
cities must spend over half their income on rent, leaving little else for other basic needs. The
constraints produced by low incomes are exacerbated by multiple systemic barriers, including
poor access to health care, reliance on inadequate transportation, poor quality education, and
substandard or overcrowded housing. Personal barriers like limited English proficiency, large
families, and lack of two wage earners can also act as barriers to economic empowerment.
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The deck is stacked against impoverished municipalities.
In recent years, funding from the State to individual municipalities has dwindled markedly. In
response, local property taxes have soared, generating an ever-increasing burden on nearly all
New Jersey residents. But, in impoverished cities, the burden is even greater. Because an everincreasing reliance on property taxes is layered over a diminishing tax base, a counterintuitive
scenario has resulted, whereby the most impoverished municipalities shoulder an unmanageable
municipal tax burden — a greater burden than even their wealthy neighbors.
Figure 1: Percent of Median Household Income Devoted to Municipal Property Taxes in
Example Cities (Higher rank means higher burden)
Municipality (County)

2014

Passaic City (Passaic)

Rank (of 565)

17%

1
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9%

12

Trenton City (Mercer)

7%

30
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5%
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3%
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Ewing Township (Mercer)

2%
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Metuchen Borough (Middlesex)

2%

393

West Windsor Township (Mercer)

1%

473

These budget pressures limit essential functions in NJUMA Cities.
Given the dire circumstances presented by concentrated poverty, one might expect that the
NJUMA cities would allocate more of their budget to vital services that can alleviate poverty —
programming in healthcare, libraries, housing, mental health services, social wrap-around
services, economic development, and youth programs. And yet, the converse is true: wealthier
cities, without such concentrations of poverty and need, are spending the same or even more on
these services, while the cities are forced to make decisions about what vital services to cut.1
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1

“Education,” here, does not refer to schools but essentially to the library. West Windsor and Ewing have County
libraries, but one might expect proportional costs.
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As the budget analysis in this report reveals, services other than public safety and public works
make up an all too negligible portion of municipal budgets in the examined cities, despite the
significant need for public services created by the dynamics of concentrated poverty.
Urgent strategies are needed to alleviate concentrated poverty in New Jersey.
We need to strengthen the safety-net for poverty-stricken families and their children, while at the
same time addressing the budgetary system that unfairly burdens both income-strapped families
and impoverished municipalities. If New Jersey is to make real progress on reducing the
systemic poverty that traps far too many of our residents, the entire state must recognize and
respond to this crisis. This means promoting family financial success through supportive
work/family policies, adjusting the allocation of municipal budget State aid and support
programming so that it prioritizes areas of concentrated need, and reimagining the fundamental
structure of New Jersey’s property tax system.
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INTRODUCTION
This report offers a new lens for examining the challenges of concentrated poverty; it
seeks to explore the concentration of poverty at the local level and examine how its
compounding costs are trapping citizens and municipalities in a cycle of perpetual economic
struggle. Through micro-examination of budgetary expenses in select New Jersey municipalities,
the consequences of concentrated poverty in urban municipalities will be explored, revealing the
growing scarcity in resources available to fight poverty at the local level.
This report comes at an opportune time in the State of New Jersey given the recent
proclaimed legislative focus on poverty. Through hearings and legislative proposals, leaders in
Trenton have declared the priority of responding to New Jersey’s poverty epidemic. This strong
commitment to implementing real solutions creates a new opportunity to advance positive
systemic change based on careful analysis of the current problem. Ultimately, this report will
show the correlation between concentrated poverty and budget distress — and how imbalanced
property tax policy, declining — municipal State aid, and deep cuts to State and federal grant
programming leaves poverty-stricken communities without the necessary resources to properly
sustain their own operations or to break the hold of persistent poverty on their residents.
This report is organized into two research sections, followed by recommendations for
action. The first research section reviews related literary resources that provide a historical,
sociological, and policy background for what is already known about the broad-reaching
negative consequences of concentrated poverty. We will highlight both historical and more
recent poverty alleviation efforts and the lasting effects that living in poverty has on individuals
and families, with a special focus on children. This review will serve as a context for examining
the specific challenges being faced by four of New Jersey’s impacted cities.
The second section presents new primary research focused on the local costs of poverty
on the municipal level, with a primary concentration on four select New Jersey municipalities:
Bridgeton, Passaic, Perth Amboy, and Trenton. Each municipality has significant issues with
concentrated poverty and will be compared to a representative of sample of other New Jersey
municipalities. Through this review, we will supplement existing research with a new
perspective on the way that concentrated poverty is perpetuated by a self-reinforcing system of
inadequate resources.
Lastly, the final sections of this report will offer poverty alleviation recommendations,
considering policy changes that can positively impact low-income residents, and stop the selfperpetuating cycle of persistent poverty that currently creates a drag on the well-being of our
entire State.
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SECTION ONE:
LITERATURE REVIEW: A HISTORY OF POVERTY POLICY AND IMPACT
The examination of the social and economic consequences of concentrated poverty in this
report grows from a broad and informative body of research about the dynamics, sources, and
solutions for poverty in the United States. While this project endeavors to present a new
mechanism of analysis that can help to focus attention on specific steps that New Jersey and its
localities can take toward reducing the harmful effects of poverty, we must first examine what is
already known.
Existing research provides a foundation for understanding the full scope of poverty and
the limitations of existing measures to encompass that scope. It provides sobering evidence of
the long-term consequences of concentrated and persistent poverty, not only for children who
suffer deprivation but for adults as well. Historical analysis also allows us to consider the
policies and investments that have been attempted, to examine their success or failure, and to
consider how these lessons can inform our efforts to affect change.
POVERTY DEFINITION, POVERTY MEASUREMENTS:
CALCULATIONS AND PROBLEMS
A comprehensive definition of poverty must recognize the role that financial resources
play in determining life outcomes. Common usage generally relates to some level of material
deprivation, but a full description of the costs of poverty encompasses much more. The United
Nations definition of poverty offers such a description:
Poverty is a denial of choices and opportunities, a violation of human
dignity. It means lack of basic capacity to participate effectively in
society. It means not having enough to feed and clothe a family, not
having a school or clinic to go to, not having access to credit. It means
insecurity, powerlessness and exclusion of individuals, households and
communities. It means susceptibility to violence, and it often implies
living on marginal or fragile environments, without access to clean water
or sanitation (Gordon, 2005).
This definition applies just as clearly to areas of concentrated poverty in New Jersey as it
does to global poverty because it draws the vital connection between having the resources
to meet basic needs and access to security and opportunity.
In contrast, the technical definition of poverty that is used to calculate official poverty
estimates is much further removed from the human significance of poverty. The United States’
original poverty thresholds were developed between 1963 and 1964 by Mollie Orshansky, an
economist working for the Social Security Administration (Fisher, 1992). This formula used data
on spending patterns of low-income families in the 1960’s, an era during which food costs
typically made up about one third of poor household budgets. While the relative cost of food is
now nowhere near this ratio, the old formula has only been updated for inflation, and as a result
the federal poverty threshold no longer provides an accurate measure of economic deprivation,
especially in high-cost New Jersey. Increases particularly in the cost of housing, healthcare, and
9

childcare as a share of low-income household budgets have made the historic formula inadequate
to measure true need.
In response to the concerns of the poverty threshold’s accuracy the U.S. Census Bureau
and Bureau of Labor Statistics recently introduced the Supplemental Poverty Measure (SPM),
based on suggestions from the Interagency Technical Working Group (Kimberlin, 2013). The
SPM thresholds are more reflective of economic realities for poor families. They include all
individuals living in a household including foster children, apply adjustments based upon
geographical determinants such as housing costs, and consider the sum of cash and noncash
income. These modifications allow the SPM to address some of the disparities of the initial
thresholds, and both higher real poverty, as well as the positive impact of safety net programs.
Because the SPM is not used to calculate official poverty thresholds (Kimberlin, 2013), this more
accurate reflection of the truth of poverty in not widely understood.
POVERTY IN THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Understanding the way poverty is calculated is important to understanding the breadth of
true poverty in New Jersey. While the State’s official poverty rate leveled off at just above 11%
in 2014, this threshold only captures those facing the most severe economic deprivations. Using
a more accurate measure of true poverty (250% of the federal poverty level, or an income of
about $50,000/year for a family of three) in 2014 there were 2.8 million New Jerseyans living in
true poverty; 800,000 were children (Legal Services of New Jersey, 2015).
New Jersey’s high costs relative to the poverty
threshold are not merely an academic matter; those costs have
consequences for families’ abilities to support themselves.
According to the National Low Income Housing Coalition, in
2015 a NJ resident who earned minimum wage would have to
work 100 hours per week to afford a one-bedroom apartment
at fair market rent (National Low Income Housing Coalition,
2015). Clearly, the cost of living within the State is too high
for low-income families to afford to reside here without any
assistance.

In 2015, a NJ resident
who earned minimum
wage would have to
work 100 hours per
week to afford a onebedroom apartment at
fair market rent.

The mismatch between New Jersey’s cost of living
and the realities of poverty is particularly critical for children.
According to the Children’s Defense Fund, in 2014 “15.9% of New Jersey’s children lived in
poverty placing New Jersey 15th in child poverty among [all] states.” (Children’s Defense Fund,
2015). Although this ranking means that more than two thirds of U.S. states have higher rates of
child poverty, the data must be read in reference to New Jersey’s high costs, which exclude the
majority of the 800,000 children that fall within the more accurate true poverty measure.
Moreover, considering that, during the same year New Jersey tied with Washington, DC in first
place for the nation’s richest states/territory (Forbes, 2014), child poverty is also out of balance
with the resources in our State. These statistics show the intersecting problems of poverty and
inequality. There are numerous resources within the State that must be used to address these
issues so a more equitable State can be created for all New Jersey residents. The urgency of a
new course of action can be understood by turning to research on the costs of poverty.
10

THE COST OF POVERTY
LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF CHILDHOOD EXPERIENCES OF POVERTY
There are lasting consequences for those who encounter poverty in childhood. When
families experience limited financial resources and greater stress, young children spend less time
engaged in important developmental activities, like reading and speaking with adults (The Future
of Children, 2014). In fact, income-related gaps in cognitive skills can be observed in babies as
early as 9 months old and often widen with age (Halle et al., 2009).
Such early differences create disadvantages for impoverished children that are often hard
to overcome. When children experience frequent and prolonged adversity – by living in poverty,
with chronic hunger and possibly exposure to violence – the cognitive effects can be profound,
frequently leading to social incompetency and decreased educational achievement. As adults,
these children of poverty are more likely to have unstable employment, live in poverty and be
involved with the criminal justice system (Brooks-Gunn & Duncan, 1997).
In general, the experience of childhood poverty correlates strongly with poverty in
adulthood. For children who were never poor, only 1 percent spend half their adult years living
in poverty, while 32 percent of persistently poor children spend half their adult years living in
poverty. Furthermore, only one third of persistently poor boys and half of poor girls have
consistent employment in adulthood (McKernan & Katcliffe, 2010).
Poverty has real costs to society, both socially
and economically. Simply put, children who live in
poverty are prone to become less productive adults. This
loss of productivity, as well as the accompanying
increased costs of crime, unstable housing, and
healthcare, carries a high price tag. Researchers have
estimated that the cumulative effects of child poverty add
up to approximately half a trillion dollars a year in the
United States (Holzer et al., 2007). Moreover, these costs
reflect only financial losses and expenses. They do not
calculate the numerous societal gifts that were lost due to
poverty’s constraints on the fulfillment of childhood
potential (Children’s Defense Fund, 2015).
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Simply put, children who
live in poverty are prone to
become less productive
adults.
And that has a real cost for
society – about half a
trillion dollars a year in the
United States are lost.

CONCENTRATED POVERTY AND BARRIERS TO ESCAPING POVERTY
The long-term consequences of individual and family poverty are amplified by the
experience of concentrated poverty. Concentrated poverty consists of poor populations clustered
together in very poor communities, rather than living dispersed throughout the larger population
in mixed-income neighborhoods. These areas of “concentrated poverty place additional burdens
on poor families that live within them beyond what the families’ own individual circumstances
would dictate” (The Federal Reserve System & The Brookings Institute, 2008). In the U.S. “the
number of people living in high-poverty ghettos, barrios, and slums has nearly doubled since
2000, rising from 7.2 million to 15.8 million” (Jargowsky, 2015). This shift in poverty also
affects New Jersey which currently has an increasing number of citizens who experience poverty
(Legal Services of New Jersey, 2015).
Given the strong negative impacts of poverty on life chances, there are clear societal
benefits for families, and particularly for children, to have the opportunity to move out of
poverty. However, structural factors often restrict the options available to families with lowincomes.
The common American ideology of pulling one’s self up by his/her bootstraps is not the
reality of many residents. Working hard is no guarantee of even making ends meet, much less
making economic progress. Only 4 percent of those raised
in the bottom quintile (the poorest 20 percent of the
population) make it all the way to the top quintile as adults
A remarkable 66 percent
(The Pew Charitable Trusts, 2012). In fact, forty-three
of those raised at the
percent of Americans raised in the bottom quintile remain
bottom of the wealth
stuck in the bottom as adults; 66 percent of those raised at
ladder remain on the
the bottom of the wealth ladder remain on the bottom two
bottom two rungs
rungs throughout their lives, and 66 percent of those raised
throughout their lives.
at the top of the wealth ladder remain on the top two rungs,
confirming that there are significant barriers to economic
mobility.
It is critical to note here that there are racial differences in financial mobility that are
especially concerning. Race does affect one’s ability to transcend upward mobility limitations.
An astounding 53 percent of Blacks raised in the bottom family income group remain stuck there
throughout their lifetime, whereas only 33 percent of Whites remain stuck in the bottom family
income group like their parents. For family income, a majority of all Americans exceed their
parents; however, Blacks have lower absolute mobility gains than Whites (The Pew Charitable
Trusts, 2012).
Looking past the basic trends to the barriers that prevent income mobility, the cost of
housing emerges as a clear systemic barrier. Housing is the leading contributor to childhood
poverty rates. The number of children living in low-income families who spent an unsustainable
amount of their wages on housing costs increased 11 percent between 2009 and 2013. In 2013,
82 percent of low-income New Jersey families with children spent more than the federallyrecommended 30 percent of income on housing. This leaves less for other-necessities, such as
food, healthcare, clothing or transportation (Advocates for Children of New Jersey, 2015).
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Highly priced housing markets make it difficult for low-income families to find good
housing within their budget. This economic reality forces those with the fewest resources into the
areas with the most affordable housing, which is often located in low-opportunity neighborhoods
of concentrated poverty. These neighborhoods are characterized by high crime rates, poor
physical infrastructure and services, and environmental hazards (Nilsen, 2007). These conditions
have serious consequences for the children and families who live in these communities and such
consequences affect child development and stability in adulthood.
In the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) experiment, sponsored by the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development, a randomized experiment provided families with housing
vouchers to move out of concentrated poverty areas. Researchers found that children who moved
to low-poverty communities and were exposed to these neighborhoods at a younger age were
more-likely to have positive outcomes such as attending college, earning more as adults, and
having stable families compared to children who remained in concentrated poverty areas (Chetty,
Hendren, & Katz, 2015).
Just as the limitations of concentrated poverty have lifelong consequences for children,
the opportunity to escape concentrated poverty also impacts life chances. This opportunity,
however, is limited by additional factors beyond poverty and high housing costs. Other basic
necessities like transportation and healthcare are also
unreachable for many citizens (Center for the Study of
Social Policy, 2014). In particular, a lack of reliable
Basic necessities – like
transportation appears to be a vital factor in social
housing, transportation,
mobility. Studies have shown that sufficient access to
quality education and
public transportation, as well as limited commute times,
healthcare – are simply
are key factors in the odds of a person escaping poverty
unreachable for many
(Chetty et al., 2014; Kaufman et al., 2014). Furthermore, in
citizens.
spite of numerous gains in healthcare, approximately 1 in 4
poor or near-poor persons still lack health insurance
(Martinez 2015). This lack of coverage affects the ability
to seek preventive care and treatment and to maintain good
health, which has consequences for employability.
POVERTY IN RURAL AREAS
Rural poverty has become geographically concentrated in the same way that urban
poverty is confined by neighborhoods (Nadel & Sagawa, 2002). For this reason Bridgeton, NJ is
included as a case study city in this report. With an industrial and agrarian history, Bridgeton is
characterized by about 4,000 persons per square mile, making it the most rural municipality
included in this study (US Census, 2010).
According to one estimate, there are more than 6 million rural Americans living in
poverty, including approximately 1.5 million children (O’Brien, (2015), and they face the same
adverse reality of living in communities that lack the adequate resources to provide them with
their basic needs.
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The strong economy of the 1990s helped produce more jobs in these rural communities,
but the wages from these jobs were simply not enough to pull families out of poverty. Since
1995, the average income of the wealthier rural families has increased greatly while the income
of the poorest rural families has stagnated (Nadel & Sagawa, 2002).
In fact, child poverty has become a greater issue in rural America than in urban
communities. Throughout the nation there are 200 persistently poor counties, 195 of these
counties are rural with poverty rates often exceeding 35 percent. The dynamics of poverty are
different in rural and urban areas; however, the effects look similar. Notably, rural poverty
disproportionately affects children of color and children of single parents (Nadel & Sagawa,
2002).
POLICY RESPONSES: THE IMPACT OF PROVEN INVESTMENTS
THE WAR ON POVERTY
In 1964 former President Lyndon B. Johnson declared the war on poverty via a series of
legislative efforts designed to create social programs that would support the United States’
substantial number of families in need. During this time, 17.3 percent of the nation’s population
lived in poverty. The 1964 Economic Report of the President outlined the goals of the effort,
including not only direct assistance programs, but also development programs aimed at
increasing opportunity:
maintaining high employment, accelerating economic growth, fighting
discrimination, improving regional economies, rehabilitating urban and rural
communities, improving labor markets, expanding educational opportunities,
enlarging job opportunities for youth, improving the Nation’s health, promoting
adult education and training, and assisting the aged and disabled (Council of
Economic Advisers, 2014).
Among the programs that were created or made permanent under this initiative, and which
remain intact today, are Medicaid, Food Stamps, Head Start, Job Corps, Volunteers in Service to
America, Legal Services, and Child-nutrition programs (House Budget Committee Majority
Staff, 2014).
Today, many of the previously established programs have been expanded, and currently
there are 92 federal anti-poverty programs that address citizens’ basic needs ranging from food
assistance, to Medicaid, education and housing costs (House Budget Committee Majority Staff,
2014). However, in fiscal year 2016 federal budgetary aid dropped significantly for low-income
programs, healthcare aside, and is projected to drop to its lowest level in over 40 years (Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2016). Without the continuous support of social programs from
our policymakers on the national level, as well as in the State of New Jersey, the resources that
have provided aid to numerous families will continue to lose capacity relative to need. The
scarcity in resources will deter meeting the needs for citizens’ survival especially in urban
municipalities where poverty’s prevalence has a negative effect on residents. Continued
14

investment in these programs is key, not only in meeting basic human needs but also in
increasing the productivity of society.
Although poverty alleviation efforts have not eradicated poverty in the nation, these
programs have substantially reduced the epidemic. Not only is this assistance to families and
individuals in need essential to their wellbeing and livelihood, it also decreases the number of
individuals living in abject poverty. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
“without any government income assistance, either from safety net programs or other income
supports like Social Security, the [nation’s] poverty rate would have been 28.1 percent in 2013,
nearly double the actual 15.5 percent” (House Budget Majority Staff, 2014).
Furthermore, there is ample evidence that these anti-poverty efforts work. For example,
early childhood education programs appear to yield higher
rates of high school graduation and college attendance
among low-income children (Campbell et al, 2002), as well
There is ample
as higher adult earnings and fewer crimes (Schweinhart et al
evidence that anti2005). Additionally, the EITC has been credited with
poverty efforts work.
promoting employment among single mothers (Meyer &
Rosenbaum, 2000) and lifting nearly 2.6 million children
from poverty in a single year (Sherman 2009). Medicaid in
childhood has also been linked with fewer hospitalization or
emergency room visits in adulthood (Wherry et al 2015).
CHILD POVERTY AND THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET
Perhaps the most effective policy tools for reducing the cumulative negative effects of
poverty are programs specifically targeted to reducing child poverty. There are currently a
number of support systems and safety net programs in place that help millions of children every
year. These programs provide vital assistance, although they are not sufficient in isolation to
remediate all of the disadvantages of concentrated poverty. Childcare assistance and the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) are beneficial to working parents; programs like nutrition and housing
assistance help to ensure children have food to eat and a place to live even when families face
income constraints.
Overall, children from families receiving income boosts from the EITC or similar
programs have been found to have better birth outcomes, higher test scores, higher graduation
rates and higher college attendance (Children’s Defense Fund, 2015). Such outcomes translate
into increased economic security later in life. For example, one study found that by eliminating
child poverty amongst our youngest citizens would increase lifetime earnings between $53,000
and $100,000 per child, for a total lifetime benefit of $20 to $36 billion for this population
(Duncan et al, 2008).
Similarly, another study found that young children in low-income families that received
an additional $3,000 dollars a year went on to earn about17 percent more as adults, as compared
to similar children whose families did not receive the added income (Duncan et al, 2010).
Additional studies of the federal nutrition programs found that children in poverty who received
food assistance before age 5 were in better health as adults and were more likely to complete
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more schooling, earn more money, and not rely on a safety net programs as adults (Sherman et
al, 2014). Furthermore, one study demonstrated that expansion of Medicaid and the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program, not only lessened the EITC payments to families, but also
yielded higher wages and greater tax contributions later in life (Brown et al, 2015. Thus,
assistance to families with young children, not only provides children with a great foundation, it
alters their course of life, and increases their earnings over their lifetimes. This ultimately puts
less strain on public resources and breaks the cycle of potential inter-generational poverty.
Yet, the number of individuals and families who can benefit from safety net programs has
been affected by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PRWORA) of 1996,
which created the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program under the banner
of welfare reform. Among the changes created to the nation’s welfare program were new
program elements that combined financial incentives and sanction policies designed to
emphasize work, mandatory work-related activities, time limits on cash-assistance benefits, and
increased availability of childcare subsidies (Loprest, Schmidt, and Witte, 2000). Under the
regulations of PRWORA the number of families who could receive some form of public service
assistance increased, however the amount of families who qualified for direct cash assistance
decreased (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2006).
Since poverty continues to persist within in the State, funding for programs to aid
families in meeting their needs is essential. According to the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities aid has decreased: “Under TANF the cash assistance safety net has weakened.”
Between December 2006 and December 2014 the number of NJ families with children living in
poverty that received (TANF) decreased by 13%, although the need for this assistance persists.
The decreases of TANF have provided fewer resources for children of all races; however 8 out of
10 children who live in families that receive this assistance are Black or Hispanic (Castro, 2016),
demonstrating the disproportionate impact of disinvestment in the TANF program. The decrease
in participation is not a reflection of declining need, however, the number of families receiving
Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP) increased by 132%, during the same
timeframe. This correlation shows that when poverty is not addressed at the level of basic
income, the State is forced to deal with the consequences of poverty (such as hunger) which
leads to spending in other areas (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 2015).
Considering the financial strain that is placed upon resources when poverty is addressed
retroactively at the diverse points of need created by low-incomes, it is important to note that
“investing significant resources in poverty reduction might be more cost-effective over time”
Duncan, Holzer, Ludwig, Schanzenbach, & Whitemore, (2007).
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THE CHALLENGE IN THE CURRENT CONTEXT:
BREAKING THE CYCLE OF PERSISTENT POVERTY
In 2016 the poverty guideline for a family of four is just $24,300 in total annual income.
The most recent Census data (2014) estimates that about 316,000 New Jersey children lived
below the official poverty line, of whom about 44 percent (139,000 children) lived in extreme
poverty, meaning their families were earning less than half the posted poverty threshold. Child
poverty in New Jersey remains 34 percent higher than the prerecession levels in 2017, despite
several years of recovery in the broader economy (Castro, 2016).
This persistent, ever growing trend of child poverty raises the question of what needs to
be done beyond or within the existing safety net system. In answering that question, we need to
consider both causes and consequences of poverty. Childhood poverty derives most directly from
the financial status of parents. Poor parents have fewer financial resources and often experience
more stress than their non-poor counterparts. Parental stress and limited financial resources
directly affects the development of children (Children’s Defense Fund, 2015). In addition,
children who live in homes where food is limited also struggle. In 2013, more than 45 percent of
poor children lived in homes with a food shortage, meaning not everyone had enough food to eat
(Coleman-Jensen et al, 2013). Food insecurity is associated with lower reading and math scores,
greater incidence of emotional and behavioral problems, more health problems, and a higher
chance of obesity (Cook and Jeng, 2009).
TRANSIENT V.S. CHRONIC/PERSISTENT POVERTY
People who experience poverty consistently over a period of time (cumulative or chronic
poverty) are more susceptible to experiencing the negative effects of being poor. Chronic poverty
has more adverse effects on children than transient poverty in regards to physical health, mental
health, educational outcomes, and cognitive and developmental deficits (Kimberlin, 2013).
Most children in the US, approximately 63 percent, enter adulthood without ever
experiencing poverty. This means that an average of 37 percent of children live in poverty at
some point in their lives; these children either cycle into and out of poverty one or more times, or
they live in persistent poverty. A child is considered to live in persistent poverty if they have
been poor for more than 9 years of their childhood. This is most likely for children who are born
poor. Thirteen percent of all children (8 percent of White children, and 40 percent of Black
children are poor at birth). Status at birth strongly predicts future poverty status; children who are
born into poverty have substantially higher poverty rates at all ages than children who are not
born into poverty. Among children who are poor at birth, roughly 40 to 60 percent are poor each
year of their childhood (McKernan & Ratcliffe, 2010).
Children who are poor at birth are significantly more likely to be poor as an adult, drop
out of high school, and have a teen non-marital birth than those who are not poor at birth. While
4 percent of individuals in non-poor families at birth go on to spend at least half their early adult
years living in poverty that proportion rises to 21 percent for those born in poor families.
Similarly, 7 percent of individuals who are not poor at birth lack high school diplomas, whereas
22 percent of individuals who are poor at birth lack high school diplomas. In addition, the
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likelihood of having a teen non-marital birth is three times as likely for women who are poor
versus not poor at birth (McKernan & Ratcliffe, 2010).
The challenge that these facts pose for social policy is the challenge of a self-reinforcing
cycle. We know the tremendous costs – both individual and societal – of growing up poor. We
know that these costly consequences are reinforced by
persistent poverty, as opposed to an episode of poverty
with limited duration. We know that concentrated
The challenge that these
poverty reinforces persistent poverty because of the
facts pose for social policy
barriers present in low-opportunity, high-poverty
is the challenge of a selfneighborhoods. We also know that investments in proven
reinforcing cycle.
safety net programs can make a difference in reducing
poverty, but also that these impacts tend to be limited to
raising families above the low federal poverty threshold
rather than into self-sufficiency, and that many families
cycle in and out of poverty.
As New Jersey grapples with how to best direct our efforts to alleviate poverty, we need
to seriously address the dynamics of concentrated poverty. Poverty at the individual level cannot
be separated from the larger social environment, and the perpetuating influences that operate in
areas with high rates of poverty and multiple barriers cannot be ignored. As the State moves to
address poverty with a concerted legislative agenda, that effort must be informed by the lessons
we can learn from New Jersey’s challenged cities – the places where decades of limited resource
have led to concentrated poverty. This research offers a new rich data set from budgetary
analysis of our four NJUMA cities. We turn now to an examination of this information to guide
the discussion and ultimately explore policy options that have the potential to eradicate poverty
in New Jersey.

Poverty at the individual level cannot be separated from
the larger social environment, and the perpetuating
influences that operate in areas with high rates of
poverty and multiple barriers cannot be ignored.
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SECTION TWO:
THE COMPOUNDING COST OF POVERTY:
EXAMINING THE SPIRALING CYCLE OF CONCENT RATED POVERTY
THROUGH MUNICIPAL CA SE STUDIES
SECTION INTRODUCTION
For decades, the deck has been stacked against New Jersey’s cities in many significant ways.
The suite of issues is predominantly structural and does not reflect a deliberate ideology or
partisan interest. Put simply, the types of revenue available to urban areas in New Jersey have
either declined markedly (State and federal aid) or are derived in a way that may have worked
well for the cities of the early and mid-20th century, but not today (local property taxes). In the
same way that concentrated poverty contributes to multi-generational structural poverty for
individuals and families, that same concentrated poverty creates structural conditions for
municipalities that practically guarantees year after year of budget deficits, fiscal distress, and,
perhaps most surprisingly, an outsized property tax burden for residents. While poverty levels
and other relevant socioeconomic indicators would argue for significantly enhanced levels of
municipal spending in what may be broadly called social services, there is no budgetary
foundation for a correlation between the two. In fact, in several municipalities with low poverty
rates reviewed in this report, the proportion of municipal spending on social services is greater
than those with high poverty rates. In short, concentrations of need within a given municipality
do not translate into a concentration of municipal services, because high need tends to correlate
with budget constraints.

Methodological Note
A few major methodological decisions are worth stating at the outset. All figures are inflation
adjusted to be in 2015 dollars, unless otherwise noted. For historical comparisons, an
approximate equalized value was calculated based on the common level ratio. The urban, dense
suburban, suburban, and rural classifications are derived from American Community Survey
population data from the 2010-2014 5-year Estimates data and the land area of each
municipality—i.e., population density. American Community Survey statistics cited come from
the 2010-2014 5-year Estimates data set in order to correct for annual fluctuations as much as
possible and to provide the most complete dataset (corresponding data from 1-year and 3-year
Estimates are often not available).
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This report reviews the “cost of poverty” in four New Jersey cities: Bridgeton, Passaic, Perth
Amboy, and Trenton, located in the Counties of Cumberland, Passaic, Middlesex, and Mercer,
respectively. With the exception of Cumberland County, which is among the most rural counties
in a highly urbanized state, each of these counties possesses highly diversified land use,
landscape, industrial, commercial, and residential development.2 To complement our study of
these four cities, we have chosen a handful of “peer communities” and several other New Jersey
communities along a spectrum of urban typologies developed according to population density
and wealth:
Figure 1: Table of NJUMA cities and Comparison Municipalities3
Suburb – Tier 1 Suburb – Tier 2

County

NJUMA Cities

Peer Cities

Cumberland

Bridgeton*

Vineland

Upper Deerfield

Essex

Not part of study

Newark

Bloomfield

Essex Fells

Mercer

Trenton*

Hamilton &
Ewing*

West Windsor*

Middlesex

Perth Amboy*

New Brunswick

Woodbridge &
E. Brunswick

Metuchen*

Passaic

Passaic*

Paterson

Clifton*

Wayne*

The original research question of this study was to examine what poverty costs these cities had to
bear in comparison to those that have a less impoverished population; i.e., what poverty
alleviation services must be provided in these cities—and to what degree—that more affluent
communities do not need to provide? The sad reality is that poverty does not generate clear
proportional costs in municipal budgets. For the most part, the direct cost of poverty is not
factored into municipal budgets simply because it cannot be. While the indirect costs of poverty
are certainly significant, as discussed below, the actual amount of revenue that goes towards
fighting the effects of systemic poverty is remarkably low as a proportion of a municipal budget.
In each NJUMA city, between 34 and 49 percent of the cost of government relates to budget
lines not directly related to service delivery (e.g., debt, pension, healthcare, and reserves 4 -

2

Cumberland County, however, possesses three urbanized subdivisions: Bridgeton, Vineland, and Millville.
Starred municipalities (“*”) indicate their use for budget comparison, while unstarred municipalities were added to
the focused analysis of socioeconomic and demographic indicators. Tier 2 indicates a wealthier and less urbanized
suburb. It is helpful to think of a geographic progression from the central city outward. In Passaic County for
example, it is very common for a family to be able to trace its roots to Paterson or Passaic in the early 20 th Century,
Clifton in the mid-20th Century, and Wayne at the end of it.
4
It is oversimplifying to entirely divorce pensions and healthcare costs from service delivery because these costs
are a valid element of the cost of having any workforce. Debt, too, often stems from a capital investment (though
there are ever more debt issues for non-capital items, such as meeting budget deficits or funding pensions).
However, from the lens of examining extra services required by a high-poverty community, these expenses do not
translate to additional poverty alleviation services.
3
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reflected below as “Non-Departmental” spending). And, in each case, public safety and public
works account for between 70 and 78 percent of budgeted service-related costs:
Figure 2: Share of Budget Appropriation by Major Category (2014)5

34%

20%

47%

Bridgeton

37%
48%

49%

15%

14%

37%

36%

Perth Amboy

Trenton

14%

49%

Passaic

Public Safety + Public Works

Other Departmental Services

Non-Departmental

***
Once again, the higher need for services necessitated by the generally lower socioeconomic
profile of city residents does not materially translate into more municipal services to meet that
need. That is, if we tried to quantify this correlation by calculating a ratio of need to service
expenditures, the service cost will not correlate closely to the amount of need. Quite the
opposite: those cities whose poverty profile suggests a high level of need would have a relatively
low ratio of need to expenditure.
A useful analogue that we will return to throughout this study is the State’s school funding
formula defined by the School Funding Reform Act (“SFRA”), which can help us understand
this relationship conceptually. After approximately three decades of litigation commonly
identified by the Abbott v. Burke cases, SFRA was enacted in 2008 as a mechanism to ensure
that the State could fulfill its constitutional requirement to “provide for the maintenance and
support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of all the
children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years.”6 While two of SFRA’s
5

Unless otherwise noted, all budget figures represent the actual amount paid out, not the amount budgeted. In basic
terms, “Departmental” spending includes spending related to the delivery of services (police, fire, sanitation,
recreation, etc.) and “Non-Departmental” includes items such as debt, pension, and healthcare benefits. For a
breakdown of what lines lie within each category, see Appendix II, “Departmental v. Non-Departmental Spending
Per Capita in NJUMA cities.” Grants are excluded from this calculation as they are always, according to State
regulations, entirely offset by revenues and thus are not paid for by property taxes, general State aid, or other local
revenues. However, as will be discussed below, the loss of grant funding often translates to programming now
needing support from non-grant revenues and, at that time, causing a negative budget impact.
6
New Jersey State Constitution of 1947. Article VIII, Section IV, paragraph 2 amended effective December 4,
1958.
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primary variables attempt to correct for discrepancies in a local school district’s revenue
potential by calculating a “local share,” essentially represented by equalized assessed property
values and income, significant added weight is given to students with special needs, those
learning English, and those students eligible for free and reduced price lunch. That is, SFRA
does not just attempt to correct for disparities in a school district’s ability to fund education, but
also seeks to mitigate the adverse circumstances that students in those districts might find
themselves in. This is expressed in an “adequacy budget.”
Municipalities do receive two major categories of formula-derived State-aid payments,
Consolidated Municipal Property Tax Relief Aid (“CMPTRA”) and disbursements from the
Energy Receipts tax. Like SFRA, funding has essentially flat-lined or diminished over the past
several years; but, unlike SFRA, the formula does not derive from a specific constitutional—and,
later, judicial—mandate; accordingly, there is no clear analogue to an “adequacy budget” for
municipalities.
Following the example of the SFRA’s adequacy budgeting, the best way to approach the
challenge that poverty poses for municipal budgets is through revenue, as opposed to expenses.
So, we ask: “how much and what kind of revenue is allocated for poverty alleviation services?”
The “what kind of” revenue question is particularly important in this instance. Municipal
healthcare services, which for the most part are a good proxy for the municipally-sponsored
programs that deal with poverty alleviation, are often funded by County, State, and federal
grants. These are, as we shall see, on the decline. Moreover, the other major pool of funds, local
property taxes and municipal State aid, are increasingly locked up by other needs—primarily,
public safety, public works, insurance, debt service, and legacy costs.
Of course, the decline in the revenue share allocated for these services is not due to a
corresponding decline in need; in many cases, poverty has remained stagnant in urban centers for
decades and, in some cases, grew after the Great Recession and never quite recovered.
As a result of this imbalance between need and
expenditure on responsive services, the
fundamental question that this study will probe
is not so much the cost of poverty, but why
these four cities cannot meet that cost.

The fundamental question that this
study will probe is not so much the
cost of poverty, but why these four
cities cannot meet that cost.

To simplify the answer that will be
demonstrated in full below, a combination of
declining State and federal aid revenues paired
with an otherwise property tax-dependent
revenue cycle makes keeping up with the fundamental costs of government an incredible
challenge. This relationship “crowds out” available funds for the programs that tend to do the
most to alleviate poverty: social services, healthcare, recreation, and, economic development.7
And, because the local revenue system in New Jersey is almost entirely dependent on the

7

Education is also clearly one of the single most important poverty alleviation programs, but school spending in
New Jersey is funded through a separate budget process and, therefore, falls outside of the scope of this research and
analysis.
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taxation of real property—which concentrated poverty, by definition, significantly curtails—
revenue cannot be raised to meet expenses.8
While this phenomenon is not restricted to New Jersey’s cities and the four NJUMA cities, it is
certainly most acute in urban areas — particularly the most impoverished. Indeed, almost every
municipality is dealing with the same “crowding out” of revenues, to a greater or lesser extent.
However, over the decades, the cities’ reliance on a generally increasing pot of State and federal
aid, and their declining ability to rely on revenue generated from local property taxes, made the
effect of this phenomenon much different—and worse—than in suburban areas.9
Understanding the relative decline in value of the property tax base in New Jersey cities is a key
part of understanding this more global phenomenon. In cities, the proportion of residential to
non-residential property has declined drastically since the end of World War II and even more so
in the last several decades (i.e., there are more residential properties and fewer industrial and
commercial ones).10 On the other side, however, the commercial and industrial functions once
almost exclusively contained in cities have moved on to the suburbs—and, increasingly even
further out into rural areas (think of the giant pharmaceutical complexes in Hunterdon County,
for example or the telecommunications hubs in Monmouth and Somerset Counties, an
impossibility 100 years ago). Moreover, several of New Jersey’s urban centers have declined in
population since the mid-20th Century and, even in cities that have not experienced significant
population decline (e.g., Paterson), the remaining population possesses far less wealth both
personally and as expressed in real estate, further diminishing their ability raise property tax
revenue.11 This relocation of commercial and industrial interests, as well as household wealth,
has upset the fiscal balance on which New Jersey’s cities were originally built.
Cities, as will be discussed in detail below, have a unique set of costs. One of the most important
of these, and useful for illustrative purposes, are paid fire departments and their associated legacy
costs (pension, healthcare, and other post-employment benefits).12 These municipal services are
absolutely essential to public health and safety in urban areas, with their large buildings and
dense populations that create greater fire risk and require professional firefighters to fight more
complicated fires and prevent spread between closely packed buildings.
8

There is a basic distinction in taxation between real and personal property. When “property taxes” are referenced
in New Jersey, we almost exclusively mean the taxation of real property—i.e., homes, stores, factories, and so forth.
Except in a few very limited circumstances that only apply to certain large businesses (e.g., oil refineries), personal
property, which, in the most basic terms, is movable property, is not taxed in New Jersey.
9
In New Jersey, the classification of “rural” areas is complicated and, certainly, even an expansive definition of
rural would still be limited in its application when compared to other states. Many of the communities in New Jersey
that New Jerseyans might call rural do not meet the federal definition or what people in other parts of the country
would understand as rural. For example, the most rural county in Pennsylvania, Cameron, has a population density
about 15-times less than New Jersey’s most rural county, Salem. In addition, almost all communities in New Jersey
are within an hour and a half drive to two of the largest cities in the United States, unlike most rural areas in other
states. Cameron County, by contrast, is about a 3-hour drive from the nearest major metropolitan area, Pittsburgh.
10
See Figure 46, “Residential Property as % of Total Property Value.”
11
See Figure 47, “Change in Property Value (1968-2014).”
12
It is also worth noting that the existence of these professional jobs, and the retirement security they offer, can
represent stable middle class job opportunities, which are often scarce in struggling cities. Thus, the cost they
represent must be balanced with the boost they also provide to the local economy. However, there is an increasing
trend for the better paying municipal public sector jobs—particularly in police and fire—to be held by non-city
residents, mitigating this impact.
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The problem comes from the erosion of the funding base to support this legitimate need. With
current and legacy costs considered, a paid fire department can cost a city 15-25 percent of its
budget. This is a cost that is simply not incurred by the majority of suburban and exurban
communities. The nature of the urban landscape inevitably creates more service-intensive need.
Not only the fire department, but also large public works and inspections department are needed
to manage the proliferation of tall and large buildings (often former industrial or commercial
spaces), particularly when they become shelters for the homeless population, which is itself
highly concentrated in these same communities.
Why this is such a useful example is that it demonstrates a key relationship: the need remains,
but the funding source has not. In the middle of the 20th century, the fire department was “paid”
by a property tax, which was buttressed by the many industrial and commercial enterprises in
their host cities that demanded a professional fire department to keep their businesses viable. But
as these enterprises left, taking their assessed values with them, the cost of the need for
professional fire protection, did not follow the businesses out proportionally. In cities, the
majority of the buildings that once held large businesses remain, often becoming more hazardous
over time, and so the need remains. Moreover, as abandoned buildings become places of shelter
for the homeless as conventional facilities are shuttered or “centralized” in a location some
distance away from the municipality, police officers and firefighters are exposed to hazardous
building conditions, such as decaying roofs and floors, when they need to enter these buildings.
Of course, the residents left holding the bag, have, over time, become the ones least capable of
paying. From the chart below, we can see that each NJUMA city has a municipal property tax
bill that ranks in the top 15 percent of the State, when ranked according to the amount of median
household income that residents pay towards property taxes.13
Figure 3: Municipal Property Tax as Percent of Median Household Income14
Municipality (County)
Passaic City (Passaic)
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
Trenton City (Mercer)
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
Clifton City (Passaic)
Wayne Township (Passaic)
Ewing Township (Mercer)
Metuchen Borough (Middlesex)
West Windsor Township (Mercer)

13

2014 Rank (of 565)
17%
1
9%
12
7%
30
5%
53
4%
117
3%
244
2%
356
2%
393
1%
473

The municipal property tax bill excludes property taxes for the school district, the county government, and,
special/fire districts; it includes municipal library and municipal open space taxes. “Rank” refers to the relative
position of an average household’s municipal tax burden when compared to the 564 other cities and towns in New
Jersey. For example, Passaic, which is ranked 1, has the highest burden in New Jersey, whereas West Windsor has
among the lowest.
14
Due to the unavailability of data and an attempt at uniformity, this analysis does not include the Homestead
Rebate, which is discussed below in greater detail.
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In addition, as cities developed to be the centers of the surrounding communities — and continue
to be today — many of the government, educational, media, and religious functions for a given
area are concentrated in cities. For the most part, these institutions do not pay property taxes.
When compared to their suburban peers, New Jersey cities far and away have more exempt
property (averaging around 27 percent). Recognizing that so many people from outside the cities
use these institutions, other states have instituted various other forms of taxation (such as
“commuter” or “local services” taxes). These do not exist in New Jersey and, once again, the
difference has to be made up by the local, and, often residential, taxpayer. Naturally the situation
is particularly acute in Trenton, New Jersey’s capital, which is 49 percent exempt. Neighboring
Ewing and nearby West Windsor, by contrast, are 24 percent and 6 percent exempt,
respectively.15 It is worth noting that only 1 percent of median household income in West
Windsor and 2 percent in Ewing go towards municipal property taxes, whereas 7 percent does in
Trenton.
As a final counterexample, the New Jersey school funding system provides an instructive guide.
In 31 districts, a series of policies16 has attempted to socialize the costs of a “thorough and
efficient system of public schools” across New Jersey’s broader tax base. As a result the property
tax burden for education in those 31 districts (including all four of the NJUMA cities) is quite
low; this is especially true when compared to municipal services, which, on a dollar for dollar
basis, are funded far less than the schools. An interesting counterfactual would be to ask: “what
if the New Jersey Constitution also guaranteed a ‘thorough and efficient’ system of public safety,
public works, and public health?”
Figure 4: Comparison of Rank of Property Tax as % of Median Household Income (of 565)17
Municipality (County)
Clifton City (Passaic)
Wayne Township (Passaic)
Metuchen Borough (Middlesex)
Passaic City (Passaic)
Ewing Township (Mercer)
West Windsor Township (Mercer)
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
Trenton City (Mercer)
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
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School Rank Municipal Rank
138
117
184
244
203
393
287
1
353
356
355
473
440
12
541
30
550
53

Ewing hosts the College of New Jersey.
Once again, consider the State Supreme Court decisions in the various Abbott v. Burke cases and their legislative
descendent the School Funding Reform Act of 2008. The Abbott cases established 31 “Abbott Districts,” which had
higher needs and lesser financial ability to meet them. While there are no longer Abbott Districts, those Districts that
were remain, by far, the Districts with the most State school aid and separated as a class into “School Development
Authority Districts.” The basic purpose of a School Development Authority District is to identify school districts
that are able to receive 100% of the costs of eligible school facilities construction and capital investment paid for by
the State and to have those projects undertaken by the State or its agents.
17
The definition of rank follows the definition above. Each rank is separate (i.e., the School Rank does not take into
account municipal spending and vice-versa). Here, school taxes include the District School Tax, the Regional and
Consolidated School Tax, and the Local School Tax.
16
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THE “POVERTY PRESSURES” ON NJUMA CITIES
AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF NJUMA CITIES:
BRIDGETON, PASSAIC, PERTH AMBOY, AND TRENTON
The New Jersey cities selected for this study have complex, powerful, illustrious, and unique
histories. At the same time, they share several key qualities among themselves and with all New
Jersey cities. It is worth offering a brief narrative account of some of these qualities and a very
cursory history of these cities and their context before jumping headlong into a complex analysis
of socioeconomic data and a series of useful indicators. We must understand enough about how
each city developed and why it developed in order to better grasp how it arrived at its current
position, including the historical forces (and policy decisions) that contributed to that position.
The most fundamental consideration that we should keep in mind during this discussion is that
the way cities are organized is often reflective of a political reality, business influence, or policy
directive of 100, 200, or even 300+ years ago. Moreover, the funding mechanisms for cities are
often based on the historically more even distribution of wealth among residents and the
presence of prosperous commercial and industrial concerns. Finally, the government funding
mechanism has become increasingly central to a city’s financial health, given the growing role of
government in providing the majority of social services to those in need — and the
corresponding decline in various charity services provided, primarily, by religiously-affiliated
medical, social, and recreational facilities.
Perhaps the first point to underscore is that all of these cities are, by American standards, almost
ancient. Perth Amboy, founded in 1683, was one of the most important cities in America during
the Colonial period and was a rival to New York City for several decades to claim the title of
America’s premiere commercial city; it was also capital of East Jersey, when New Jersey was
split into two colonial provinces, until 1702. Trenton famously played a key part in the American
Revolution and was temporarily the capital of a young United States; it was also considered as a
temporary and even a potential permanent capital city by the likes of Thomas Jefferson and
Alexander Hamilton. Bridgeton was at the center of Southern New Jersey’s early economy,
serving as a trading post for the region’s natural resource deposits (lumber and bog iron) and
early manufactured goods. Passaic was an early Dutch settlement, benefiting from its position on
a wide segment of the Passaic River after the Great Falls and the meeting of the Saddle River.
Moving forward in time to the 19th Century, each city began to build upon these foundations to
transform themselves into industrial powerhouses at the cutting edge of the contemporary
economy. Some of the qualities noted above—particularly location—were key contributors to
each city’s rapid industrial growth. In part because of each of these cities’ presence on vital
transportation networks, both natural and manmade, with access to two of America’s largest
markets (Philadelphia and New York) and international markets through well-developed ports,
they quickly started accumulating industries themselves. In addition, each city had ready access
to the most important natural resources in this era of industry: iron from Northern, Northwest,
and Southern New Jersey (Passaic benefited especially from the first two and Bridgeton the
latter) and coal from Northeastern Pennsylvania (which benefited Trenton especially).
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Trenton, for example, was a central stop on one of the largest and most advanced transportation
projects in early American industrial history, the Delaware and Raritan Canal, which allowed
goods to move with unprecedented ease between New York City and Philadelphia. Not
incidentally, the Delaware and Raritan Canal terminated in New Brunswick at a navigable point
of the Raritan River allowing goods to be moved by river to Perth Amboy to be processed and
shipped through the Raritan Bay to New York or other ports. Perth Amboy also holds the
distinction of being involved with the first major railroad project in the United States in the
1830s, which, in some ways, made obsolete the Delaware and Raritan Canal by offering a faster
and cheaper way to get goods to and from the New York and Philadelphia markets.18 Passaic
and Bridgeton also benefited from having access to train lines very early in their history, with
Passaic benefiting from Paterson’s early industrial preeminence and Bridgeton being on a line to
move both iron, lumber, and agricultural products to the Delaware River. Bridgeton also offered
regular steamboat service to Philadelphia and was uniquely connected to other cities and towns
in its region by the pioneering Bridgeton-Millville interurban system that emerged in the 1890s.
Trenton was an early national center in iron and steel (notably the Roebling family companies)
and grew in several aspects of heavy industry until the mid-20th century, including in iron,
rubber, steel products, machine tools, and, porcelain products. Perth Amboy, too, became a
center of heavy industry in steel, cars, and chemicals. Passaic, in part due to proximity to early
America’s premier industrial city, Paterson, grew into an industrial juggernaut in its own right.
While Paterson had silk, Passaic became a center of woolens in the late 19th Century, particularly
after an act of Congress made foreign imports far more costly. In fact, Passaic became the site of
one of the first foreign companies to open up operations in America: the German company
Botany opened a plant in 1890 that grew to 60 acres. Bridgeton emerged as a leader in iron
production, and, most notably, glass as the 19th Century wore on. It also came to be an
educational center in South Jersey with its West Jersey Academy, Ivy Hall Seminary, and South
Jersey Institute.
With this commercial and industrial preeminence, each city grew wealthy—often with
particularly tony enclaves (Berkley Square/Parkside in Trenton and around what is now
Veteran’s Memorial Park in Passaic). Great institutions were founded — theaters, museums,
music halls — which were, in turn, often supported by each city’s own set of leading citizens.
However, much of the wealth of each city was built on the backs of the sometimes-exploited
labor of European immigrants, members of the Great Migration, and immigrants from Mexico,
Central America, and South America. As the 20th Century continued, and especially after
successful initiatives by organized labor to raise wages and better working conditions, the middle
class grew — with the caveat that Whites saw a deeply disproportionate share of the gains.
The Deindustrialization that followed this era of prosperity is, perhaps, all too familiar, but it is
unfortunately the case in each city. Indeed, in some ways, New Jersey’s urban
deindustrialization was earlier and more acute than some of the well-known cases in places like
Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Chicago. First, as noted at the start of this section, each of these cities is
old. New Jersey, as will be discussed in greater detail below, in some ways suffered from a “first
mover” problem. Each city’s transportation systems, spatial organization, and the age of the
structures themselves often significantly exceed those of their Western and even Midwestern
peers. Moreover, the types of industry prevalent in each city often preceded Fordism and the
18

Though the line terminated in South Amboy, much of the processing occurred in Perth Amboy.
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incredible scale of 20th Century industry. Iron and steel offer a very useful example. As
mentioned above, the Roebling family companies in Trenton benefited from easy access to New
Jersey’s two iron fields and easy access to coal in Northeastern, Pennsylvania. However, coke
came to largely replace coal for steel making, with the bituminous coal of Southwestern,
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, and Ohio emerging as the major resource centers. The
Mesabi Range of the Northern United States eclipsed the fast-depleting fields in New Jersey and
were made highly accessible to the Midwest through rail investments and Great Lakes shipping
(often backed by companies associated with Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller). Until
its own decline later in the 20th Century, steel production in the Monongahela Valley,
Youngstown, Cleveland, and Chicago far outpaced production in New Jersey (though large steel
operations persisted for decades, with Perth Amboy only recently losing a major plant and
Sayreville maintaining one). The difference in scale is clear, with the former Trenton Roebling
site roughly .1 square miles while what is now the US Steel and ArcelorMittal complex just
outside of Chicago in Northwestern Indiana is 3.34 square miles.
In many instances around the United States, the decline of heavy industry did not lead to a oneway loss in a given city’s economy. In fact, many American cities successfully realigned
themselves in other sectors, broadly defined as the service sector. However, in New Jersey both
residents and businesses left at a greater scale and moved to the suburbs in greater numbers for a
host of reasons ranging from real estate prices, to the federal subsidy of the highway system
(which often cut through the heart of city neighborhoods); this will be explored in greater detail
below, particularly as it relates to government tax policy. Indeed, New Jersey may be the
national poster child for suburbanization—both for business and residents. The industries and
downtown department stores of Trenton and Passaic gave way to the office parks and shopping
malls of West Windsor and Wayne. Perhaps most unfortunately, as William Julius Wilson has
identified, the rollback of the most overtly discriminatory and racist practices such as redlining,
unfair lending practices, exclusion from labor unions, and exclusion from the better positions at
industrial/commercial concerns, corresponded with the flight of business and industry from the
cities, resulting in acute and debilitating spatial mismatch (i.e., the concentration of people who
need jobs the most primarily in places distant from commercial centers).
As will be seen below, these cities, which used to be relatively diverse according to income, race,
and ethnicity (or at least more in line with national trends), are much more homogeneous today.
For the most part, middle and higher income individuals, who were far more likely to be White,
left the cities. Poverty is now highly concentrated in cities — a phenomenon that is reinforced by
spatial mismatch. Because of the flight of higher wealth families and commercial/industrial
enterprises, the need to provide social services is more acute for those who remain, while, at the
same time, the ability to fund those services locally has diminished profoundly because of this
very same exodus.
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SOCIOECONOMIC PROFILES OF NJUMA CITIES WITHIN
THE CONTEXT OF NEW JERSEY’S MUNICIPALITIES
In the context of broader history and trends, we now turn to a more in depth look at the
contemporary socioeconomic profile of each of the NJUMA cities, as well as some
municipalities that are helpful for comparison purposes.19 The importance of this section lies in
defining two key variables that will underlie the subsequent budget analysis: the profile of
available local resources and the profile of local need. As we shall see, in the NJUMA cities
need far exceeds local resources, whereas the opposite case exists for the majority of suburban
communities in New Jersey. As the introduction illustrates, municipal budgets do not reflect an
ability to tackle these disproportionate service needs, as municipal funding for these services has
declined markedly. However, the following provides strong evidence that, regardless of current
spending patterns, the need exists in the NJUMA cities and their peers and that there are not
sufficient local resources to meet those needs (particularly within the structure of New Jersey
budget and tax law, as will be illustrated below). While some of the declining municipal funding
phenomenon can be accounted for by shifting the service provision to various higher levels of
government (County, State, and federal), as well as not-for-profit organizations, there are too
often declines in the quality of service and the true availability of the service even if a transfer is
successful.
To aid in our analysis, because a major theme of this report revolves around the distinction
between cities and suburbs, we have created four groupings of municipalities for comparative
purposes (in addition to the NJUMA cities): Urban, Dense Suburban, Suburban, and Rural.20

19

Unless otherwise noted, the data cited below comes from American Community Survey 2010-2014 5-year
Estimates.
20
These determinations were made according to population density figures from the 2010-2014 American
Community Survey. Municipalities with over 8,000 people per square mile are classified as “Urban.” Municipalities
with population densities between 7,999 and 5,000 people per square mile are classified as “Dense Suburban.”
Municipalities with population densities between 4,999 and 1,000 people per square mile are classified as
“Suburban.” Finally, municipalities with population densities under 999 are classified as “Rural.” Some examples:
Urban: Garfield, Jersey City, Camden, and Asbury Park. Dense Suburban: Montclair, Haledon, Hasbrouck Heights,
Mount Ephraim, and South River. Suburban: Toms River, Bridgewater, West Deptford, Livingston, and Pompton
Lakes. Rural: Sparta, Readington, Robbinsville, and Buena. Given New Jersey’s unique demographic and spatial
makeup (especially its first in the nation population density), sticking to the federal definition of urban and rural is
less helpful in this context, which goes as follows: “The Census Bureau identifies two types of urban areas: (1)
Urbanized Areas (UAs) of 50,000 or more people; (2) Urban Clusters (UCs) of at least 2,500 and less than 50,000
people. “Rural” encompasses all population, housing, and territory not included within an urban area.” Finally, all
members of the New Jersey Urban Mayors Association are grouped in the “Urban” classification, if not one of the
four cities closely examined under this study (the “NJUMA” category); in addition, all municipalities that have had
“Urban Enterprise Zones” in recent years are classified as “Urban.” This is essentially to correct for those
municipalities that have urban characteristics but have low population densities due to large geographic size, such as
Pemberton and Vineland.
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Figure 5: Population by Density Classification
Classification
Population % of Total
NJUMA
231,352
2%
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
25,271
Passaic City (Passaic)
70,172
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
51,300
Trenton City (Mercer)
84,609
Urban
2,411,853
20%
Dense Suburban
892,279
10%
Suburban
3,605,397
47%
Rural
1,691,525
21%
New Jersey Total
8,832,406
100%
In considering the comparison of data for municipalities in these categories perhaps the place to
begin is with poverty itself. The Anti-Poverty Network of New Jersey defines poverty along a
spectrum:
The experience of poverty in New Jersey encompasses a broad spectrum
of individuals and families facing economic struggle. The spectrum
includes people with very low incomes facing dire deprivation and daily
sacrifices. It also includes many among the working poor, who are often
ignored by official poverty statistics but who nevertheless experience real
and harmful economic challenges.
While we will certainly examine official poverty statistics based on the federal guidelines, we
will also try to paint a detailed picture of the experience of poverty in each of the NJUMA cities,
which we will see expressed through some of the data that captures features of everyday life: do
you have access to a car? How old is your home? How much of your income goes towards
paying your mortgage or your rent? Do you have private or public health insurance? And so
forth.
Like most of the United States, poverty in New Jersey is highly concentrated; and, because New
Jersey is almost entirely urban according to the federal definition, it is unsurprising that poverty
is mostly concentrated in the cities.21 What may be surprising is the extent of that concentration.

21

Around the country, poverty tends to also be concentrated in rural and remote areas, which do not fully exist in
New Jersey in the same way, as discussed above.
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Figure 6: Distribution of Poverty by Classification22
50.0%
45.0%
40.0%
35.0%
30.0%
25.0%
43.5%

20.0%

31.9%

15.0%
10.0%
5.0%

15.0%

13.1%

10.4%

10.1%

9.3%
3.7%

2.7%

2.7%

0.0%
NJUMA

Urban

Dense Suburban

Individuals Below 50% of Poverty Level

Suburban

Rural

Individuals Below 150% of Poverty Level

While cities in New Jersey as a whole are home to over 3-times more people who are in deep
poverty (i.e., they are making only 50 percent of the income threshold the federal government
uses to calculate poverty) than the average suburb, the NJUMA cities are even more
impoverished on average than even their urban peers. For individuals making 50 percent over the
poverty threshold, the proportions remain similar.
The high concentration of official poverty in the case study cities also reveals the
disproportionate share of the population from across the poverty spectrum that is concentrated in
these cities. At both the extreme poverty end (income below 50 percent of the poverty level), and
among the working poor whose incomes exceed official poverty thresholds but still leave gaps
relative to the costs of living, a disproportionate share of the state’s poor live in urban cities, with
very high rates the NJUMA cities. The analysis below compares the total share of individuals in
deep poverty in each municipal category to the category’s share of the total state population.
This analysis demonstrates how large a share of the poverty population resides in the cities,
concentrating the needs associated with poverty in these areas as well.

22

See Appendix II, “Distribution of Poverty by Classification.”
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Figure 7: Relative Share of Population v. Relative Share of Deep Poverty23
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2.6%

0.0%
Urban

Suburban

Rural
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NJUMA

Distribution of Population

Most notably, the concentration of poverty is incredibly evident by looking at the chart below,
which asks how much the deep poverty rate would have to shift if they were evenly distributed
by population across New Jersey. For example, for those individuals with incomes below 50
percent of the poverty level, urban areas are over-represented, in relative terms, by 92 percent
whereas suburbs are underrepresented by 45 percent. In addition, the NJUMA cities are
significantly over-represented, with 171 percent of what their share should be if poverty were not
so highly concentrated in urban areas.

23

In this instance, the aggregate population numbers comes from the ACS 2010-2014 dataset “Population for whom
poverty status is determined.”
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Figure 8: Percent Over/Under Representation of Individuals in Deep Poverty
200%
171%
150%

92%

100%

50%

0%
NJUMA

Urban
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Suburban
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-45%

-45%

-24%
-50%
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Unsurprisingly, given income levels, structural unemployment24 is also quite high and also
corresponds closely to poverty concentrations:
Figure 9: Comparison of Unemployment Rates in 2009 and 201525
Row Labels
NJUMA
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
Passaic City (Passaic)
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
Trenton City (Mercer)
Urban
Dense Suburban
Suburban
Rural
Statewide Average

24

2007
2009 2015
7.9% 14.4% 8.8%
9.5% 17.1% 10.0%
7.0% 12.7% 8.0%
7.9% 15.4% 9.3%
7.2% 12.5% 8.0%
6.0% 12.1% 6.9%
4.2% 9.2% 5.3%
3.6% 7.9% 5.1%
3.7% 7.8% 5.8%
4.0% 8.5% 5.6%

Structural unemployment refers to persistently high unemployment rates due to longstanding underlying
economic fundamentals, rather than unemployment driven by a particular passing event. For example, the loss of
automobile manufacturing jobs has led to high structural unemployment in Detroit, whereas most of the
unemployment caused by the impact of the Great Recession has not generated lasting unemployment in most parts
of the country (i.e., most jobs have been restored). The data range above is meant to show the impact of the Great
Recession and the subsequent uneven recovery.
25
From State of New Jersey, Department of Labor and Workforce Development, Annual Municipal Labor Force
Estimates, 2007, 2009, and 2015.
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Shifting to a consideration of resources, median household income, and especially per capita
income (income per person), is also significantly less in urban areas and NJUMA cities:
Figure 10: Review of Median Household and Per Capita Income by Classification26
$100,000

$91,218

$80,000

$88,444

$73,900

$60,000

$54,243
$44,248
$37,339

$40,000

$43,450

$36,145
$27,704

$16,290

$20,000

$0
NJUMA
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Figure 11: Median and Per Capita Income in Select Municipalities ('000s)
$200.0
$180.0

$174.1
$161.7

$160.0
$140.0
$120.0

$109.4
$104.8

$100.0 $87.8
$80.0
$60.0
$40.0

$97.3
$71.5 $71.2

$66.2
$50.7

$80.1 $77.5
$68.1
$53.8 $50.7

$46.2 $42.7

$33.3 $33.1 $31.9 $31.8 $31.1
$27.5 $24.6

$20.0

$45.3

$35.6 $34.0 $34.0 $33.1 $38.4 $35.4

$19.2 $17.0 $16.8 $16.3 $15.2
$14.1 $13.7

$0.0

Per Capita Income

26

Median Household Income

See Appendix II “Median Household Income and Per Capita Income” and “Distribution of Household Income.”
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Median household income and per capita income are important indicators of need because they
reflect a capacity to meet basic needs without relying on social services. As is discussed above,
the official poverty threshold is not an accurate measure of real income needs. New Jersey is, as
is widely known, one of the most expensive states in the country to simply lead an ordinary life,
leading us to the concept of the living wage. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology provides
a living wage calculator at the state level, which further breaks the data down according to
household size and the most common annual expenses. Among the available household types
beyond a single adult, the two with the lowest income needs are households with two adults
(with either one or both adults working). Of the NJUMA cities, only Perth Amboy’s Median
Household Income of $45,276 exceeds the “living wage” even for these lowest-cost household
types. If we look at any of the other household types, no NJUMA city’s Median Household
Income exceeds the “living wage” calculation:
Figure 12: New Jersey Living Wage Schedule by Household Type27
Expenses

1
Adult

1 Adult
1 Child

1
Adult
2 Kids

2 Adults
1
Working

2 Adults 1
Working;
1 Child

2 Adults 1
Working;
2 Kids

2
Adults

2
Adults
1 Child

2
Adults
2 Kids

Food

$3,509

$5,176

$7,786

$6,434

$8,011

$10,339

$6,434

$8,011

$10,339

Child Care

$0

$7,977

$11,301

$0

$0

$0

$0

$7,977

$11,301

Medical

$2,266

$6,330

$6,118

$4,558

$6,118

$6,182

$4,558

$6,118

$6,182

Housing

$11,334

$15,541

$15,541

$12,846

$15,541

$15,541

$12,846

$15,541

$15,541

Transport

$3,764

$6,855

$7,901

$6,855

$7,901

$9,258

$6,855

$7,901

$9,258

Other

$2,096

$3,644

$3,987

$3,644

$3,987

$4,819

$3,644

$3,987

$4,819

Taxes

$3,048

$6,041

$6,985

$4,557

$5,515

$6,123

$4,557

$6,573

$7,622

Required
annual
income

$26,018

$51,564

$59,619

$38,894

$47,073

$52,263

$38,894

$56,109

$65,063

While this analysis tells a concerning story about the average household, it is also important to
move beyond median income figures to determine what share of families have a realistic
opportunity to meet the high cost of living in New Jersey.

27

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Living Wage Calculator, http://livingwage.mit.edu/pages/about
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Figure 13: Household Income Over and Under $50,00028
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If we read the above chart in contra-position to the MIT “Living Wage” study, we see the
importance of the household earnings above $50,000, which, depending on the makeup of the
individual family, is a relatively good stand in for the genuine cost of living. We see, therefore,
that a full 62 percent of households in our NJUMA cities do not meet that threshold. As we turn
to a closer examination of the individual characteristics of each city, in some ways the prospect
become even more dire.
One key fact, as we begin to look at other social indicators, is the limit of available income after
meeting the most basic of needs (namely, shelter). Public housing availability is incredibly
limited in each of the NJUMA cities — as it is across all New Jersey urban areas — and
affordable housing and Section 8 are also inadequate to meet the need. It is not rare for waiting
lists for public housing to stretch years and even beyond a decade. Thus, for a significant portion
of the population the share of income allocated towards rent in the NJUMA cities, is well-over
the recommended 30 percent expenditure29 for housing costs:

28

See Appendix II “Distribution of Household Income.”
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development defines a household as housing cost burdened if they
spend more than 30 percent of gross income on housing, indicating the instability of this budget imbalance and the
strain it creates on meeting other non-housing needs.
29
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Figure 14: Percent of Households with Rent Greater than 30% of Median Household Income30
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Figure 15: Percent of Households with Homeowner Costs Over 30% of Median Household
Income
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The basic point to be gleaned from this analysis is that housing costs, even in the markedly less
expensive urban areas of concentrated poverty, create significant strains on discretionary
spending for individuals and families. The definition of what is discretionary must be expanded,
too, as we shall see below.

30

See Appendix II, “Gross Rent as % of Median Income” and “Gross Rent as % of Median Income in NJUMA
Cities” and following tables.
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While access to something like a car, and the ability to pay for its associated expenses, might be
considered discretionary under the strictest definition, it can be necessary to overcome the
problems posed by spatial mismatch and actually move out of poverty. Therefore, it is worth
looking at several other indicators beyond income that demonstrate elevated need on the one
hand, and the difficulty in meeting those needs on the other. First, rates of health insurance
coverage are comparatively low in the NJUMA Cities and other urban communities:
Figure 16: Percent of Population without Health Insurance31
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Figure 17: % of Population with Public Health Insurance Coverage
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Lack of health insurance coverage leaves fewer options for residents seeking care from
traditional medical practices, driving them to charity care, government-sponsored facilities, and,
increasingly, emergency rooms for primary care. We can also see that those with coverage in the
31

See Appendix II, “Those with No Health Insurance.”
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urban municipalities are disproportionately reliant on public coverage. In recent years, as more
and more hospitals are leaving cities or reducing staffing there (e.g., Capital Health’s new central
campus is in Hopewell, not Trenton, and the closures and consolidations of hospitals in Passaic,
which reduced the city’s hospital facilities from three to one, St. Mary’s), added importance is
placed on municipal healthcare service provision.32 However, as we will see below, municipal
funds available for these services are low and have diminished over time. Though, in many
cases, coverage and programming might exist at a centralized location at the County or a
regional medical center, getting to that programming is a great challenge. For example, the
Capital Health Campus in Hopewell is a challenge to get to for Trenton residents. If one visits
the Capital Health website to get directions on how to get to the Hopewell Campus via mass
transit, it provides bus directions to the Trenton Transit Center and then the names and phone
numbers for taxi cab companies that provide service to the Hopewell Campus.
Health care needs thus intersect with transportation needs. Vehicle ownership statistics are
doubly concerning in the context of transportation needs to access health care.
Figure 18: Household Vehicle Availability33
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First, the amount of households without access to any vehicle is far higher in the NJUMA cities
than the comparison cities (roughly 5-times the suburbs). Moreover, the limited number of
households with access to more than one vehicle illustrates the difficulty of driving to services
for a child or another person if it interferes with work. Two and three vehicle households make
32

Some measure of a caveat must be introduced to this analysis, given New Jersey’s recent expansion of Medicaid
and the expanded availability and access to non-employer-based health insurance through the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010. Since the dataset uses what amounts to a 5-year average between 2010 and 2014, it is
hard to capture the full effect of its introduction. However, the ACA has also provided reasoning, the effects of
which have not yet been fully analyzed, for the State to significantly cut its contribution to hospitals for charity care
($148 million in State Fiscal Year 2016, from $750 million to $502 million).
33
This further underscores the importance of mass transit, particularly due to the spatial mismatch phenomenon.
Once again, those in most need of good paying jobs have the hardest time getting to them. See Appendix II,
“Vehicle Availability.”

39

up about 63 percent of suburban households, while they constitute only 29 percent and 32
percent of the NJUMA cities and urban areas respectively. Thus, the oft-cited premise that cities
attract people in poverty because various social services can be accessed easily by residents at a
centralized location must be called into question, particularly given the decentralization of social
services and the decline in mass transit funding, which, in turn, has led to fewer routes, less
frequent routes, and higher fares.
The question of “navigation” is also worth examining. First, a larger share of individuals in the
NJUMA cities and urban areas more broadly face potential barriers to navigating the systems and
institutions that are the gatekeepers of social services and economic opportunity. Once again, the
impact of this is compounded by cuts to municipal services. Typically, these services were more
oriented towards case management and the provision of assistance to navigate the larger social
service delivery systems at higher levels of government. While individual barriers are always
uniquely personal, three factors with demonstrable impacts on opportunity are limited English
proficiency, citizenship status, and lower educational attainment. Populations facing these
barriers can face greater challenges in navigating the complex bureaucracies behind social
services:
Figure 19: Speak English Less Than "Very Well"34
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See Appendix II, “Language Facility Profile.”
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Figure 20: Percent Non-US Citizen35
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Figure 21: Educational Attainment36
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Finally, it is important to note some of the relevant conditions with additional direct impacts on
municipal service delivery. First, the share that older homes constitute in NJUMA cities and
urban municipalities far and away exceeds the suburbs:
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See Appendix II, “Citizenship Status.”
This marks one of the leading indicators for the experience of poverty. The disparity is a relatively new
phenomenon when speaking in terms of decades and represents and outsize contribution to the concentration of
poverty. See Appendix II, “Educational Attainment by Classification” and following.
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Figure 22: Age of Housing Stock37
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This data is critical insofar as it demonstrates a lack of new construction—i.e., a lack of
investment, with a correlated decline in ratables (defined as the taxable value of property), as
will be shown below. In addition, although older housing does not in itself create additional
liabilities for firefighters and building inspectors as some older building materials were better
suited for fire suppression than modern ones, there is a strong correlation in older cities between
the age of housing and a reduction in investment and upkeep, which contributes to public safety
issues and especially the need for a larger professional fire department and building/health
inspection apparatus. Older housing with low upkeep means more fraying electrical wiring, lead
paint, primitive water heaters, primitive heating systems, and lack of central air. An added safety
challenge is posed by overcrowding, which is significantly higher in urban areas and,
particularly, the NJUMA cities than in area of less concentrated poverty. The US Department of
Housing and Urban Development defines overcrowding at more than 1 person per room in a
dwelling unit, where all rooms other than bathrooms are included in the room count. By this
same methodology, more than 1.5 people per room is considered severe over-crowding.
Figure 23: Percent Overcrowded Housing38
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See Appendix II, “Age of Housing Stock by Classification.”
See Appendix II, “Room Occupancy.”
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Owner occupied housing is another important consideration, insofar as non-owner occupied
housing is likely to place far more of the burden of upkeep on non-residents, which increases the
likelihood of the proliferation of outstanding maintenance issues.
Figure 24: Percent Owner Occupied Housing39
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Finally, the challenges presented by vacant housing are significant - as already discussed above
with respect to the added challenges for police, fire, and public works personnel - but also
presents a fiscal challenge insofar as vacant housing generally does not generate much, if
anything, in tax revenue:
Figure 25: Percent Vacant Housing40
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See Appendix II, “Owner Occupation and Mortgage Status.”
See Appendix II, “Home Occupation and Mortgage Status.”
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It is worth noting that the number of disabled residents, is more concentrated in NJUMA cities
and urban areas generally, with the ratio of disabled to non-disabled residents in Trenton
particularly high (a little over 1 in 7); high ratios of disability within a city’s population create an
array of service needs, which can often be complicated to meet:
Figure 26: Number of Non-Disabled Residents for Every Resident with a Disability41
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Figure 27: Percent of Disabled Population Under 18
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The essential and evident conclusion of this section is a demonstrated concentration of need in
nearly every relevant category in the NJUMA cities and urban municipalities more broadly. Now
we shall explore how municipal government is able – or not able – to meet these needs.
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See Appendix II, “Occurrence of Disability” and “Schedule of Disability Determinations.”
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THE BUDGETARY PRESSURES ON NJUMA CITIES AND THEIR PEERS:
THE CONTEXT OF THE MUNICIPAL BUDGET PROCESS
Among all states, New Jersey has a unique municipal budget process that emphasizes fiscal
discipline, often expressed through a comprehensive regime of State oversight. Accordingly, the
degree of emphasis that certain priorities have or don’t have must be understood for the findings
of the study to be comprehensible.
When we think of what a government does, we often think of services — police and fire
protection, garbage pickup, social services, parks and recreation, healthcare, snow plowing,
street paving, and so forth. What is less visible, but no less real a consideration for municipal
budgets, are obligations that fall outside these direct service categories. In the case of each of our
NJUMA cities, between 34 and 49 percent of the cost of government relates to budget lines not
related to current service delivery (e.g., debt, pension, healthcare, and reserves). While these
expenditures may reflect important resources for the local workforce and retirees, they are not
easily redirected to respond to the direct needs created by concentrated poverty and are often
paid to non-residents; unfortunately, the highest paying municipal jobs in the police and fire
departments are often held by non-residents. The lion’s share of the remaining funds supports
public safety and public works (“essential services”). And, in each case, public safety and public
works account for between 70 and 78 percent of budgeted service-related costs and 36 and 49
percent of overall costs. This leaves very few resources to be divided among diverse important
departmental service categories, including Recreation and Culture, Public Defender and Courts,
Economic Development, and Health.
Figure 28: Budget Allocations among NJUMA Cities (2014)42
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See Appendix II, “Detailed Budget Allocations Among NJUMA Cities (2014).”
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This structure and set of demands for municipal budgeting leaves little space for considering the
mismatch between poverty-related needs and available services. The reality is that most
conversations on budgeting at the local and State-oversight level revolve around three factors:
limiting property tax growth, managing legacy costs, and providing essential services. Only in
very extreme circumstances will the State allow a municipality to significantly cut police and fire
budgets. Pension and debt costs can essentially only be reduced in even more limited
circumstances; the leading example is if a municipality enters into federal Chapter 9 bankruptcy
protection, which the State must permit a municipality to enter in any event. Instead, all other
“non-essential” areas of spending are usually the first to be cut. Cutting the economic
development budget means less economic development, and thus less revenue. Cutting the
recreation budget lowers quality of life and thus limits the inflow of residents, also undercutting
revenue. That means less money to pay police and fire…and so forth.
Too often, budgetary pressures only allow a municipality to run in place, keeping up essential
service functions, making debt and pension payments, and too little else. The fundamental point
is clear as well: as long as this basic relationship remains true it will be incredibly difficult for
municipalities to escape structural budget distress and, thus, to deliver services that meet the
needs of residents, which extend beyond police protection, fire suppression, and sanitation.
***
There are three foundational points that must be made clear before moving forward. First, with
only a few minor exceptions, municipal and school budgets are separate. That is, they have their
own property tax levies, sources of external aid, and budget governing structures at the local,
state, and county levels. Municipal budgets are the focus of this report.43
Second, by far the primary mechanism for service delivery in New Jersey is the municipality. In
many other states, particularly in the South and the West, county governments deliver many of
the cost-intensive services that municipalities deliver here, such as policing. New Jersey is often
faulted for having too many municipalities, but the real issue may be that New Jersey has too
many entities delivering what could very easily be redundant services. A good comparison is
Maryland, which has a general socioeconomic profile similar to New Jersey, but is far more
heavily oriented towards county service delivery.
Third, New Jersey has one of the most intensive local government budgeting oversight
frameworks in the United States. Indeed, New Jersey is often paired with North Carolina as the
state that takes the most active role in local budgeting and, to a lesser but corresponding extent,
in governance. While New Jersey’s system of oversight cannot forestall macro-budget pressures
very easily, it routinely prevents the budget stresses that can emerge through faulty budget
practices that are more common in other states, such as failing to make a debt or pension
payment or anticipating too much speculative revenue.
While we will go into greater depth with each of these issues below, understanding the oversight
function and budgeting process in New Jersey is a good first step. While each of the NJUMA
cities is unique, they must operate according to the framework delineated in State statute,
43

Municipal budgets do contain the public library budget (if not a county-based system), though it has its own
dedicated tax levy.
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overseen by the Local Finance Board (“LFB”), and managed operationally by the Department of
Community Affairs’ Division of Local Government Services (“DLGS”).
Unique among states, New Jersey has historically maintained a relatively strict and intensive
degree of oversight on municipal budgets, which is designed to increase as a municipality
becomes more financially distressed. The Department of Community Affairs’ Division of Local
Government Services administers procedures for annual reviews of municipal budgets, offers
technical support, and oversees a rigorous licensing system for municipal financial officers, tax
collectors, purchasing agents, and other public employees. The Local Finance Board, made up of
gubernatorial appointees (and approved by the State Senate) and chaired by the Director of Local
Government Services, must approve exceptions to a range of New Jersey laws that regulate local
government fiscal practices. Importantly, the process from considering the issuance of municipal
bonds to actually selling them on the market has many more steps in New Jersey, not least of
which is the required approval of several types of local municipal debt issues by the Local
Finance Board. This oversight may be one the State’s most important safeguards against local
government actions that lead to financial distress, as so many municipalities around the country
have fallen deep into distress due to imprudent debt strategies.
SHIFTING REVENUE RESOURCES
The New Jersey State Budget annually makes appropriations for formula aid that supports
municipal budgets. This State aid, today, predominantly takes the form of Consolidated
Municipal Property Tax Relief Act aid and disbursements from the Energy Tax Receipts
program that is delivered to municipalities every year based on formulas frozen in place over a
decade ago. Aid has fallen significantly—between a quarter and a third in ten years. It is also
important to note that much of what is now known as “State aid” might be more accurately
called a “State distribution,” as many of the funding sources for the State aid budget line come
from taxes and fees that the State now assesses and collects when it was formerly done by the
municipality. For example, municipalities used to collect taxes on utilities whereas the State does
so today, which is the approximate derivation of the Energy Receipts Tax aid program.
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Below, we can see how falling State aid has affected the NJUMA cities:
Figure 29: 10-Year Municipal State Aid Trends in NJUMA Cities (Millions)44
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Figure 30: Municipal State Aid to Trenton45
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Includes Transitional Aid in 2010 for both Bridgeton and Passaic. See Appendix II, “10-Year Municipal State
Aid Trends in NJUMA Cities (Millions)” for detail. Adjusted to 2016 dollars.
45
See Appendix II, “Municipal State Aid to Trenton (Millions).”
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In each instance, State aid has declined markedly for the NJUMA cities, with 33 percent declines
for Bridgeton and Passaic, as well as a 35 percent decline for Perth Amboy between 2005 and
2015. Trenton, meanwhile, has seen all forms of its State aid decline 20 percent between 2006
and 2014; if taken from the height of Trenton’s aid allocation of $106 million in 2007, the
decline would be 34 percent.
Economically and financially distressed cities typically receive more formula aid than others,
which, in the majority of cases, helps them stay out of acute financial distress, but does not
ensure what we might call, borrowing some language from the school funding formula, the
maintenance of an “adequacy budget.”
A somewhat more complex, though very important feature of State aid, is the Qualified Bond
Act (“QBA”), which allows bonds, issued by municipalities to be “backed” by the State of New
Jersey. Theoretically and in basic terms, in the case of a default — when a municipality fails to
make a bond payment to a creditor — the bondholders will, nonetheless, be paid out of State aid
funds that would have otherwise flowed to the City’s general budget fund. This Act is of critical
importance for distressed cities, as it allows them to borrow at a far lower rate than their overall
fiscal health would suggest. Therefore, the proportion of budgets allocated to State aid in the
NJUMA cities — particularly in Trenton — is far lower than it would need to be in an
environment in which the QBA did not exist.
From a legal perspective, budgets in New Jersey must be balanced; if they are not they will not
work and much more easily lead to insolvency. And, even more simply, they will not be
approved by the State’s oversight bodies. In budget terms, “balance” means that appropriations
must match revenues, broadly speaking. Unlike a business, with very few exceptions—e.g., some
licenses and inspections functions—the revenues associated with a given activity do not generate
nearly enough revenue to support that activity. Therefore, funding for municipal services and
marbleized costs46 must come out of general revenues, made up of taxes, state aid, grants, fines
and fees, delinquent taxes, and other miscellaneous revenues. In most cases, taxes followed by
state aid make up the lion’s share of budgeted revenues.

46

“Marbleized” costs refer to costs that are set in stone, costs over which the city has little to discretion to reduce
expenses based on revenues.

49

Figure 31: Share of Municipal Revenues from Property Taxes47
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The above chart demonstrates the increasing reliance on local property taxes in NJUMA cities
over time to support municipal budgets. A significant reason for this shift toward greater reliance
on property taxes is a corresponding decline “Misc. Revenues,” which is basically the decline in
State aid, federal aid (mostly expressed through grants) and, to a lesser extent, grants from
federal, state, and county sources. While this pattern repeats itself in most municipalities across
the State — i.e., rising property taxes — there does not seem to be any correction for “ability to
pay.” The statewide average municipal property tax levy increase between 2000 and 2014 was
58 percent, while municipal miscellaneous revenues declined by 19 percent. In the below charts,
we can see, for example, that Perth Amboy and Bridgeton have faced particularly intense
property tax increases. Once again, it is clear that this pattern, in absolute terms, is relatively
constant among municipalities and the evenness of the distribution of our sample indicates as
much. Of course, the impact is felt much more profoundly in poorer urban areas, which, as
demonstrated above, have the concentration of need.

47

See Appendix II, “Source of Municipal Revenues among Select Municipalities” for greater detail or revenue
allocation.
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Figure 32: Growth in Municipal Property Tax Levy by Classification (2000-2014)48
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Figure 33: Municipal Property Tax Levy Growth in Select Municipalities (2000-2014)49
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Includes municipal open space levy and municipal library levy in appropriate years and for those towns with
them. See Appendix II, “Municipal Property Tax Trends.”
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See Appendix II, “Source of Municipal Revenues among Select Municipalities.”
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Figure 34: Municipal Property Tax Trends (2000-2014, Millions)
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Figure 35: Misc. Municipal Revenue Trends (2000-2014, Millions)
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Figure 36: Reduction in Misc. Revenues (2000-2014)50
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Generally speaking, urban communities have fared better than other classes of municipalities
with respect to miscellaneous revenue loss and slightly worse than other classes with respect to
municipal property tax levy growth when compared to the statewide average. Still, the basic
point is that the variance in decline/growth reflects no statistically meaningful correction for
NJUMA cities or other urban communities. The 54 percent average municipal property tax levy
growth in cities is just a touch under the 55 percent growth in suburban communities, but, given
the marked variance in ability to pay this tiny discount means little. Similarly, a 12 percent
decline of miscellaneous revenues in urban communities versus a 24 percent decline in the
suburbs is an inadequate advantage, given the variance in municipal property tax growth and the
demonstrated higher need in urban communities.
It is also very useful to compare this trend of insufficient adjustment to need in municipal aid
with reference to the chart immediately below, which shows the increasing proportion of the
overall tax levy devoted to municipal budgets and how this shift is more pronounced in the
NJUMA cities and peer municipalities:
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See Appendix II, “Reduction in Misc. Revenues (2000-2014).”
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Figure 37: Municipal Share of Property Tax Levy (2000-2014)51
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Figure 38: Distribution of Property Tax Levy (2014)
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Note that while the proportion of property taxes accounted for by the municipal tax levy has
increased in absolute terms by 3 and 4 percent in each non-urban classification, it has increased
by 7 and 9 percent in urban communities and NJUMA cities, respectively. The proportion of
school taxes collected in the NJUMA cities and urban communities, by contrast, has decreased
significantly since 2000. While the amount of tax revenues collected in urban communities, not
the NJUMA cities, has increased slightly, it is far lower than other classes of municipalities and
the rate of municipal tax levy growth. The basic reason for this is the essential maintenance of
“Abbott” aid and its successor, SFRA. Notwithstanding critiques of the application and funding
51

See Appendix II, “Distribution of Property Tax Levy (2000-2014).”
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of the SFRA formula, the effect of keeping the relevant tax levy stable is clear and begs the
question of a similar application of aid for distressed municipal budgets beyond what exists in
CMPTRA.
Finally, before delving too deeply into property taxes, the pattern of decline in State aid
discussed above is mirrored in the decline in grant funding, which, for the most part, comes from
the State of New Jersey’s budget appropriation directly or federal funds passing through the
State:
Figure 39: Grants Funding Levels 2008-201452
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Further, the proportion of municipal government programming funded by grants has fallen
similarly drastically:
Figure 40: Grants as Proportion of Total Municipal Current Fund Spending53
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See Appendix II, “Variance in Grant Funding (2008-2014).”
Does not include local matching funds for specific grants, when applicable.
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If we breakdown the grants further, we see that no category has been exempted from significant
cuts.
Figure 41: Comparison of Grants by Category in NJUMA and Comparison Cities (2008-2014)54
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Taken in the aggregate, this equals a remarkable 70 percent decline in grant funding, which is in
part accounted for by the steep decline in volatile Economic Development and Planning grants;
were we to exclude the Economic Development and Planning category, the decline would still be
43 percent.
The loss of grant funding to a municipal government does not all necessarily mean funding is
redirected to another grantee within the municipality that will meet the same needs; in general,
aggregate funding is down for all sectors (government, business, and not-for-profit). For
example, CDBG and HOME funding to Perth Amboy used to be approximately $1 million, with
a significant portion provided to not-for-profits for their operational costs. Due to declining grant
funding, almost by half, the City can no longer forward funds to the not-for-profits, which have
had to reduce their operations or close entirely. Two effected not-for-profits had to lay off
employees with only approximately $70,000 left available for non-City uses in 2016.
Another troubling trend for federal grants is a movement away from providing funding to
providing technical assistance. The theory is that independent funding can be found and that the
technical assistance can help coordinate participation among all sectors. In reality, there is
general agreement among municipalities that this form of federal assistance has limited utility
and that the most beneficial aspect of the technical assistance is, almost ironically, that it offers a
venue for municipalities to talk to each other and exchange ideas. Moreover, strong emphasis
was placed on the importance of access to State bureaucrats, since State bureaucrats are typically
the ones making allocation decisions even if the funding itself originated with the federal
government. One example in Perth Amboy is a Department of Environmental Protection pilot
program whereby a DEP representative is assigned to three challenged cities in order to develop
a sustainability plan collaboratively and help guide the process through the State.
Perhaps an important, though unfortunate, reality is the bearing that political alignments can
have on a given municipality’s ability to get funding — even if more standard “pork” is
54

See Appendix II, Variance in Grant Funding (2008-2014).
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excluded. As a general rule, larger cities in New Jersey have an easier time getting grants simply
by virtue of the fact that a larger staff can be supported. In order to somewhat offset this structure
a County government or County/regional public authority can assist a municipality’s application
or guide the process through the State. However, there is certainly known precedent for cases
wherein the political alignment between a City and its home County are not amenable and so
assistance that had been available in the past was reduced. It goes without saying that such
dynamics should have no place in providing assistance to revenue-poor municipalities.
***
If we synthesize the above analysis on grants, property
taxes, and State aid, what we see is an ever-increasing
burden on nearly all New Jersey municipalities, with
the rate and depth of the increase often greater in
absolute terms in urban municipalities. What this
creates is a counterintuitive scenario in which the most
impoverished municipalities are becoming ever more
reliant on property taxes for which there is a patently
insufficient ratables base. Moreover, perhaps the most
important point is that the relative burden for taxpayers
in these municipalities is significantly higher than
wealthier suburban municipalities:

The most impoverished
municipalities are becoming
ever more reliant on property
taxes for which there is a
patently insufficient ratables
base.

Figure 42: Property Tax as % of Median Household and State Ranking (2014)55
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County taxes are included in the calculation for the “Overall” rank, though not shown in the table. There are 565
municipalities in New Jersey.
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Indeed, on average, the relative tax burden is higher in low income municipalities than in
wealthy ones. The chart below breaks down, by classification, the average percentage of median
household income devoted to property taxes, by taxing district (i.e., municipal, school, and
county). In the NJUMA cities and urban areas, 16 percent of median household income is
devoted to paying local property taxes while it is roughly half that in rural municipalities.
Figure 43: Percent of Median Household Income Devoted to Property Taxes (2014)
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The critical question, naturally, is how did this happen? To what extent is this to be accounted
for by “discretion”? Is this trend reflective of bad governance or a more structural and systemic
concern? The following analysis will demonstrate that even if we were to grant blame for bad
decision-making and install a perfectly good government tomorrow, the standing structural
limits of revenue raising in New Jersey make reducing the burden almost impossible.
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THE ERODING REVENUE BASE OF NEW JERSEY’S URBAN MUNICIPALITIES
New Jersey is famous for its property taxes. The fundamental reason for this is, unsurprisingly,
that property taxes are the primary form of revenue available for local municipal governments,
school districts, and county governments. In fact, property taxes are far and away the most
significant revenue lines in nearly every New Jersey municipality. Naturally, this is not by
choice. Unlike many other states, property taxes in New Jersey essentially present the only legal
option for a major revenue raising tax.56 In neighboring Pennsylvania, for example,
municipalities—and particularly distressed ones—have access to a far greater number of
significant revenue streams, which drastically drives down the municipal property tax burden
(although not necessarily the tax burden overall). Many cities in Pennsylvania are given the
ability to levy the following taxes: a resident-based earned income tax, a non-resident based
earned income tax, a specialized resident or non-resident earned income tax to pay pension costs,
a business privilege tax, a mercantile tax (both forms of gross receipts taxes), an amusement tax,
and a local services tax (collected as a $1-$3 fee on each week of pay depending on certain
statutory guidelines). Philadelphia and Pittsburgh have even more options (and can often charge
higher rates, too). In addition, one key element of this model is the ability for municipalities to
levy various kinds of taxes on non-residents. That means the people who work in the
municipality also pay for some share of the services they use (or depend on) while there. As will
be seen in more depth below, this, in some ways, corrects for the concentration of not-for-profits
in cities, as well as the flight of commercial, industrial, and higher value residential properties
and higher wealth individuals from urban centers, which, at the most basic level, was caused by
cheap land, low cost of services, various homeownership incentives, and subsidized highway and
interstate construction.
The incredible rate of suburbanization as expressed through the shift in population over the
course of the last 110 or so years is, perhaps, the simplest expression of the eroding revenue base
for cities; even irrespective of the flight of personal and real property wealth from the cities, put
simply, fewer people means fewer taxpayers. We can see this trend at work by looking at
Trenton’s share of the total population of Mercer County, as well as a comparison of
Philadelphia and its suburbs:
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Of course there are exceptions, which will be discussed in greater detail below. One is the employer-based
payroll tax that is only available to the City of Newark. The City’s municipal property tax levy is roughly $213
million; the payroll tax generates roughly $40 million. Hotel and parking taxes are also available in some
municipalities, though the revenue is far less than property taxes. There are several taxes and fees in Atlantic City,
but most of them flow to the State directly or through the Casino Reinvestment Development Authority.
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Figure 44: Suburbanization in Mercer County and Philadelphia Metropolitan Area57
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While Trenton’s population represented 77 percent of the Mercer County total, it represents only
23 percent today. Similarly, Philadelphia has only 78 percent of the population in a grouping of
three of its major suburban counties, whereas, at the beginning of the 20th Century, it had 424
percent of the population of those same counties.
New Jersey’s property tax-driven revenue model has many consequences. These consequences
are felt most significantly in cities. Property taxes are driven by three major considerations: the
amount needed to be raised by taxes (called the tax levy), the assessed value of property (the
taxable value or “ratables” base), and the rate that is calculated from the first two considerations,
which is then applied to a given property to calculate its owner’s tax payment.58 In a perfect
world, the need to raise taxes would be mitigated by the increase in the assessed value — this
would leave the rate, and the homeowner’s burden, essentially constant. However, in most cases,
the amount of increased assessed value cannot nearly keep pace with the amount of increased tax
need. This necessitates an increase in the tax rate.59
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The suburban Philadelphia counties used in this analysis are Bucks, Delaware, and Montgomery. Adding Chester
County would make the effect even more pronounced. See Appendix II, “Suburbanization in Mercer County and
Philadelphia Metropolitan Area.”
58
A fourth factor, which has added importance in New Jersey, is the amount of taxes that can be expected to be
collected, often called the collection rate. While a municipality might budget for a certain amount of taxes needed to
support its budget, the State requires that it make a realistic assumption for what proportion of those taxes can
actually be collected in that budget year. For example, Camden’s SFY 2016 budget assumes an 88 percent collection
rate, while Cherry Hill’s SFY 2016 budget assumes a 99.5% collection rate. Ewing’s CY2015 budget assumes
99.8%, while Trenton’s SFY 2016 budget assumes 94%. The basic discrepancy arises from the nature of the tax
base; more vacant or under-managed properties and an impoverished population are an indicator for lower
collections. In order to better ensure that the municipality avoids cash issues, as well as an inability to pay the taxes
it collects on behalf of the County and the School District, the State requires that a Reserve for Uncollected taxes be
appropriated annually in the budget. Thus, once again, an extra budget pressure is added to the municipalities that
are least able to meet it, as the Reserve, essentially, gets higher the lower the collection rate.
59
In addition, more and more development in New Jersey accesses a form of tax abatement called a “Payment in
Lieu of Taxes” or “PILOT,” wherein an eligible property pays a formula-derived amount for a fixed period of years
as opposed to real property taxes. Notably, PILOT revenue is not apportioned — i.e., divided among taxing districts
— in the manner of conventional real property taxes. Under a common form of PILOT, 95 percent of revenue
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What does that mean? Imagine that you own a home valued at $300,000 and the municipality
you live in needs to raise $50 million in property taxes to run its budget. The city has an overall
assessed value of $2 billion. This means the required tax rate is 2.5 percent, which makes your
individual tax bill $7,500. Imagine, however, that the assessed value in your city is only $1
billion. That same $300,000 home would be subject to a 5 percent tax rate (a tax bill of $15,000)
in order to meet the city’s revenue needs. Finally, what happens if the municipal budget needed a
tax levy of $75 million, divided over only $1 billion is assessed value. This would further
increase your tax bill to $22,500.
This is a simplified example, of course, but an important one. This is a microcosm of what has
happened to cities in New Jersey after the Second World War. We will explain why below.
There are three distinct — and, unfortunately, unique — ways that cities suffer under the current
property tax regime. First, cities have lost a disproportionate amount of commercial and
industrial ratables, placing a deeper burden on a population of homeowners that has grown
poorer over the decades. Second, aggregate assessed values have risen far less rapidly in cities
than in suburban municipalities, mostly due to the flight of higher wealth household from cities
and the loss of commercial and industrial ratables noted above. And, third, the amount of tax
exempt real property in cities far exceeds that of suburban municipalities due to the historic and
continuing centrality of many of New Jersey’s cities.

collected goes to the host municipality, while 5 percent goes to the host county. This has consequences for school
districts, particularly the former Abbott Districts, whose aid is falling. In Newark, for example, revenues from strong
property development are aiding the municipality, but not the school district.
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In order to understand trends in assessed value, it is necessary to understand the classifications
applied to various types of property:
Figure 45: Table of Classifications and Value in New Jersey60
Classification
No.

Name

Classification
No.

Name

1

Vacant Land

4A

Commercial

2

Residential Property

4B

Industrial

3A

Farm Residential (Farm
Homestead)

4C

Apartment

3B

Farmland

6A

Telephone
Equipment

While the classifications, for taxation purposes, are meaningless — i.e., one class is not (nor
could it) be taxed more or less than another — they nevertheless tell us something incredibly
important. By tracking how the distribution of classifications changes vis-a-vis the total amount
of assessed value overtime, we can see one of the most damaging patterns that has unfolded in
New Jersey’s cities over the past several decades. If we compare residential property (Class 2) to
all other classifications, we can see how the share of property values accounted for by nonresidential property has fallen substantially since the late 1960s.
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There are additional classifications, e.g., for railroad property and petroleum refinery equipment. Those listed in
the table are the most important for the vast majority of New Jersey municipalities.
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Figure 46: Residential Property as % of Total Property Value (1968-2014)61
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The basic point is that there has been a clear and remarkable shift in older New Jersey cities —
particularly those identified with industry — away from the commercial tax base and on to
residential property. Moreover, there has been a general shift in value away from cities and to the
suburbs, where growth in property values has generally outpaced those of the cities:
Figure 47: Change in Property Value (1968-2014)62
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This data, as other historic tax assessment data, represents calculated equalized value based on the application of
the Real Property Ratio of Aggregate Assessed to Aggregate True Value to Class 1, 2, 3a, 3b, 4a, 4b, and 4c
properties. This calculation and calculated equalization excludes Class 6 properties, as well as the Equalization of
Replacement Revenues. Thus, the number is not the same as the equalized value as prepared by each County Tax
Board, but is used as a methodological tool to compare approximate values in decades past when complete
equalization data is unavailable.
62
See Appendix II, “Historic Study of Property Values in Select Municipalities.” This dataset uses the calculation
and calculated equalized value described above.
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Finally, it is worth noting that “assessed value” is often used interchangeably with “taxable
value.” This implies that some value is non-taxable. In New Jersey, nearly all personal property
is exempt from taxation, while only certain real property is. Today, the State exempts six
classifications of real property from taxation: public property, public school property, other
school property, church and charitable property, cemeteries and graveyards, and other. As will be
seen below, tax exempt real property is highly concentrated in NJUMA cities and urban
municipalities more broadly:
Figure 48: Taxable v. Tax Exempt Property (2014)
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Figure 49: Over or Under Representation of Exempt Property63
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This calculation is based on a state average exempt property share of 24 percent.
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-16% -16%

To fully understand the impact of this variance on urban areas it is helpful to consider how much
taxable property would be added to their tax base if exempt properties were evenly distributed
across the state.
Figure 50: Even Distribution of Tax Exempt Property Hypothetical Effect on Muni. Tax Levy64
Bridgeton
Muni. Tax Levy
Even Distribution
$18,794,087
Actual
$11,871,970
Variance
$6,922,116
Passaic
Muni. Tax Levy
Even Distribution
$57,034,918
Actual
$58,150,340
Variance
-$1,115,422

Perth Amboy
Muni. Tax Levy
Even Distribution
$49,904,561
Actual
$55,105,391
Variance
-$5,200,831
Trenton
Muni. Tax Levy
Even Distribution
$116,239,900
Actual
$74,680,173
Variance
$41,559,727

While it is abundantly clear that not-for-profits and other exempt entities (e.g., governments) are
highly concentrated in New Jersey cities (as is true around the country) and that such
concentration presents significant negative property tax revenue raising consequences for those
municipalities, it is less clear what ought to be done about this — though some sort of correction
is in order. Adding financial burdens to certain not-for-profits, particularly smaller ones not tied
to larger institutions, would perhaps speed their departure from cities or cause them to shut their
doors altogether — just when various levels of government are becoming more reliant on notfor-profits as they cut their own level of services and funding. Larger not-for-profits, such as
hospitals that are part of larger healthcare systems, have also moved out of cities or narrowed
their operations there (e.g., the recent construction of the Capital Health Campus at Hopewell, as
opposed to Trenton) and adding to their financial burden might contribute to speeding their exit
from urban center as well. Indeed, as many of New Jersey’s urban centers have become
increasingly reliant on not-for-profits as their economic engines (i.e., “Eeds and Meds”), cities
could lose out on critical jobs that have well-known multiplier effects. Finally, large not-forprofits positively drive up property values for many types of properties, such as businesses that
supply the not-for-profits themselves or their employees and visitors.
However, there is no doubt that the question of what qualifies for a real property tax exemption
has emerged in a way that it has not in decades — perhaps since the 1947 drafting of New
Jersey’s current constitution. The recent Morristown Memorial Hospital v. Town of Morristown
lit a fire under this discussion, with Judge Bianco ruling that the hospital’s tax exempt status
should be eliminated (retroactively as well) given that the nature of medical care provided at
hospitals today is, for all intents and purposes, a for-profit exercise with little resemblance to the
hospitals’ charity care origins in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This ruling triggered a
series of tax appeals by other municipalities hosting hospitals and a flurry of proposed legislation
to attempt to find a solution amenable to both municipalities and the hospitals. A piece of
64

Given that the actual 2014 tax rate is applied to run this calculation, assessed value, as opposed to equalized
value, is used.
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legislation, ultimately vetoed by Governor Christie, would have required hospitals to pay a $2.50
per-bed fee, as well as a fee for each satellite emergency care facility. The most recent
development is a call for a “moratorium” on tax appeals filed by municipalities against now-tax
exempt hospitals. In addition, this conversation is not just limited to hospitals, as Princeton
University is currently battling to maintain its tax exempt status in a case that is working its way
through the courts. While Princeton is a much different institution than other universities and
colleges in New Jersey (for example, Seton Hall University’s endowment is about 1 percent of
Princeton’s) the outcome of that case could have similar implications as Morristown for private
tax exempt higher education institutions more broadly.
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LOCAL BUDGET POLICIES OF THE CHRISTIE ADMINISTRATION
Like most new governors of New Jersey, Governor Christie took office naming a reduction in the
property tax burden as one of his major initiatives. In the broadest of terms, there have been two
philosophies on how to lessen this burden over the past several decades, which often come
together in practice: “spread” the cost of local government over the state, allowing some degree
of subsidy to localities by state taxpayers, or put in place more stringent limits on local spending
and tax increases.
On the municipal level, two key initiatives mark Governor Christie’s effort: the tightening of the
property tax levy cap and the introduction of the Transitional Aid program. New Jersey has long
had in place several “cap” laws for municipalities and school districts that restrict the annual
amount available for a tax increase, unless certain “outside the cap” costs go up or the voters
approve, by referendum, a greater tax increase.65 Before Governor Christie’s administration, the
criticism was often that the “cap” was not really a cap at all, as too many expenses were
“excluded” from the cap and the cap itself was 4 percent. Today, the cap baseline has been
lowered to 2 percent and only certain costs, beyond certain amounts, are excluded: costs incurred
from a declared emergency, health insurance, pensions, debt service, and other capital.
The tax levy cap has accomplished what it set out to do. Tax levy increases for each municipal
tax are far lower than they were under the prior regime, averaging 2.5 percent since 2011, as
opposed to 6.9 percent between 2001 and 2010. No municipal tax levy increase since 2011 has
exceeded any from 2000-2010.
Figure 51: Statewide Municipal Tax Levy Increase (2000-2015)66
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Some school districts, which are classified as Type I Districts, do not need a referendum for an extraordinary tax
increase, but rather approval from a body called the Board of School Estimate.
66
Not inflation adjusted.
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However, as discussed above, the tax levy is only one part of the tax burden — i.e., the amount
actually paid by individual taxpayers. Including the tax levy there are three variables that must be
accounted for when calculating property taxes, with the others being the assessed value and the
tax rate, which is the amount applied to the assessed value to raise the amount required by the
levy. What this means is that a suppressed tax levy increase does not necessarily mean a
suppressed tax burden because the tax rate is not similarly capped by statute and could not be
practically speaking. An easy, if extreme, example to illustrate this point is Atlantic City.
Between 2013 and 2014, the tax levy of Atlantic City decreased slightly, while the actual tax
payment for the average homeowner went up:
Figure 52: Municipal Tax Burden Assessment in Atlantic City
Field
2013
2014 Variance (%)
Atlantic City Municipal Budget Levy $198,232,346 $197,124,665
-1%
Tax Rate
$1.349
$1.749
30%
Avg. Home Value
$211,653
$191,788
-9%
Tax Payment
$2,856
$3,354
17%
The reason for this contrast is that, due to casino closings, the total assessed value of Atlantic
City decreased at a rate far more rapid than the levy or the assessed value of the average home.
Again, this is an extreme example, but it demonstrates the critical need to look at the tax burden
holistically, accounting for all of the variables. Though not nearly at the same scale and rapidity
of Atlantic City, we can see this at work in the NJUMA Cities as well, as the total assessed value
has dropped, in each case, by between 23 and 27 percent.67 As the tax levy has also grown in
each instance, this amounts to a significant tax burden increase.
Figure 53: Drop in Total Assessed Value in NJUMA Cities
Municipality
2000
2007
2014 Change Since 2000
Bridgeton
$496,120,959
$411,519,719
$368,624,503
-26%
Passaic
$1,815,641,712 $1,566,429,605 $1,331,213,900
-27%
Trenton
$2,565,816,123 $2,257,633,012 $1,979,405,344
-23%

Another major factor in reviewing the tax burden is the decline and delay in payment of the
Homestead Rebate. Traditionally, the Homestead Rebate has provided significant tax relief to
New Jersey taxpayers. However, in recent years, the availability and amount of the Homestead
Rebate has declined markedly. The overall New Jersey State Budget allocation has also declined
significantly in the past several years and the eligibility criteria has narrowed. In 2008, a little
under $2 billion was budgeted for the program, while only $341 million was budgeted for Fiscal
Year 2015-2016. Moreover, the baseline variable for the calculation of the rebate benefit remains
the eligible taxpayer’s 2006 property tax payment, and eligibility is approximately 50 percent of
what it was in 2007. In addition, a new eligibility limitation excluding renters from the program
67

Since assessed values are used here, Perth Amboy was excluded in order to avoid having to adjust for its
reassessment of property.
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has an outsized effect on urban municipalities given the concentration of rental properties in
cities. Finally, the most recent round of the credit was released in May of 2015, but the credit
was tied to the 2012 benefit. The last credit was awarded in 2013.68
The second key initiative of the Christie Administration, which was deployed in the first full year
of his Administration, was the development of the Transitional Aid program. When a
municipality does not feel it can meet its obligations without an extraordinary tax increase or a
series of layoffs that would jeopardize municipal service delivery, it can apply for Transitional
Aid.69 When a municipality receives Transitional Aid, it must sign a Memorandum of
Understanding (“MOU”) that establishes certain policies and procedures that the municipality
must follow. For example, many hiring and firing decisions must be reviewed and approved by
the Division of Local Government Services, as well as the soliciting and awarding of
government contracts. A municipality must also draft a basic plan that identifies how it will
reduce and eventually eliminate its reliance on Transitional Aid through new revenues, economic
development, expense and personnel reductions, healthcare savings, and so forth. If the
municipality believes that structural balance can only be achieved through more recurring
ordinary aid, it can petition Local Government Services to convert a portion of Transitional Aid
to ordinary/formula aid.70
Figure 54: Transitional Aid Awarded Since Program Inception (Millions)71
$180
$160

$15
$13

$140
$120

$4
$11
$13

$14
$24

$100

$22
$30

$80

$23

$60
$40

$75

$65

$3
$4
$12

$13
$4
$18

$18
$2
$18

$23

$23

$25

$26

$23

$25

$16

$15

$15

$12

2012

2013

2014

2015

$20
$0
2010
Camden

2011
Trenton

Paterson

Union City

68

Asbury Park

$27
$2
$18
$25
$20

All Other Recipients

The data for the Homestead Rebate is no longer available on the State’s various websites that used to host that
data along with other property tax data. The most recent data set available dates to 2007. As such, the rebate was not
included in the calculations for this report, in much the same way the State no longer uses it in their calculations of
the average property tax payment. While this presents some difficult methodological choices, the unavailability of
data makes the calculation of the rebate with available data prone to inaccuracy.
69
Transitional Aid is the most recent incarnation of “discretionary” aid programs that are based on administrative
determinations rather than legislative direction. The first program of this type dates back to 1986.
70
$18.23 million was converted in 2015. The City of Trenton received $4.86 million in this way.
71
City of Newark Transitional Aid award data is incomplete. See Appendix II, “Transitional Aid Awards since
Program Inception (Millions).”
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It is important to note the steep decline in both the amount of Transitional Aid since 2010 (about
$67.5 million) and the number of municipalities in the program (from 22 to 11). In many ways,
this reduction in the number of municipalities in the Transitional Aid program underscores the
program’s success, but, at the same time, supports the proposition that it is perhaps not the right
tool to handle some of the most financially distressed cities (Trenton being one). For example, 16
municipalities received under $2 million in aid in 2010 while only 5 did in 2015. Transitional
Aid then remains in place almost perpetually in these select communities, which causes
continued intensive State oversight and limits the ability to investigate a more permanent
solution. One way the State has chosen to address this problem is by making a certain amount of
Transitional Aid permanent as CMPTRA, if the City demonstrates that the structural balance
cannot be closed without it (or a tax increase/RIF that is considered to be too severe). However,
thus far, the scope of this conversion has been limited to five municipalities, with, notably, $10
million awarded to Atlantic City in 2015 and $4.86 million to Trenton.72
As noted previously in the discussion of budget priorities, the tightened tax levy cap and
Transitional Aid program have raised the stakes of budgeting. In Transitional Aid municipalities,
non-essential services have often been cut deeply. In some
cases, this allows for an exit from the program. But, in the
case of severely distressed municipalities, it requires not only
In Transitional Aid
an increase in the tax levy beyond the cap (which the Local
municipalities, nonFinance Board may approve), but also significant cuts to
essential services (as was the case in Trenton). In a way, the
essential services have
analysis of the Transitional Aid program is telling, insofar as
often been cut deeply.
the most distressed municipalities either need an amount of
aid far in excess of what the program can and should be able
to afford or a new way to raise revenues.
It must be said, before this analysis concludes, that the decline in formula aid, Transitional Aid,
and the Homestead Rebate must be viewed in the context of the State’s own budget difficulties.
Naturally, some discretion through the policy making process has been involved in this shift, but
much of it relates to growing costs and declining revenues elsewhere in the State budget. On the
revenue side, the current Administration has made a policy decision to not increase tax rates or
introduce significant new taxes. In addition, existing tax revenues have been suppressed for
much of the Administration’s term given worse than expected economic performance (compared
with both the Administration and Legislature’s forecasts).
The expense side, however, is far more dire and accounts for a great deal more of the decline in
revenues made available to municipalities and school districts. Like the budgets of
municipalities, State general fund revenues are being crowded out by previously deferred benefit
costs and debt, lessening the ability of the State to fund discretionary programs — including even
formula-derived, constitutionally-backed programs like SFRA. Much of this can simply be
traced back to the failure of gubernatorial administrations since the early 1990s to make the
actuarially required contribution to the pension funds. Had these contributions been made, far
more revenue would be available today.
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See Appendix II, “Transitional Aid to CMPTRA (2015).”
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NJUMA CITIES MACRO BUDGET ANALYSIS
Creating a budget is, perhaps, one of the most important exercises a municipality engages in each
year. While a budget may appear like just a collection of numbers, it is also a relatively objective
window into the priorities of a given municipality, within the bounds of available discretion. The
idea of priority is one that we have already explored in a limited way above, insofar as the ability
for a Mayor or Council to set priorities is increasingly limited by escalating non-discretionary
costs on the one hand and state and federal policy directives on the other — both of which are set
in an environment of declining federal, state, and local revenue. In a way, a municipality’s
budget tells us what has to be a priority. One of the easiest ways to see this is the relative
uniformity among budgets for similar municipal types, and, indeed, municipalities in New Jersey
overall when taken in aggregate.
For some of our analysis below, we will use a per capita calculation in order to regularize
spending data among the municipalities, as well as a means to account for absolute variances in
population. In essence, this powerful calculation allows us to see how much a municipality
spends on providing a given service for the average person living in it.
Figure 55: Departmental v. Non-Departmental Spending Per Capita (2014)
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First, the “departmental” versus “non-departmental” distinction is not a convention of New
Jersey budgeting, but presented for interpretive purposes here. Essentially, the idea is that
Departmental spending attempts to capture that spending associated with the delivery of services,
whereas Non-Departmental spending captures things like debt, insurance, pension, and other
items that do not directly relate to service delivery.73 This distinction is helpful for those
unfamiliar with municipal budgets in expressing just how much of the cost of government does
not directly relate to government services. In fact, between 2008 and 2014, the percentage of the
budget for each of the NJUMA and Comparison cities allocated towards departmental spending
has dropped, or remained flat in just one case:
73

See Appendix II, “Departmental v. Non-Departmental Spending Per Capita in NJUMA cities (2014).”
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Figure 56: Change in Share of Total Municipal Budget Accounted for by Departmental Spending
(2008-2014, absolute)74
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Non-Departmental spending, to put it simply, consists of fixed obligations, often derived by
contract, and it must be paid. For a municipality to default on a bond payment, for example,
would have incredibly dire consequences for that municipality’s ability to borrow in the future
and would likely trigger a financial disaster that could spread beyond that municipality’s borders
to other municipalities across New Jersey.75 Similarly, municipal pension obligations, as well as
employee and retiree health insurance obligations must be paid according to annually calculated
actuarial liabilities and insurance premiums. Moreover, a budget that consciously excluded any
of these items outside of a truly exceptional situation would never be approved by the Division
of Local Government Services.
In a way, departmental spending costs are fixed too, insofar as they are usually subject to labor
or vendor contracts that cannot be abridged. However, a municipality can conduct a layoff in a
time of budget distress while a municipality cannot decide to reduce its debt or pension
obligation as a “management prerogative.” Thus, for departmental spending, there is not really
an analogue to the more legal consequences relevant for reductions in non-departmental
spending; i.e., reducing a municipality’s police force does not put the municipality in contempt
of a legally-binding formula for the number of officers required per square mile, or something
along those lines. But, construed broadly, there is not necessarily any less financial consequence
for being forced to conduct a deep lay off of police officers due to budget pressure than missing a
bond payment. The same might be said of cutting economic development, recreation, or social
74

See Appendix II, “Departmental v. Non-Departmental Spending (2008-2014).”
Though serious in every state, a municipal bond default in New Jersey would likely have expanded consequences
due to the level of State oversight. Rating agencies have regularly indicated that a default in one municipality would
effect the credit of others, as it would represent a departure from the State’s traditional commitment to maintaining
local budget discipline.
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programming. The consequences for a deliberative reduction in a municipality’s nondepartmental spending budget simply have much more immediate, apparent, and calculable
consequences.
Despite the serious constraints that are operative in municipal budgeting, it is important to
understand just how most municipalities do spend the money they have essential discretion over
by examining departmental spending paradigms in our NJUMA Cities budgets:
Figure 57: Share of Budget Appropriation by Major Category (2014)76
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Non-Departmental

Figure 58: Per Capita Spend by Major Category (2014)
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There is no instance in which public safety and public works functions are not the first and
second item of spending, respectively (this arrangement would be even further compounded if
the associated pension and benefit costs particular to those entities were added). As a rule, public
safety and public works spending account for roughly 70 percent of each departmental spending
budget, leaving 30 percent for all other services and administration. Taken alone, public safety
accounts for 57 percent of spend in the NJUMA cities and 46 percent in the comparison
municipalities.
Figure 59: Public Safety and Public Works as Percent of Dept. Spend (2014)77
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See Appendix II, “Detail of 2014 Budget Spending (Actual)” and “Select Services as % of Dept. Spend.”
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If we further breakdown public safety into the two major categories of police and fire functions,
we can see just how little variance there is among the examined municipalities with respect to
police functions and the added budgetary cost that a professional fire department presents:
Figure 60: Police and Fire Function Spend as Percent of Total Dept. Spend Budget (2014)78
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Remarkably, the average proportion of departmental spend devoted to police functions is
identical between the NJUMA cities and the other examined municipalities (20 percent). Perhaps
even more surprisingly, when the individual cities are considered, Trenton is at the bottom of the
list, with its per capita police function spend having fallen by about a third since 2008—despite
the fact that the need is greatest there among the municipalities, with a violent crime rate higher
than the other NJUMA cities except Bridgeton and far higher than the others in absolute terms.79
The impact that poverty has on fire department personnel (and budgets) relates most specifically
to the quality of the housing stock, the number of inhabitants per room, the presence of vacant
properties, the presence of large industrial properties, and the presence of homeless in all types
of vacant properties. Fires in vacant industrial properties are a telling microcosm into poverty’s
effect on the fire department, which also encapsulates some of the broader themes of this report.
For working industrial property, fire suppression mechanisms are current and, as an operating
entity, the amount of taxes the property pays indirectly subsidizes fire suppression operations.
However, vacant industrial property — particularly large “Fordist” era buildings — are
concentrated in cities. In normal circumstances, fires should be less of a threat in vacant
industrial properties, given the sort of activity that can cause fires has ceased. However, because
such properties are attractive to the homeless population, with ever-fewer options for quality
shelter, fires start in these buildings due to smoking, cooking, or simply from using fire to keep
warm. The same goes for other types of vacant buildings, though at a smaller scale. Putting out a
fire in a large industrial building, particularly when it may go undetected or unreported for some
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See Appendix II, “Detail of 2014 Budget Spending (Actual)” and “Select Services as % of Dept. Spend.”
From the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s “Table 8: Offenses Known to Law Enforcement in New Jersey Cities,
2013.”
79

75

time, is immensely difficult. It can also be particularly difficult to find all those in the building
who might be endangered by the fire. Due to the aforementioned issue and due to the lack of
structural integrity in many of the buildings, it is far more dangerous for fire personnel as well.
There are similar dangers for police officers, who often respond to even more vacant property
related calls than the fire department.
When we begin to look at other major function areas, such as education (basically the library),
recreation and culture, and health, we see how marginal these services are, despite the significant
poverty-related needs we have already demonstrated through analysis of municipal
characteristics:
Figure 61: Comparative Health Services, Recreation and Culture, and Education Spend Per
Capita (2014)80
$160
$140
$120
$57
$100
$80
$51
$60
$23
$40

$0

$24

$65

$35

$17
$8

$20

$28

$26

$11
$20

$21
$4
Bridgeton

$26

$20
West
Windsor

$22

$12
Passaic

Health Services Spend Per Capita

Trenton

$17

$43

$33

Ewing

$17

$16

Peth Amboy

Clifton

$20
$6
Metuchen

Wayne

Recreation & Culture Spend Per Capita (Inc. Utilities)

Education Spend Per Capita

While the NJUMA cities trended toward the bottom for per capita spending on these service
areas, the same is not always true when we examine the loss of services in recent years, with
Trenton in particular showing steep cuts in all service areas since 2008:
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See Appendix II, Departmental v. Non-Departmental Spending Per Capita in NJUMA and Comparison cities
(2014).

76

Figure 62: Average Per Capita Spend on Select Services (2014)81
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Figure 63: Decline in Education, Recreation, and Health Services Funding Since (2008-2014)
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In each instance, the average spend of the NJUMA city is lower than the comparison
municipalities. It has also lowered over time.
The other major factor, as has already been discussed, is that non-departmental costs are
crowding out departmental costs, with each municipality (with the marginal exception of
Bridgeton) seeing departmental spending fall or stagnate while non-departmental spending rises:
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Figure 64: Trends in Dept. v. Non-Dept. Spend (2008-2014)
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To put a point on it, one can look at the rate of health services spend decline compared to the rate
of health insurance spend growth:
Figure 65: Trends in Employee Health Insurance v. Health Services Spend (2008-2014)
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With respect to health insurance specifically, and non-departmental spend more broadly, the
effect of rising costs has been somewhat mitigated by the Chapter 78 reforms enacted in 2010.
These reforms required a phase in of employee healthcare contributions that are just now
reaching their maximum. While health insurance premiums have continued to rise at a rapid clip
since 2010, rising employee contributions helped to mitigate this effect. Beginning in earnest in
calendar year 2017 budgets, we will see healthcare premiums rise while employee contributions
plateau, adding even more strain to municipal budgets.
MUNICIPAL CASE STUDIES CONCLUSION
The challenges facing New Jersey’s economically distressed urban municipalities are both
complicated and profound. The preceding analysis has examined various intersecting trends that
involve historical socio-economic shifts, technical legal structures related to revenue collection
and budgeting authority, comparisons of the components of property tax structures, and
questions of limited discretion in departmental versus non-departmental spending. Within this
complicated examination of the current municipal budgeting challenge one fundamental reality
must be elevated. New Jersey’s cities are caught in a self-perpetuating cycle of concentrated
poverty: higher levels of need confront structurally-depressed capacity to fund services, a
mismatch that functionally impairs the capacity of these cities to solve their own problem.
Although budget crises are certainly not unique to urban cities, and the state as a whole also
faces significant structural budget problems, the challenge in our cities is unique. Given the longterm costs for our entire society posed by persistent, concentrated poverty, the state as a whole
must engage in solving the problem of concentrated urban poverty.
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SECTION THREE:
SOCIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
This report explores two powerful trends that are combining to create a self-reinforcing
crisis within New Jersey’s high-poverty cities. The well-researched and documented impacts of
concentrated poverty generate significant service needs in order to interrupt the cycle of poverty
for city residents. Given that clear finding, one might except that the NJUMA cities would spend
more on various services to help alleviate poverty and, overall, use public money to improve the
quality of life. In fact, the converse is true. Given their far greater local resources and the
corresponding decline in federal and state aid, municipalities without concentrations of poverty
are spending more on these same types of services (or, at the very least, about the same), for
residents who, on average, need them far less. Under the current tax regime, there is no way to
fix this locally. There are undoubtedly improvements that could be made to the costs of
municipal services, but the only “game-changing” savings that could be realized stem from
benefit adjustments, which, with the notable exception of health insurance, may practically be
impossible. In any scenario, without a comprehensive, even constitutional, retooling of the tax
revenue structure, more federal and state aid is the only solution; this, in turn, means higher taxes
for those municipalities more able to afford it.
Considering the negative effects experienced by New Jersey citizens who reside in
concentrated poverty areas, as well as the various concentrated poverty municipalities within the
State, both urban and rural, there is a significant need for a strong statewide anti-poverty
initiative. This approach must be statewide not only because the impacted areas have the least
financial capacity, but also because concentrated poverty is a problem for the whole state.
Although the manifestation of the problem may be localized, the result is a tremendous drain on
New Jersey’s greatest natural resource: its people.
This initiative must take a systems approach to effectively tackle the challenges that are
faced by the State’s urban centers. This statewide initiative should not only aid in transforming
the lives of individuals and families, but it will also shift the burden from municipalities that lack
the resources to provide residents with the necessary services. The approach must be one that
also interrupts the self-perpetuating loop of service access being tied to areas of concentrated
poverty, thus requiring the poor to stay in these areas. The following recommendations will
highlight various initiatives that can be utilized to tackle New Jersey’s issue with concentrated
poverty.
Strategy #1 - Improve Supports for Families and Their Children by Strengthening the Safety-Net
The safety net is a vital lifeline for poor families – as well as those who are near poverty. Tax
incentives, housing vouchers and food and nutrition supplements are just a few programs that
provide families with supports in times of need. State policies that support families through
difficult times not only help to mitigate hardship but can also provide access to future
opportunities and increase positive outcomes for families and their children. Important policies
and investments include:


Strengthening the State EITC and creating a refundable State Child Care Tax Credit. Tax
credits supplement the cash income available to families to meet household expenses and
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also support local economic growth. The State’s recent investments in expanding the
State EITC can be further strengthened by adding a refundable State Child Care Tax
Credit and further increasing the EITC benefit.


Improving access to Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits by funding
adequate staffing levels and making administrative changes to increase the participation
rate among eligible families.



Strengthening the Work First New Jersey cash welfare program to better respond to the
income needs of those in extreme poverty, including implementing grant increases and
removing the family cap policy.



Addressing the crisis of homelessness and extreme housing cost burden by increasing
investment and removing zoning and other barriers to the development of homes people
can afford. These efforts must also resist the reinstatement of any form of Regional
Contribution Agreements, which would further the concentration of low-income residents
in areas of concentrated poverty.

Strategy #2 – Promote Family Financial Success through Supportive Work/Family Policies
Supportive work policies are essential to ensuring the economic security of families living in,
and near, poverty. In addition to the safety net, supportive workplace policies help to expand
opportunities and allow families to grow toward independence by supporting parents in their
efforts to both successfully raise a family and maintain stable work. Work is an important aspect
of a family’s ability to meet their financial needs and develop assets and social support systems which positively impact their children’s future. Important work/family policies include:


Implementing meaningful and on-going increases in the State minimum wage with a
structured increase to $15/hour over 4 years, followed by annual adjustments for inflation
to prevent future deflation of the real wage floor. Also phase-in an elimination of a
separate tipped worker minimum wage.



Implementing strengthened pay equity rights and enforcement mechanisms to redress the
significant gender pay gap for similar work, particularly among working women of color.



Establishing protection for pregnant workers.



Increasing awareness and enforcement of State Paid Family Leave benefits for all
employees, including targeted outreach to low-wage workers.



Developing and implementing stronger wage theft protections to ensure that low-wage
workers are not exploited by unethical employers.

Strategy #3 – Provide Supports for Families with Multiple Barriers
Child and youth well-being is dependent on the well-being of parents and caregivers, which is
strongly tied to parental capacity, concrete supports, and social connections. Families with
multiple barriers, such as a history of mental health issues, substance abuse, or domestic violence
are often more susceptible to falling behind and becoming even less financially secure.
Additionally, parents or family members that are reintegrating ex-offenders and adults with low
levels of literacy have significant obstacles to overcome related to finding meaningful
employment. In order to ensure that children avoid the difficulties experienced by their parents
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whenever possible, it is critical for policy to support parents experiencing overlapping barriers.
The most effective way to alleviate the struggles these families may face is by providing
personalized supports and services and by strengthening policies and programs that improve
access to comprehensive work supports. Respect, compassion, peer support and mentoring are
essential to the success and independence of these families. Important policies and investments
include:


Ensuring that families with a history of mental health, substance abuse, or domestic
violence receive the proper supports and services to allow for successful integration into
work



Promoting policies that reduce barriers for reintegrating ex-offenders.



Promoting opportunities to advance adult literacy.

Strategy #4 — Invest in Young Children
Children growing up in low-income families tend to fall behind in educational settings
significantly faster than their more economically secure peers. It is crucial to invest in early
education, since gaps begin to grow starting in infancy and only continue to expand into
adulthood when left unaddressed. Increasing investments in multi-generational strategies that
support both parents and their children can help to alleviate poverty twofold and can lead to
better outcomes for these children as they transition into adulthood. Quality child care, early
learning programs and subsidized child care opportunities can help to minimize the achievement
gaps caused by poverty and reduce the likelihood that children continue to be poor as adults.
Research shows that high-quality early care and education programs provide enormous societal
benefits. For every one dollar invested in quality early child care, the State saves $11 — five
dollars of which are savings in crime and corrections costs over time. Important policies and
investments include:


Increasing the number of quality child care and early learning programs available to lowincome families through targeted investment in high-poverty areas not currently served.



Increasing subsidized child care opportunities, including both the number and value of
vouchers for low-income families.



Integrating early learning program standards in child care and Head Start.
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SECTION FOUR:
MUNICIPAL BUDGETARY RECOMMENDATIONS
Municipalities with concentrated poverty currently face a Catch-22. They are caught in an
inevitable cycle of decreased revenue capacity, forcing decreased services and an increased tax
burden, which only serves to further reinforce existing patterns of concentrated poverty, with the
high associated service needs and a lack of resources that only perpetuates or even deepens the
problem. Our cities need new solutions, and it is clear that they cannot solve this entrenched
problem on their own. The state as a whole must engage in the process of reversing the cycle of
concentrated poverty.
The following recommendations will highlight various initiatives that can be utilized to address
the budget and poverty crisis in New Jersey’s poorest cities.
Strategy #1: Address structural limitations on municipal revenue-raising capacity
a. Establish a task force to create and develop, with the input of a diverse group of
stakeholders, a system of taxation that accounts for the multitude of discrepancies
and differences between cities, suburbs, and rural areas lost in the current tax
regime and that have accumulated over time. This group should be limited in
membership and should function somewhat like a commission, but should
conduct itself more in the manner of an academic study. Points of focus in this
discussion ought to be targeted to the relative ability to pay, the relative tax
burden among homeowners and commercial property, as well as an equitable
adjustment for large non-profit institutions, most commonly found in concentrated
poverty cities. An adjustment would not be limited to a discussion of a tax or fee
on local non-profits, as is currently begin contemplated in the Legislature in
regard to hospitals, but include mechanisms for charging for the services they
provide when used by non-residents (such as a local services tax or non-resident
earned income tax, which are found in Pennsylvania). The relative ability to pay
is, at its simplest, a measure of the tax burden relative to income (as opposed to
just taking into account real property value). The basic issue that this effort would
seek to correct is that poorer residents tend to have higher tax burdens than
wealthier ones, simply due to the proportion of a lower income that must be
allocated for tax payments.
b. Carefully consider, via an academically-based study entity, the introduction of
other forms of taxation to be made available to cities, which, for example, have
been available in neighboring Pennsylvania for decades, and which can be more
equitably distributed among all those who use the resources of the city, rather than
just the residents. Pennsylvania municipalities — and particularly those with
financial difficulty and concentrated poverty — are able to access a variety of
taxation powers, often based on income and usually targeted towards particular
functions. For example, general resident and non-resident income taxes are
available (those who live and work in the city and those who just work in the city)
with a version of the latter allocated towards funding pension-related costs. In
addition, local services taxes (up to a $3 a week fee deducted from employee
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paychecks beyond a certain income threshold) limit payments to funding
particular services that commuters make use of. As money is fungible, such
revenue gathered from that tax could then replace general revenues currently
funding those programs and shift it to other functions. As major municipal taxes
of this form only exist in New Jersey for Newark, the enabling statute could and
should be written to require revenues to go towards particular municipal functions
and services. Not only would the aggregate tax revenues be raised, but, more
importantly, redistributed; i.e., we would seek to generate more revenue from this
redistribution of the burden but limit exposure to those least capable of paying
more.
Strategy #2 Assess and adjust State Aid to Municipalities to prioritize areas of concentrated
need.
a. Ensure more stable and predictable budgeting by allowing for greater municipal
participation in the grants process with appropriate State agencies, perhaps with
the creation of a municipal ombudsman position to monitor the allocation of grant
funding within the State budget. As significant amounts of municipal revenues
and programming comes from grants, and since grant revenues can sometimes be
moved in a fungible State general fund budget, their sources and uses must be
carefully monitored in order to ensure provision to needy municipalities. The
same recommendation applies, to the extent possible, to municipal state aid for
municipal budget purposes. Short of a constitutional amendment, it would seem
that the statutory framework is there presently and that there needs to be an entity
pushing this argument forward and ensuring, from outside the Administration,
that the law is complied with, to the extent feasible in the State budget. CMPTRA
takes into account some of what is discussed herein, but could be subject to a
readjustment based on the “Adequacy Budget” principle created under SFRA.
b. Empower a diverse group of stakeholders with an academic lead, to rework the
formula and variables weighed in the allocation of municipal state aid, in order to
more substantially account for the service requirements concentrated in cities,
such as professional fire protection, the maintenance of large infrastructure
systems, the upkeep of vacant homes, factories, and commercial structures, and
the service needs associated with concentrated poverty. Such a stakeholder group
would have representatives from “effected parties” − the business, not-for-profit,
and political communities (namely Mayors and Councilpersons), who would have
ready access to both bureaucrats in the Division of Local Government Services
and the Division of Taxation, along with academic experts at higher education
institutions, such as the John S. Watson Institute for Public Policy of Thomas
Edison State University and Rutgers’ Local Government Research Center. Once
again, this formula exercise should seek inspiration from the Adequacy Budget,
insofar as a certain amount of spending on poverty alleviation should be required.
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Strategy #3 - For those cities that have been in the Transitional Aid program since its inception,
create a new instrument of aid that allows for the structural gap to truly be closed, rather than
continually relying on a fluctuating Transitional Aid allotment, which, as the name suggests, is
supposed to be truly temporary.
Strategy #4 - Develop a methodology for more accurately assessing the full cost (both fiscal and
service costs) of cost-saving and cost-shifting changes at the municipal level.
a. A methodology should be developed and widely implemented to fully cost out the
impact of service reductions, particularly in areas outside of public safety and
public works (broadly, social services). That is, when a “service” is cut through
eliminating a department or position, is the service actually an absolute cut or
must there be someone to take up the burden (e.g., a police officer now does the
work of a caseworker in bringing a homeless person with behavioral health issues
to a healthcare services site)? If the latter is the case, we must understand the true
budgetary and service impact, as apparent immediate budget savings may actually
result in near-immediate budget losses and a decline in service quality. If cuts are
due to a need to keep under the property tax levy cap, there might still be
incentive to perform the cut in order to demonstrate “budget” savings and there
would be a need to correct for this. State aid should be made available if the
municipality were able to prove the negative budget impact of the service
reduction. If under Transitional Aid or a similar program, the municipality could
demonstrate to the State that by keeping this service intact it will save money in
the long term; the State, in that case, should maintain that level of aid. The central
problem here must be to diminish the focus on short term impacts and to limit
“hiding” costs in the public safety or other large budgets, which are often much
harder to trim.
Strategy #5 - To establish, by formula, minimum funding requirements for libraries rather than a
minimum tax levy based on equalized values.
a. Under the current system, some poor, high population municipalities and some
rich, low population municipalities collect roughly the same amount of money for
library purposes from the carved out tax. The difficulty here is obvious, given that
low income, high population communities have a far greater and higher need
population to serve than a smaller wealthier community. The funding requirement
could be the current tax levy system with a “gap” filled by State aid. This
suggestion is limited to libraries, given that they have already been “carved out”
by statute. Such thinking could apply to most other municipal functions, but too
many carve outs, short of the “Adequacy Budget” approach discussed above,
could present difficulties.
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APPENDIX I:
DETAILS OF SOCIAL POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
Strategy #1 — Improve Supports for Families and Their Children by Strengthening the SafetyNet
Tax Credits: Policies such as the State Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) or the federal Child
Tax Credit have helped families increase their wages by providing both income support and
incentivizing work. The EITC assists low-income families that work through a refundable tax
credit. EITC reduces poverty by supplementing the wages of low-income families thereby
providing extra financial assistance to use toward other important costs that can enhance family
well-being. In addition to the financial benefits of the EITC, the credit has also been shown to
significantly increase other positive outcomes for children. Research shows that the EITC
improves the school performance of children on a variety of measures including test scores,
which could lead to alleviating poverty among parents, as well as their children in the future.
While New Jersey already has a strong EITC, families could further benefit from increases in
this benefit, as well as institution of a parallel Child Care Tax Credit, to provide an additional
refundable credit that working parents can use to offset the high cost of child care for the hours
they are working.
Nutrition Programs: With over a million people in New Jersey are still affirming that they do
not always have adequate access to nutritious food on a daily basis, it is critical that various
forms of in-kind assistance for low-income families such as SNAP (food stamps) and school
meals be available to the widest possible number of New Jerseyans. Unfortunately, New Jersey
has lagged behind other states in its use of federal nutrition programs and therefore available
federal funds are not being allocated. Although New Jersey has taken steps to expand eligibility
for SNAP and streamline the application process, only about 77% of those eligible actually
participate in the program. New Jersey lags considerably behind the National average of 83% of
eligible people accessing SNAP benefits. If the participation rate rose just five percentage points,
57,000 more people would have $22.4 million more per year to purchase nutritious food. Federal
waivers are available to states that would allow expansion of income eligibility to 200% of the
federal poverty level and also allow easier documentation of household expenses that would
boost benefits. In addition, an investment in adequate staffing at the county level would ensure
the timely processing of applications as well as increase the time available to clients thereby
increasing the likelihood that all available expenses are documented. Similarly school meals play
a crucial role in feeding low-income children. Sadly not all federally funded school meal
programs enjoy the participation rate of the school lunch program. For example, only 44% of
New Jersey’s eligible children receive school breakfast leaving almost 300,000 children
unserved. If New Jersey school districts served breakfast to just 70% of the students who receive
free or reduced-priced lunch, districts would collect an additional $21.9 million in federal
funding. Supporting the expansion of school breakfast at the state level by investing as small
amount of incentive funds to districts to adopt a “breakfast after the bell” approach to school
breakfast would increase participation.
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Work First New Jersey: The Work First New Jersey (WFNJ) program, including both
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) for very low-income families and General
Assistance (GA) for adults without children, provides cash assistance for those at the very
bottom of the economic ladder. Any household that is eligible for benefits under WFNJ can
receive a small monthly cash grant and may also receive other services including emergency
housing payments, child care assistance, substance abuse and mental health services, and job
training or job placement. Both eligibility and cash grants, however, have declined significantly
since grant levels were last increased in 1987. A three-person family still receives only $424 per
month, and a single adult with a disability receives only $210. Benefits are also artificially
reduced through a policy known as the family cap, which prohibits providing benefits for a child
conceived while the mother is on TANF, meaning that a family of four may still only receive
$424 per month if one of the children is “capped.” As a result of the nearly 30 year gap since
grant levels were increased, approximately 80 percent of poor children now receive no cash
assistance in New Jersey. New Jersey’s TANF grants are the lowest among all North Eastern
states, and when housing prices are considered, New Jersey grants are the 10th lowest in the
nation.
Homelessness and Affordable Housing: Homelessness and high rates of housing cost-burden
are challenges that characterize areas of concentrated poverty, with significant relevance for the
long-term costs of concentrated poverty at both the individual and societal level. The solutions to
both of these problems are, moreover, related. Increasingly the supply and distribution of
affordable housing across the state will directly impact homelessness and housing cost burdens
for those households that are able to move into such units, and by ensuring access to housing
outside of high-poverty areas for low-income families, the service costs related to concentrated
poverty can be reduced. In order to achieve these goals, action is needed on many levels, both
through funding for the development of new and rehabilitated housing that can be rented or sold
at affordable costs, and through the dismantling of zoning restrictions and other blocks to
development.
Strategy #2 — Promote Family Financial Success through Supportive Work/Family Policies
Minimum Wage: One way policies can change to better support families is to raise the
minimum wage. Raising the minimum wage for low-wage workers can prevent millions of
families from living in poverty. An increase in wages can often help provide families with just
enough to provide the essentials to meet their basic needs. Minimum wage earners have seen
wages stalled at an all-time low, while the cost of living continues to rise. However, 14 states and
municipalities have agreed to incrementally or more expediently increase their minimum wage to
$15 with full implementation ranging from 2018-2021 these include the State of New York, the
cities of Seattle, WA, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Emeryville, Sunnyvale, Palo Alto, Mountain
View, and the County of Los Angeles, CA. (National Employment Law Project, 2015). New
Jersey however has yet to make the decision to increase minimum wage to $15, currently the
minimum wage for the State is $8.38/hour.
Another way to better support families is to support equal pay for women. Women are still
experiencing a significant wage gap in comparison to their male counterparts. In the nation
overall women who work full time earn approximately 79 cents on the dollar, compared to their
male counterparts. This gap equates to hundreds of thousands of dollars in lost wages over the
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course of a lifetime. The pay gap becomes larger among minority women; African American
women earn 60 cents and Latino women earn 55 cents for every dollar that a White non-Hispanic
man earns (National Partnership for Women and Families, 2015).
Pay Equity: Women working full-time in New Jersey make only about 80 cents on the dollar
compared to full-time male workers, and this gap is even more significant for women of color,
who make only 58 cents or 43 cents (for Black and Hispanic women, respectively) compared
with White, Non-Hispanic men. Given the high rates of poverty among female-headed
households, this pay gap translates to significantly reduced resources available to New Jersey’s
neediest households. Legislation that would have made it easier to remediate instances of pay
inequity based on gender (particularly by allowing pay inequity claims for substantially similar
work even when job titles are different) was recently conditionally vetoed by Governor Christie.
Much remains to be done to strengthen pay equity rights as a direct poverty reduction tool.
Protections for Expectant Mothers: Expecting mothers are also a vulnerable demographic that
greatly affects the amount of families living in poverty. Pregnant workers are often penalized for
requiring certain accommodations on the job, and often times, these women are forced out or
fired. When possible, working during pregnancy can allow women to earn additional income and
permit women to take a longer period of leave following childbirth. Low-income women in the
workforce are often more affected by the demands of job duties during pregnancy than are their
more affluent peers, since they are more susceptible to work in jobs with limited flexibility.
However, women with slightly higher paying jobs in fields that have traditionally been
dominated by men, such as policing and trucking, face multiple obstacles in keeping their
employment during and after pregnancy. The physical conflict between work and childbearing
can lead some mothers to lose their jobs, which disconnects their families from needed income
during a crucial time.
Paid Family Leave and Earned Sick Leave: Paid family and medical leave provides income
replacement to workers on leave for family caregiving, bonding with a new child, or personal
leave taken to recover from a serious health condition. It is essential to provide new parents with
the opportunity to request time off without being penalized or forced to incur the economic
burden of unpaid leave or the possible threat of losing their jobs. In 2014 New Jersey residents
filed 160,000 leave claims since the State’s implementation of the program in 2009; of those
120,000 were new parents. This provides opportunities to families with newborns. Inflexible
work schedule and insufficient time off makes it difficult for parents to have an engaged and
meaningful presence in their children’s lives, which is especially impactful on newborns. This
support is important to ensure financial security by maintaining job stability and is critical for
both parents (National Partnership for Women & Families, 2014). While New Jersey has a strong
Paid Family Leave Law, implementation is slow and more effort needs to be devoted to public
education. In addition, about ten percent of workers facing temporary sickness (their own or a
family member’s) currently have no access to Earned Sick Time. This inability to take paid time
off when they are ill means that these workers must choose to forgo their day’s pay (or
potentially lose their jobs) in order to take care or their health or see a doctor. For low-wage
workers, this lost income is often highly disruptive and they chose instead to come to work sick,
raising the risk of infecting their coworkers and the public.
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Strategy #3 – Provide Supports for Families with Multiple Barriers
Supports and Services: It is important to prioritize the safety and well-being of children in
families with multiple barriers by providing comprehensive services that include treatment and
support for issues that can interfere with parenting. Families that have come in contact with
issues related to mental health, substance abuse or domestic violence will need a targeted, rather
than universal approach to effectively meet their needs. When left untreated, mental health and
substance abuse issues can be detrimental to both the parent and the child’s well-being. Access to
mental and behavioral supports and services can increase a parent’s capacity to provide a safe
and stable home and decrease the risk of childhood trauma. Increasing access to treatment can
have positive impacts on child well-being—both in childhood and as children grow into adults.
Quality, evidence-based home-visiting programs help to create better outcomes for babies and
families with multiple barriers. These programs also promote family self-sufficiency and provide
a link to social support services.
Re-entry Services: One in every 28 children in the United States has a parent behind bars,
which means that policies that reduce barriers for reintegrating ex-offenders have the potential to
positively impact numerous children and multiple generations. Without the proper support, exoffenders have high rates of recidivism, and having a parent who is incarcerated can impede the
well-being and economic success of a child. Ex-offenders face multiple barriers to employment
that make it nearly impossible to reintegrate into society successfully without support.
Workforce strategies for reintegrating ex-offenders should include increasing the opportunities
offered to further education, employment and asset development.
Literacy: 30 million adults in the United States, 14 percent of the population, cannot read
beyond that of the average 3rd grader; however, only 3 million will have access to education
services. Without basic reading skills, these adults will face significant obstacles in finding work
and supporting their families. Adults with low literacy skills also find difficulty in financial
literacy and are more likely to fall victim of predatory lenders and financial scams that would
further jeopardize their family’s economic stability. Without the ability to read, these adults will
be unable to keep pace with technological advances and, as a result, will be left out of
opportunities that are accessible only through the Internet. Family literacy programs create an
opportunity for low-income parents to keep pace with technological advances, as well as increase
social supports for parents through activities that foster healthy educational activities that build
relationships with educators and community members.
Strategy #4 — Invest in Young Children
Quality Child Care: Quality childcare and early learning programs have proven to increase the
likelihood of educational attainment. Data from early grades have been powerful predictors of
achievement and outcomes; therefore, strong foundational skills in reading, math and writing are
fundamental for successes in high school, college and in the workplace. Along with an array of
other factors, early learning programs targeted at low-income children can help to increase future
success; however, unfortunately, high-quality early opportunities are often cost-prohibitive, and
access is limited for many low-income families. Only 42 percent of eligible children are served
in Head Start preschool and less than 4 percent of eligible children are served in early Head Start.
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Child Care Subsidies: The average fee for full-time child care in the State of New Jersey ranges
from approximately $3,475 to $12,638 a year, depending on where the family lives, the type of
care provided and the age of the child. This cost is a substantial financial burden for low-income
families. Child care subsidies help to assist families to offset the cost (New Jersey Association of
Child Care Resources and Referral Agencies, 2014). Unfortunately in 2012 in the United States,
child care assistance spending fell to a 10-year low, while the number of children receiving Child
Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG) funding for child care fell to a 14-year low; about
263,000 fewer children received CCDBG-funded child care in 2012 than in 2006. Reduced
funding for these subsidies will seriously impact low-income families working to support their
children. Many low-wage jobs would actually make work a financial burden for low-income and
poor families – with child care costing more than the families earning potential through work.
Requiring parents to choose between child care and work is restrictive to the financial success
and independence of low-income families. Increasing subsidies for child care can provide an
increased number of families with the opportunity to work toward success.
Early Learning Program Standards: Not only is access to child care and early learning
programs necessary, but quality is also an important aspect to consider. Unfortunately, limited
access to high quality programs has been restrictive for many low-income families. Children who
attend high quality early learning programs often demonstrate better results compared to their
peers in a number of developmental domains. Research demonstrates that high-quality child care
with warm, responsive and skilled caregivers; healthy and safe environments; and linkages to
community supports help promote healthy development for infants and toddlers and create better
outcomes for the child’s future. In addition to early learning opportunities, Early Head Start’s
comprehensive early childhood development programs provide children and families with access
to a variety of services such as health screenings, referrals and follow-up support, as well as
parenting resources, which helps to positively impact the overall well-being of children and
families. Programs that integrate high-quality care standards and address the holistic needs of
families help to foster family stability and promote positive outcomes for low income children
and families.
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APPENDIX II:
MUNICIPAL DATA DETAIL
Distribution of Poverty by Classification begun
NJUMA
All Individuals below X% of
Poverty Level:
50 percent
29,161
125 percent
82,087
150 percent
96,462
185 percent
115,672
200 percent
123,016
Urban
All Individuals below X% of
Poverty Level:
50 percent
221,953
125 percent
628,894
150 percent
761,992
185 percent
938,068
200 percent
1,006,589
Dense Suburban
All Individuals below X% of
Poverty Level:
50 percent
32,475
125 percent
103,655
150 percent
132,983
185 percent
178,335
200 percent
195,293

Suburban
All Individuals below X% of
Poverty Level:
50 percent
94,362
125 percent
278,080
150 percent
359,498
185 percent
490,253
200 percent
546,607
Rural
All Individuals below X% of
Poverty Level:
50 percent
43,947
125 percent
132,731
150 percent
172,265
185 percent
236,202
200 percent
264,321

% of Total
Population
13%
37%
43%
52%
55%
% of Total
Population
9%
26%
32%
39%
42%

% of Total
Population
3%
8%
10%
14%
15%
% of Total
Population
3%
8%
10%
14%
16%

% of Total
Population
4%
12%
15%
20%
22%

Median Household Income and Per Capita Income
Median Household Income
NJUMA
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
Trenton City (Mercer)
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
Passaic City (Passaic)
Urban
Dense Suburban
Suburban
Rural

Per Capita Income
NJUMA
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
Trenton City (Mercer)
Passaic City (Passaic)
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
Urban
Dense Suburban
Suburban
Rural

$37,339
$45,276
$35,647
$35,352
$33,081
$54,243
$73,900
$91,218
$88,444
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$16,290
$19,217
$17,021
$15,193
$13,730
$27,704
$36,145
$44,248
$43,450

Distribution of Household Income
NJUMA
Total Households
Less Than $10,000
$10,000 To $14,999
$15,000 To $24,999
$25,000 To $34,999
$35,000 To $49,999
$50,000 To $74,999
$75,000 To $99,999
$100,000 To $149,999
$150,000 To $199,999
$200,000 Or More
Urban
Total Households
Less Than $10,000
$10,000 To $14,999
$15,000 To $24,999
$25,000 To $34,999
$35,000 To $49,999
$50,000 To $74,999
$75,000 To $99,999
$100,000 To $149,999
$150,000 To $199,999
$200,000 Or More
Dense Suburban
Total Households
Less Than $10,000
$10,000 To $14,999
$15,000 To $24,999
$25,000 To $34,999
$35,000 To $49,999
$50,000 To $74,999
$75,000 To $99,999
$100,000 To $149,999
$150,000 To $199,999
$200,000 Or More

#
70,285
10,013
5,545
10,208
8,255
9,224
12,052
6,451
5,762
1,841
934
#
855,517
84,622
53,649
97,832
90,805
110,632
142,213
97,516
100,434
41,089
36,725
#
329,509
15,583
11,196
25,282
24,764
34,037
55,719
44,611
58,527
30,249
29,541

% Of
Suburban
100% Total Households
14% Less Than $10,000
8% $10,000 To $14,999
15% $15,000 To $24,999
12% $25,000 To $34,999
13% $35,000 To $49,999
17% $50,000 To $74,999
9% $75,000 To $99,999
8% $100,000 To $149,999
3% $150,000 To $199,999
1% $200,000 Or More
% Of
Rural
100% Total Households
10% Less Than $10,000
6% $10,000 To $14,999
11% $15,000 To $24,999
11% $25,000 To $34,999
13% $35,000 To $49,999
17% $50,000 To $74,999
11% $75,000 To $99,999
12% $100,000 To $149,999
5% $150,000 To $199,999
4% $200,000 Or More
% Of
100%
5%
3%
8%
8%
10%
17%
14%
18%
9%
9%

92

#
% Of
1,313,042
100%
42,588
3%
34,281
3%
82,542
6%
81,285
6%
120,120
9%
201,174
15%
175,243
13%
261,016
20%
140,405
11%
174,388
13%
#
% Of
620,145
100%
19,817
3%
16,924
3%
42,581
7%
43,569
7%
62,124
10%
98,441
16%
82,316
13%
120,794
19%
62,939
10%
70,640
11%

Gross Rent as % of Median Income
Classification

(%)

NJUMA

Classification

(%)

Suburban

Less Than 15.0 Percent

8

Less Than 15.0 Percent

11

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

8

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

12

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

11

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

13

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

10

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

11

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

9

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

9

35.0 Percent Or More

54

35.0 Percent Or More

44

Urban

Rural

Less Than 15.0 Percent

10

Less Than 15.0 Percent

12

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

11

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

12

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

11

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

13

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

11

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

11

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

9

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

8

35.0 Percent Or More

48

35.0 Percent Or More

44

Dense Suburban
15.0 To 19.9 Percent

12

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

13

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

12

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

9

35.0 Percent Or More

43

Gross Rent as % of Median Income in NJUMA Cities
Municipality (County)

(%)

Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
Occupied Units Paying Rent

Municipality (County)

(%)

Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
17

Occupied Units Paying Rent

17

Less Than 15.0 Percent

9

Less Than 15.0 Percent

8

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

8

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

9

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

12

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

14

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

7

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

10

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

10

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

9

35.0 Percent Or More

54

35.0 Percent Or More

50

Passaic City (Passaic)
Occupied Units Paying Rent

Trenton City (Mercer)
17

Occupied Units Paying Rent

17

Less Than 15.0 Percent

7

Less Than 15.0 Percent

8

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

7

15.0 To 19.9 Percent

7

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

10

20.0 To 24.9 Percent

9

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

11

25.0 To 29.9 Percent

14

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

8

30.0 To 34.9 Percent

10

35.0 Percent Or More

58

35.0 Percent Or More

53
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Selected Monthly Owner Costs As A Percentage Of Household Income (SMOCAPI) for
Housing with a Mortgage
Classification
(%) Classification
(%)
NJUMA
Suburban
Less Than 20.0 Percent
24 Less Than 20.0 Percent
29
20.0 To 24.9 Percent
13 20.0 To 24.9 Percent
16
25.0 To 29.9 Percent
11 25.0 To 29.9 Percent
13
30.0 To 34.9 Percent
11 30.0 To 34.9 Percent
10
35.0 Percent Or More
40 35.0 Percent Or More
32
Urban
Rural
Less Than 20.0 Percent
24 Less Than 20.0 Percent
30
20.0 To 24.9 Percent
13 20.0 To 24.9 Percent
16
25.0 To 29.9 Percent
11 25.0 To 29.9 Percent
13
30.0 To 34.9 Percent
9 30.0 To 34.9 Percent
10
35.0 Percent Or More
44 35.0 Percent Or More
32
Dense Suburban
Less Than 20.0 Percent
27
20.0 To 24.9 Percent
15
25.0 To 29.9 Percent
13
30.0 To 34.9 Percent
10
35.0 Percent Or More
35
Selected Monthly Owner Costs as a Percentage Of Household Income (SMOCAPI) for
Housing with a Mortgage Among NJUMA Cities
Municipality (County)
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
Passaic City (Passaic)
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)
Trenton City (Mercer)
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30%
55%
39%
36%

Those with No Health Insurance
% of Population Without Health
Insurance
Passaic
New Brunswick
Perth Amboy
Bridgeton
Newark
Paterson
Trenton
Clifton
Vineland
Bloomfield
Upper Deerfield
Woodbridge
East Brunswick
Hamilton (Mercer)
Metuchen Borough
Wayne
West Windsor
Essex Fells

% of Population Without Health
Insurance
NJUMA
Urban
Dense Suburban
Statewide Average
Suburban
Rural

30%
30%
29%
29%
26%
25%
23%
16%
14%
11%
11%
11%
10%
10%
7%
7%
4%
2%
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28%
19%
14%
10%
8%
7%

Vehicle Availability
NJUMA
Occupied Housing Units
70,285
No Vehicles Available
21,097
1 Vehicle Available
28,769
2 Vehicles Available
15,257
3 Or More Vehicles Available
5,162
Urban
Occupied Housing Units
855,517
No Vehicles Available
216,367
1 Vehicle Available
369,045
2 Vehicles Available
198,530
3 Or More Vehicles Available
71,575
Dense Suburban
Occupied Housing Units
329,509
No Vehicles Available
31,772
1 Vehicle Available
124,961
2 Vehicles Available
123,959
3 Or More Vehicles Available
48,817
Suburban
Occupied Housing Units
1,312,323
No Vehicles Available
75,424
1 Vehicle Available
410,329
2 Vehicles Available
553,218
3 Or More Vehicles Available
273,352
Rural
Occupied Housing Units
620,864
No Vehicles Available
28,476
1 Vehicle Available
173,521
2 Vehicles Available
261,979
3 Or More Vehicles Available
156,888

Bridgeton
Occupied Housing Units
No Vehicles Available
1 Vehicle Available
2 Vehicles Available
3 Or More Vehicles Available
Passaic
Occupied Housing Units
No Vehicles Available
1 Vehicle Available
2 Vehicles Available
3 Or More Vehicles Available
Perth Amboy
Occupied Housing Units
No Vehicles Available
1 Vehicle Available
2 Vehicles Available
3 Or More Vehicles Available
Trenton
Occupied Housing Units
No Vehicles Available
1 Vehicle Available
2 Vehicles Available
3 Or More Vehicles Available
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5,937
1,122
2,487
1,583
745
20,044
7,667
8,339
3,239
799
16,306
3,786
6,463
4,423
1,634
27,998
8,522
11,480
6,012
1,984

Language Facility Profile
NJUMA
Speak English Less Than
"Very Well"
Asian & Pacific Islander
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Total
Asian & Pacific Islander
English
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Urban
Speak English Less Than
"Very Well"
Asian & Pacific Islander
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Total
Asian & Pacific Islander
English
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Dense Suburban
Speak English Less Than
"Very Well"
Asian & Pacific Islander
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Total
Asian & Pacific Islander
English
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish

64,990
765
3,651
520
60,054
211,826
1,709
89,149
8,475
1,889
110,604
512,696
45,543
92,308
16,727
358,118
2,246,938
103,369
1,153,645
218,477
48,434
723,013
112,833
15,038
28,232
5,087
64,476
842,738
38,498
556,584
79,330
18,854
149,472
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Suburban
Speak English Less Than
"Very Well"
Asian & Pacific Islander
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Total
Asian & Pacific Islander
English
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Rural
Speak English Less Than
"Very Well"
Asian & Pacific Islander
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish
Total
Asian & Pacific Islander
English
Other Indo-European
Other
Spanish

280,733
82,157
97,565
11,685
89,326
3,425,260
212,918
2,611,082
319,372
43,239
238,649
63,176
13,719
21,331
1,945
26,181
1,611,741
38,654
1,399,390
82,660
9,422
81,615

Citizenship Status
Classification
Amount % Non- Citizen
54,846
24%
NJUMA
441,053
18%
Urban
98,474
11%
Dense Suburban
266,896
7%
Suburban
53,970
3%
Rural
Municipality
Amount % Non- Citizen
5,021
11%
Bloomfield
5,525
22%
Bridgeton
13,326
16%
Clifton
5,629
12%
East Brunswick
30
1%
Essex Fells
1,736
5%
Ewing
6,660
8%
Hamilton (Mercer)
803
6%
Metuchen
17,866
32%
New Brunswick
50,939
18%
Newark
20,542
29%
Passaic
26,629
18%
Paterson
13,203
26%
Perth Amboy
15,576
18%
Trenton
323
4%
Upper Deerfield
4,936
8%
Vineland
3,394
6%
Wayne
4,411
16%
West Windsor
14,261
14%
Woodbridge
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Educational Attainment by Classification
NJUMA
Population 25 Years
And Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree
Urban
Population 25 Years
And Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree
Dense Suburban
Population 25 Years
And Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree

141,791 %
of
25,743 18%
19,952 14%
51,725

36%

21,120
6,052
11,647
5,552

15%
4%
8%
4%

1,596,362 %
of
162,721 10%
152,793 10%
516,906

32%

277,446
83,167
267,839
135,490

17%
5%
17%
8%

619,408 %
of
31,665
5%
33,507
5%
173,789

28%

105,324
37,693
144,700
92,730

17%
6%
23%
15%
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Suburban
Population 25 Years
And Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree
Rural
Population 25 Years
And Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree

2,510,691 %
of
75,043
3%
108,256
4%
642,657

26%

407,559
165,080
669,754
442,342

16%
7%
27%
18%

1,184,369 %
of
30,517
3%
62,301
5%
358,190

30%

215,307
87,970
268,073
162,011

18%
7%
23%
14%

Educational Attainment in NJUMA Cities
Bridgeton City
(Cumberland)
Population 25 Years And
Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree
Passaic City (Passaic)
Population 25 Years And
Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree

15,256
15,256 %
of
2,953 19%
3,154 21%
5,585

37%

2,067
590
645
262

14%
4%
4%
2%

40,220
40,220 %
of
9,263 23%
4,701 12%
14,102

35%

4,987
1,432
3,600
2,135

12%
4%
9%
5%

100

Perth Amboy City
(Middlesex)
Population 25 Years And
Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree
Trenton City (Mercer)
Population 25 Years And
Over
Less Than 9th Grade
9th To 12th Grade, No
Diploma
High School Graduate
(Includes Equivalency)
Some College, No Degree
Associate's Degree
Bachelor's Degree
Graduate Or Professional
Degree

32,574
32,574 %
of
6,377 20%
3,848 12%
11,086

34%

4,697
1,757
3,730
1,079

14%
5%
11%
3%

53,741
53,741 %
of
7,150 13%
8,249 15%
20,952

39%

9,369
2,273
3,672
2,076

17%
4%
7%
4%

Age of Housing Stock by Classification
NJUMA
Total Housing Units
Built 1939 Or Earlier
Built 1940 To 1949
Built 1950 To 1959
Built 1960 To 1969
Built 1970 To 1979
Built 1980 To 1989
Built 1990 To 1999
Built 2000 To 2009
Built 2010 Or Later
Urban
Total Housing Units
Built 1939 Or Earlier
Built 1940 To 1949
Built 1950 To 1959
Built 1960 To 1969
Built 1970 To 1979
Built 1980 To 1989
Built 1990 To 1999
Built 2000 To 2009
Built 2010 Or Later
Dense Suburban
Total Housing Units
Built 1939 Or Earlier
Built 1940 To 1949
Built 1950 To 1959
Built 1960 To 1969
Built 1970 To 1979
Built 1980 To 1989
Built 1990 To 1999
Built 2000 To 2009
Built 2010 Or Later

80,304 100%
29,722
37%
13,520
17%
12,644
16%
7,983
10%
4,584
6%
3,496
4%
2,848
4%
4,951
6%
556
1%
972,514 100%
264,850
27%
114,039
12%
146,839
15%
128,401
13%
98,419
10%
64,701
7%
53,636
6%
94,956
10%
6,673
1%

Suburban
Total Housing Units 1,450,251 100%
Built 1939 Or Earlier
184,018
13%
Built 1940 To 1949
89,489
6%
Built 1950 To 1959
260,964
18%
Built 1960 To 1969
232,863
16%
Built 1970 To 1979
201,554
14%
Built 1980 To 1989
200,668
14%
Built 1990 To 1999
150,442
10%
Built 2000 To 2009
122,342
8%
Built 2010 Or Later
7,911
1%
Rural
Total Housing Units
708,767 100%
Built 1939 Or Earlier
60,101
8%
Built 1940 To 1949
25,942
4%
Built 1950 To 1959
64,127
9%
Built 1960 To 1969
80,779
11%
Built 1970 To 1979
126,736
18%
Built 1980 To 1989
132,650
19%
Built 1990 To 1999
104,909
15%
Built 2000 To 2009
107,440
15%
Built 2010 Or Later
6,083
1%

360,302 100%
105,643
29%
53,537
15%
76,356
21%
45,268
13%
29,642
8%
19,306
5%
13,715
4%
15,564
4%
1,271
0%
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Age of Housing Stock in NJUMA Cities
Bridgeton City
(Cumberland)
Total Housing Units
Built 1939 Or Earlier
Built 1940 To 1949
Built 1950 To 1959
Built 1960 To 1969
Built 1970 To 1979
Built 1980 To 1989
Built 1990 To 1999
Built 2000 To 2009
Built 2010 Or Later
Passaic City (Passaic)
Total Housing Units
Built 1939 Or Earlier
Built 1940 To 1949
Built 1950 To 1959
Built 1960 To 1969
Built 1970 To 1979
Built 1980 To 1989
Built 1990 To 1999
Built 2000 To 2009
Built 2010 Or Later

6,765 100%
1,684
25%
748
11%
1,557
23%
1,008
15%
559
8%
191
3%
185
3%
833
12%
0
0%
21,724 100%
6,700
31%
5,955
27%
3,202
15%
2,488
11%
1,392
6%
964
4%
471
2%
552
3%
0
0%

Perth Amboy City
(Middlesex)
Total Housing Units
Built 1939 Or Earlier
Built 1940 To 1949
Built 1950 To 1959
Built 1960 To 1969
Built 1970 To 1979
Built 1980 To 1989
Built 1990 To 1999
Built 2000 To 2009
Built 2010 Or Later
Trenton City (Mercer)
Total Housing Units
Built 1939 Or Earlier
Built 1940 To 1949
Built 1950 To 1959
Built 1960 To 1969
Built 1970 To 1979
Built 1980 To 1989
Built 1990 To 1999
Built 2000 To 2009
Built 2010 Or Later
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17,284 100%
4,970
29%
1,712
10%
2,740
16%
1,785
10%
1,037
6%
1,163
7%
1,112
6%
2,386
14%
379
2%
34,531 100%
16,368
47%
5,105
15%
5,145
15%
2,702
8%
1,596
5%
1,178
3%
1,080
3%
1,180
3%
177
1%

Room Occupancy
NJUMA
Occupied Housing Units
70,285 100%
1.00 Or Less
61,024
87%
1.01 To 1.50
4,170
6%
1.51 Or More
5,091
7%
Urban
Occupied Housing Units
855,517 100%
1.00 Or Less
794,036
93%
1.01 To 1.50
35,441
4%
1.51 Or More
26,040
3%
Dense Suburban
Occupied Housing Units
329,509 100%
1.00 Or Less
319,858
97%
1.01 To 1.50
5,660
2%
1.51 Or More
3,991
1%
Suburban
Occupied Housing Units 1,312,323 100%
1.00 Or Less
1,291,625
98%
1.01 To 1.50
14,781
1%
1.51 Or More
5,917
0%
Rural
Occupied Housing Units
620,864 100%
1.00 Or Less
615,846
99%
1.01 To 1.50
3,608
1%
1.51 Or More
1,410
0%
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Owner Occupation and Mortgage Status
Classification
Amount
NJUMA
Total Housing Units
80,304
Occupied Housing Units
70,285
Vacant Housing Units
10,019
Urban
Total Housing Units
972,514
Occupied Housing Units
855,517
Vacant Housing Units
116,997
Dense Suburban
Total Housing Units
360,302
Occupied Housing Units
329,509
Vacant Housing Units
30,793
Suburban
Total Housing Units
1,450,251
Occupied Housing Units 1,312,323
Vacant Housing Units
137,928
Rural
Total Housing Units
708,767
Occupied Housing Units
620,864
Vacant Housing Units
87,903

Classification
Amount
NJUMA
Owner Occupied Units
23,321
Housing Units With A Mortgage
16,703
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
6,618
Urban
Owner Occupied Units
328,785
Housing Units With A Mortgage
228,515
Housing Units Without A Mortgage 100,270
Dense Suburban
Owner Occupied Units
205,356
Housing Units With A Mortgage
144,679
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
60,677
Suburban
Owner Occupied Units
988,305
Housing Units With A Mortgage
694,425
Housing Units Without A Mortgage 293,880
Rural
Owner Occupied Units
528,148
Housing Units With A Mortgage
363,928
Housing Units Without A Mortgage 164,220
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Home Occupation and Mortgage Status
Municipality
Counts
Bloomfield
Owner Occupied Units
9,647
Housing Units With A Mortgage
7,095
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
2,552
Bridgeton
Owner Occupied Units
2,387
Housing Units With A Mortgage
1,534
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
853
Clifton
Owner Occupied Units
17,701
Housing Units With A Mortgage
12,054
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
5,647
East Brunswick
Owner Occupied Units
14,014
Housing Units With A Mortgage
9,517
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
4,497
Essex Fells
Owner Occupied Units
676
Housing Units With A Mortgage
473
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
203
Ewing
Owner Occupied Units
8,944
Housing Units With A Mortgage
6,410
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
2,534
Hamilton (Mercer)
Owner Occupied Units
25,019
Housing Units With A Mortgage
17,345
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
7,674
Metuchen
Owner Occupied Units
4,109
Housing Units With A Mortgage
2,778
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
1,331
New Brunswick
Owner Occupied Units
2,906
Housing Units With A Mortgage
2,100
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
806
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Municipality
Counts % of
Bloomfield
Total Housing Units
18,359
Occupied Housing Units 17,243 94%
Vacant Housing Units
1,116
6%
Bridgeton
Total Housing Units
6,765
Occupied Housing Units
5,937 88%
Vacant Housing Units
828 12%
Clifton
Total Housing Units
31,263
Occupied Housing Units 28,652 92%
Vacant Housing Units
2,611
8%
East Brunswick
Total Housing Units
17,553
Occupied Housing Units 16,750 95%
Vacant Housing Units
803
5%
Essex Fells
Total Housing Units
774
Occupied Housing Units
719 93%
Vacant Housing Units
55
7%
Ewing
Total Housing Units
13,604
Occupied Housing Units 12,661 93%
Vacant Housing Units
943
7%
Hamilton (Mercer)
Total Housing Units
35,837
Occupied Housing Units 33,734 94%
Vacant Housing Units
2,103
6%
Metuchen
Total Housing Units
5,300
Occupied Housing Units
5,149 97%
Vacant Housing Units
151
3%
New Brunswick
Total Housing Units
14,964
Occupied Housing Units 13,866 93%
Vacant Housing Units
1,098
7%

Municipality
Counts
Newark
Owner Occupied Units
20,420
Housing Units With A Mortgage
15,176
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
5,244
Passaic
Owner Occupied Units
4,821
Housing Units With A Mortgage
3,538
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
1,283
Paterson
Owner Occupied Units
11,864
Housing Units With A Mortgage
8,817
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
3,047
Perth Amboy
Owner Occupied Units
5,478
Housing Units With A Mortgage
4,158
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
1,320
Trenton
Owner Occupied Units
10,635
Housing Units With A Mortgage
7,473
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
3,162
Upper Deerfield
Owner Occupied Units
2,216
Housing Units With A Mortgage
1,451
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
765
Vineland
Owner Occupied Units
14,033
Housing Units With A Mortgage
9,127
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
4,906
Wayne
Owner Occupied Units
14,690
Housing Units With A Mortgage
9,979
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
4,711
West Windsor
Owner Occupied Units
7,235
Housing Units With A Mortgage
5,242
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
1,993
Woodbridge
Owner Occupied Units
22,598
Housing Units With A Mortgage
15,572
Housing Units Without A Mortgage
7,026
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Municipality
Counts % of
Newark
Total Housing Units
108,936
Occupied Housing Units 91,771 84%
Vacant Housing Units
17,165 16%
Passaic
Total Housing Units
21,724
Occupied Housing Units 20,044 92%
Vacant Housing Units
1,680
8%
Paterson
Total Housing Units
48,855
Occupied Housing Units 43,462 89%
Vacant Housing Units
5,393 11%
Perth Amboy
Total Housing Units
17,284
Occupied Housing Units 16,306 94%
Vacant Housing Units
978
6%
Trenton
Total Housing Units
34,531
Occupied Housing Units 27,998 81%
Vacant Housing Units
6,533 19%
Upper Deerfield
Total Housing Units
3,048
Occupied Housing Units
2,875 94%
Vacant Housing Units
173
6%
Vineland
Total Housing Units
23,054
Occupied Housing Units 20,966 91%
Vacant Housing Units
2,088
9%
Wayne
Total Housing Units
19,072
Occupied Housing Units 18,247 96%
Vacant Housing Units
825
4%
West Windsor
Total Housing Units
10,033
Occupied Housing Units
9,664 96%
Vacant Housing Units
369
4%
Woodbridge
Total Housing Units
34,985
Occupied Housing Units 33,557 96%
Vacant Housing Units
1,428
4%

Occurrence of Disability
NJUMA
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Urban
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Dense Suburban
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Suburban
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Rural
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Grand Total

25,823
3,348
15,280
7,195
267,157
23,870
145,146
98,141
83,971
5,454
38,287
40,230
337,599
26,768
145,773
165,058
179,122
13,557
77,232
88,333
893,672
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Schedule of Disability Determinations
Municipality (County)
Bloomfield Township (Essex)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Bridgeton City (Cumberland)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Clifton City (Passaic)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
East Brunswick Township (Middlesex)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Essex Fells Borough (Essex)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over

#
4,389
4,389
161
2,166
2,062
2,483
2,483
397
1,450
636
7,314
7,314
427
2,798
4,089
4,361
4,361
379
1,540
2,442
112
112
22
32
58
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Municipality (County)
Ewing Township (Mercer)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Hamilton Township (Mercer)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Metuchen Borough (Middlesex)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
New Brunswick City (Middlesex)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Newark City (Essex)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over

#
3,436
3,436
137
1,653
1,646
10,838
10,838
810
4,936
5,092
1,182
1,182
81
577
524
3,151
3,151
403
1,689
1,059
43,797
43,797
5,189
27,168
11,440

Municipality (County)
Passaic City (Passaic)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Paterson City (Passaic)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Perth Amboy City (Middlesex)

#

With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Trenton City (Mercer)

5,335
517
2,994
1,824
10,859

With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Upper Deerfield Township
(Cumberland)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over

10,859
1,110
7,151
2,598
1,160

7,146
7,146
1,324
3,685
2,137
12,522
12,522
675
6,706
5,141
5,335

1,160
148
618
394
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Municipality (County)
Vineland City (Cumberland)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Wayne Township (Passaic)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
West Windsor Township
(Mercer)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over
Woodbridge Township
(Middlesex)
With A Disability
Under 18 Years
18 To 64 Years
65 Years And Over

#
9,662
9,662
837
5,278
3,547
5,194
5,194
348
1,776
3,070
1,356
1,356
308
469
579
8,515
8,515
637
3,871
4,007

Detailed Budget Allocations Among NJUMA Cities (2014)
Municipality

Spend

Bridgeton City

$22,012,608

Departmental

$14,605,549

Public Safety

% of
Total

Municipality

Spend

% of
Total

Passaic City

$78,695,082

66%

Departmental

$49,212,829

63%

$8,517,359

58%

Public Safety

$30,308,506

62%

Public Works and Maint.

$1,724,767

12%

Public Works and Maint.

$7,944,900

16%

Finance and Tax

$1,087,891

7%

Finance and Tax

$2,594,057

5%

Unclassified

$1,081,933

7%

Administration

$1,837,028

4%

Administration

$629,824

4%

Unclassified

$1,778,340

4%

Recreation and Culture

$536,134

4%

Recreation and Culture

$1,410,466

3%

Public Defender and
Courts
Economic Development
and Planning
Education

$413,690

3%

Education

$1,159,551

2%

$213,370

1%

$990,337

2%

$196,928

1%

Public Defender and
Courts
Health

$816,169

2%

Shared Services

$107,342

1%

$373,475

1%

$96,310

1%

Economic Development
and Planning
Non-Departmental

$29,482,253

37%

$7,407,059

34%

Health
Non-Departmental
Municipality

Spend

Perth Amboy City

$67,417,731

Departmental

$34,811,575

Public Safety

% of
Total

Municipality

Spend

Trenton City

$173,969,718

52%

Departmental

$88,366,538

51%

$18,430,058

53%

Public Safety

$49,713,758

56%

Public Works and Maint.

$6,444,747

19%

Public Works and Maint.

$13,704,663

16%

Unclassified

$2,468,132

7%

Administration

$7,384,046

8%

Administration

$2,205,106

6%

Finance and Tax

$4,714,773

5%

Education

$1,210,671

3%

Unclassified

$4,631,050

5%

Recreation and Culture

$1,143,387

3%

Health

$2,191,268

2%

Finance and Tax

$1,075,162

3%

$2,101,025

2%

Health

$893,635

3%

Public Defender and
Courts
Education

$1,909,828

2%

Public Defender and
Courts
Economic Development
and Planning
Non-Departmental

$794,080

2%

Recreation and Culture

$949,453

1%

$146,598

0%

Shared Services

$815,900

1%

$32,606,156

48%

Economic Development
and Planning
Non-Departmental

$250,772

0%

$85,603,181

49%
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% of
Total

10-Year Municipal State Aid Trends in NJUMA Cities (Millions)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
2010
$18.7 $18.1 $18.0 $15.9 $16.3
$15.3
Passaic
$10.1
Perth Amboy $14.1 $13.7 $13.6 $12.0 $12.2
$6.6 $6.4 $6.4 $5.6 $5.7
$5.7
Bridgeton
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 10-Yr Trend
$13.3 $13.0 $12.8 $12.5 $12.5
-33%
Passaic
-35%
Perth Amboy $9.8 $9.6 $9.4 $9.2 $9.2
$4.7 $4.6 $4.5 $4.4 $4.4
-33%
Bridgeton
Municipal State Aid to Trenton (Millions)
Type of Aid
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Capital Cities Aid
$0.0 $0.0 $35.2 $38.8 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
CMPTRA
$56.2 $54.0 $49.4 $46.0 $23.0 $21.5 $21.3 $17.9 $17.3
Energy Receipts Tax
$5.7 $5.9 $7.3 $11.2 $25.0 $25.2 $24.0 $26.9 $26.6
MRERA Aid
$19.5 $18.8 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Special Municipal Aid $4.7 $23.9 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0
Transitional Aid
$0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $0.0 $29.5 $23.3 $26.1 $23.3 $24.9
All Other Aid
$1.9 $3.7 $1.6 $1.3 $2.3 $2.2 $2.3 $2.3 $1.5
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Source of Municipal Revenues among Select Municipalities
Municipality (County)

2000

%
Of

2007

%
Of

%
Of

$58,096,295

Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$16,667,538

29%

$18,155,892

27%

$9,836,542

13%

-41%

$34,390,757

59%

$46,528,172

68%

$58,066,398

78%

69%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$1,436,639

2%

N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$239,494

0%

$204,073

0%

N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$2,208,000

4%

$2,035,500

3%

$2,300,000

3%

4%

$4,830,000

8%

$1,306,400

2%

$3,000,000

4%

-38%

Bridgeton City
(Cumberland)
Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$21,311,054

$74,843,652

% V.
2000
29%

Bloomfield Township (Essex)

Surplus Revenue

$68,265,458

2014

$22,797,200

$23,434,780

10%

$13,321,072

63%

$13,651,282

60%

$9,079,866

39%

-32%

$6,003,064

28%

$8,831,968

39%

$11,871,970

51%

98%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$159,936

1%

N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$1,380,000

6%

$57,500

0%

$50,000

0%

-96%

$606,918

3%

$256,450

1%

$2,273,008

10%

275%

Surplus Revenue
Clifton City (Passaic)

$85,811,616

Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$27,323,404

32%

$29,022,093

27%

$21,026,865

20%

-23%

$50,277,212

59%

$67,871,772

64%

$74,908,306

70%

49%

$0

0%

$0

0%

$3,230,846

3%

N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$3,174,000

4%

$3,438,500

3%

$3,000,000

3%

-5%

Surplus Revenue

$5,037,000

6%

$5,635,000

5%

$4,725,000

4%

-6%

Municipal Library

East Brunswick Township
(Middlesex)
Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$105,967,365

$59,911,661

$106,891,017

$72,741,554

25%

$58,553,106

-2%

$27,196,945

45%

$33,850,734

47%

$17,247,687

29%

$26,338,056

44%

$32,562,264

45%

$34,452,136

59%

$0

0%

$0

0%

$2,419,793

4%

Municipal Open Space Budget

$537,648

1%

$463,556

1%

$378,490

1%

-30%

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$1,242,000

2%

$1,265,000

2%

$1,555,000

3%

25%

Surplus Revenue

$4,597,012

8%

$4,600,000

6%

$2,500,000

4%

-46%

Municipal Library
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-37%
31%
N/A

Municipality (County)

2000

%
Of

2007

%
Of

%
Of

% V.
2000

Essex Fells Borough (Essex)

$4,628,175

Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$1,333,080

29%

$1,737,997

30%

$942,432

20%

-29%

$2,286,315

49%

$3,006,112

52%

$3,506,970

73%

53%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$42,780

1%

$103,500

2%

$138,131

3%

223%

$966,000

21%

$920,000

16%

$215,000

4%

-78%

Surplus Revenue

$5,767,608

2014
$4,802,533

Hamilton Township (Mercer)

$95,026,244

Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$43,556,523

46%

$40,180,389

43%

$27,351,135

28%

-37%

$40,296,000

42%

$47,601,516

51%

$63,147,753

66%

57%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$2,807,616

3%

N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$4,278,000

5%

$470,251

1%

$437,741

0%

-90%

Surplus Revenue

$6,895,721

7%

$4,441,198

5%

$2,400,000

2%

-65%

Metuchen Borough
(Middlesex)
Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$92,693,354

4%

$14,671,330

$96,144,245

$16,524,151

1%

$16,011,836

9%

$5,513,595

38%

$5,510,263

33%

$3,358,395

21%

-39%

$7,430,869

51%

$9,267,528

56%

$10,538,497

66%

42%

$0

0%

$0

0%

$698,943

4%

N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$835,386

6%

$596,360

4%

$640,000

4%

-23%

Surplus Revenue

$891,480

6%

$1,150,000

7%

$776,000

5%

-13%

Municipal Library

New Brunswick City
(Middlesex)
Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$63,353,965

$78,855,951

$79,463,355

25%

$41,607,486

66%

$51,062,057

65%

$48,590,487

61%

17%

$19,988,359

32%

$26,850,894

34%

$27,777,647

35%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$1,045,220

1%

N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$619,620

1%

$0

0%

$0

0%

-100%

$1,138,500

2%

$943,000

1%

$2,050,000

3%

80%

Surplus Revenue
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39%

Municipality (County)

2000

%
Of

2007

%
Of

$722,516,506

2014

%
Of

% V.
2000

Newark City (Essex)

$625,774,369

$625,545,573

Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$445,852,361

71%

$530,044,249

73%

$410,550,159

66%

-8%

$105,298,508

17%

$133,707,257

19%

$196,588,808

31%

87%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$4,645,089

1%

N/A

Municipal Open Space
Budget
Receipts From Delinquent
Tax
Surplus Revenue

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

$32,982,000

5%

$28,750,000

4%

$13,761,516

2%

-58%

$41,641,500

7%

$30,015,000

4%

$0

0%

-100%

Passaic City (Passaic)

$79,774,754

Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$29,180,689

37%

$29,975,133

35%

$21,641,746

26%

-26%

$48,641,365

61%

$52,439,900

61%

$58,150,340

71%

20%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$1,068,976

1%

N/A

Municipal Open Space
Budget
Receipts From Delinquent
Tax
Surplus Revenue

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

$572,700

1%

$47,219

0%

$40,000

0%

-93%

$1,380,000

2%

$3,565,000

4%

$1,330,000

2%

-4%

$86,027,252

0%

$82,231,062

Paterson City (Passaic)

$210,183,151

Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$106,877,495

51%

$119,736,190

52%

$98,058,485

39%

-8%

$95,316,600

45%

$104,844,728

46%

$151,526,876

60%

59%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$2,327,405

1%

N/A

Municipal Open Space
Budget
Receipts From Delinquent
Tax
Surplus Revenue

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

$2,484,000

1%

$696,900

0%

$2,365,000

1%

-5%

$5,505,056

3%

$3,183,200

1%

$0

0%

-100%

Perth Amboy City
(Middlesex)
Miscellaneous Revenues
Anticipated
Municipal Budget

$228,461,018

3%

$55,494,605

$254,277,766

$90,350,591

21%

$72,286,756

30%

$29,738,623

54%

$32,751,247

36%

$13,858,753

19%

-53%

$25,326,802

46%

$52,664,017

58%

$55,105,391

76%

118%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$1,072,611

1%

N/A

Municipal Open Space
Budget
Receipts From Delinquent
Tax
Surplus Revenue

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0%

N/A

$429,180

1%

$4,796,277

5%

$250,000

0%

$0

0%

$139,050

0%

$2,000,000

3%
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-42%
N/A

Municipality (County)
Trenton City (Mercer)

2000 %
Of
$183,101,665

Miscellaneous Revenues Anticipated

$118,050,801 64% $145,612,923 70% $103,767,638 56%

-12%

$51,350,409 28% $53,233,303 26% $74,680,173 41%

45%

Municipal Budget

2007 %
Of
$207,920,565

2014 %
Of
$183,796,807

% V.
2000
0%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$767,134

0% N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0% N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$9,632,339

5%

$2,174,338

1%

$1,250,000

1%

-87%

Surplus Revenue

$4,068,116

2%

$6,900,000

3%

$3,331,862

2%

-18%

Upper Deerfield Township
(Cumberland)
Miscellaneous Revenues Anticipated

$3,994,780

$5,099,778

$4,620,933

16%

$2,765,965 69%

$3,013,616 59%

$1,890,118 41%

-32%

Municipal Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$381,800

8% N/A

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0% N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0% N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$328,440

8%

$431,250

8%

$530,000 11%

61%

Surplus Revenue

$900,375 23%

$1,654,912 32%

$1,819,015 39%

102%

Vineland City (Cumberland)

$53,142,229

$67,715,821

$59,560,880

12%

Miscellaneous Revenues Anticipated

$27,847,602 52% $34,648,218 51% $23,727,254 40%

-15%

Municipal Budget

$18,570,292 35% $25,650,103 38% $30,822,218 52%

66%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$1,352,948

2% N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0% N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$2,326,650

4%

$1,092,500

2%

$2,000,000

3%

-14%

Surplus Revenue

$4,397,685

8%

$6,325,000

9%

$1,658,460

3%

-62%

Wayne Township (Passaic)

$67,726,929

$82,079,945

$80,549,649

19%

Miscellaneous Revenues Anticipated

$16,172,521 24% $15,884,261 19% $11,439,739 14%

-29%

Municipal Budget

$41,840,588 62% $52,290,116 64% $57,881,794 72%

38%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$3,166,425

4% N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$1,229,118

1%

$1,065,000

1% N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$1,380,000

2%

$2,096,450

3%

$3,138,691

4%

127%

Surplus Revenue

$8,333,820 12% $10,580,000 13%

$3,858,000

5%

-54%
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Municipality (County)

2000 % Of

2007 % Of

West Windsor Township (Mercer)

$33,882,145

Miscellaneous Revenues Anticipated

$12,117,040 36% $12,238,357 31%

$9,852,907 25%

-19%

Municipal Budget

$12,673,001 37% $20,299,743 51% $22,681,414 58%

79%

Municipal Library

$39,929,206

2014 % Of % V. 2000
$38,947,300

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

Municipal Open Space Budget

$2,274,904

7%

$2,174,706

5%

$1,192,450

3%

-48%

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$745,200

2%

$379,500

1%

$600,000

2%

-19%

$4,620,529 12%

-24%

Surplus Revenue

$6,072,000 18%

Woodbridge Township (Middlesex) $103,983,497

$4,836,900 12%
$113,832,100

0% N/A

$138,907,892

Miscellaneous Revenues Anticipated

$52,923,230 51% $50,678,667 45% $44,553,318 32%

-16%

Municipal Budget

$45,745,287 44% $55,879,469 49% $84,264,112 61%

84%

Municipal Library

$0

0%

$0

0%

$3,534,211

3% N/A

Municipal Open Space Budget

$0

0%

$0

0%

$0

0% N/A

Receipts From Delinquent Tax

$138,000

0%

$17,464

0%

$0

0%

-100%

$5,176,980

5%

$7,256,500

6%

$6,556,251

5%

27%

Surplus Revenue
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Reduction in Misc. Revenues (2000-2014)
Classification
NJUMA
Urban
Dense
Suburban
Suburban
Rural
Grand Total

2000

2007

2014 Reduction in Misc.
Revenues
$190,291,186
$221,990,586
$148,348,004
-22%
$1,912,085,959 $2,117,220,675 $1,684,188,221
-12%
$341,199,114
$348,390,605
$258,038,192
-24%
$1,410,716,764 $1,473,926,382 $1,068,290,044
$582,901,221
$616,864,018
$438,922,209
$4,437,194,244 $4,778,392,265 $3,597,786,670

-24%
-25%
-19%

Municipal Property Tax Trends
Classification
NJUMA
Urban
Dense
Suburban
Suburban
Rural

2000

2007

2014 Growth in Municipal
Property Tax Levy
$131,321,639
$167,169,188
$202,876,531
54%
$1,595,757,268 $2,000,535,477 $2,495,936,097
56%
$634,861,193
$830,610,548
$938,507,347
48%
$2,131,460,471 $2,807,677,050 $3,295,667,086
$631,330,444
$959,282,808 $1,155,387,675
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55%
83%

Distribution of Property Tax Levy (2000-2014)
Classification
NJUMA
County
Municipal
School
Urban
County
Municipal
School
Dense
Suburban
County
Municipal
School
Suburban
County
Municipal
School
Rural
County
Municipal
School

2000 %
Of
$247,302,861
$38,523,829 16%
$131,321,639 53%
$77,457,393 31%
$3,822,083,188
$670,733,942 18%
$1,595,757,268 42%
$1,555,591,977 41%
$2,160,827,283
$331,825,024
$634,861,193
$1,194,141,066
$9,663,583,195
$1,894,420,105
$2,131,460,471
$5,637,702,619
$3,695,399,702
$858,040,630
$631,330,444
$2,206,028,628

15%
29%
55%
20%
22%
58%
23%
17%
60%

2007 %
Of
$285,985,971
$52,011,437 18%
$167,169,188 58%
$66,805,347 23%
$4,542,269,168
$834,768,603 18%
$2,000,535,477 44%
$1,706,965,088 38%
$2,758,039,142
$424,631,552
$830,610,548
$1,502,797,042
$12,517,408,730
$2,354,984,236
$2,807,677,050
$7,354,747,444
$5,346,834,351
$1,139,819,359
$959,282,808
$3,247,732,184

15%
30%
54%
19%
22%
59%
21%
18%
61%

2014 %
Of
$325,557,411
$55,381,799 17%
$202,876,531 62%
$67,299,080 21%
$5,131,393,216
$860,001,505 17%
$2,495,936,097 49%
$1,775,455,614 35%
$2,928,670,925
$448,154,964
$938,507,347
$1,542,008,614
$13,202,575,043
$2,417,075,819
$3,295,667,086
$7,489,832,139
$5,526,556,803
$1,091,073,639
$1,155,387,675
$3,280,095,489

Variance in Grant Funding (2008-2014)
Municipality
2008
2010
$2,282,745
$1,576,592
Bridgeton
$1,389,611
$958,461
Clifton
$3,337,219
Ewing
$807,210
$622,245
Metuchen
$10,293,001 $10,142,854
Passaic
$3,924,350 $1,621,486
Perth Amboy
$14,538,125 $27,613,348
Trenton
$465,518
$432,609
Wayne
$215,405
$186,179
West Windsor

2012
$1,353,494
$3,089,943
$1,531,570
$125,264
$8,866,023
$1,600,454
$9,357,480
$256,569
$126,118
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2014 Variance 2008
$663,856
-71%
$1,111,137
-20%
$451,483
-86%
$73,059
-91%
$5,731,711
-44%
$1,153,427
-71%
$1,371,339
-91%
$517,918
11%
$103,099
-52%

15%
32%
53%
18%
25%
57%
20%
21%
59%

Comparison of Grants by Category in NJUMA and Comparison Cities (2008-2014)
Grants
2008
2014 % Variance 2008
Category
$37,253,184 $11,177,028
-70%
$6,019,549 $4,578,532
-24%
Public Works and Maint.
$1,195,179
$616,329
-48%
Recreation and Culture
$5,732,071 $2,821,057
-51%
Health
$4,387,207 $2,011,175
-54%
Public Safety
-94%
Economic Development and Planning $19,661,338 $1,149,935
$257,840
Administrative
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Suburbanization in Mercer County and Philadelphia Metropolitan Area
Year Delaware County

1900
1950
2014

94,762
414,234
562,960

Montgomery
County
138,995
353,068
816,857

Bucks
County
71,190
144,620
626,685

Suburban
Total
304,947
911,922
2,006,502

Philadelphia
County

Phl. County
v. Suburban
Counties
1,293,697
424%
2,071,605
227%
1,560,297
78%

Year Suburban/Rural
Trenton
Mercer
Trenton % of Mercer
Municipalities
County
County
22,058
73,307
95,365
77%
1900
101,772
128,009 229,781
56%
1950
287,364
84,034 371,398
23%
2014

Historic Study of Property Values in Select Municipalities
Municipality
Bridgeton
Trenton
Newark
Paterson
Passaic
Bloomfield
Clifton
New Brunswick
Woodbridge
Perth Amboy
Wayne
Vineland
Metuchen
Hamilton (Mercer)
East Brunswick
West Windsor

1968
$506,029,601
$2,312,547,282
$9,850,574,030
$3,761,149,939
$1,727,439,907
$2,346,462,699
$4,927,599,331
$1,409,932,462
$4,769,545,347
$1,268,938,953
$3,375,698,101
$1,422,375,204
$693,627,767
$2,704,611,839
$1,476,912,502
$540,263,766

1994
2014 % Change
$608,419,758
$457,593,691
-10%
$3,093,895,172 $2,353,671,425
2%
$9,189,923,404 $13,433,383,650
36%
$4,513,330,786 $6,513,703,155
73%
$2,116,267,256 $3,016,384,615
75%
$3,559,894,427 $4,279,495,272
82%
$8,053,133,033 $9,448,405,229
92%
$1,881,249,307 $3,120,100,465
121%
$9,695,379,029 $10,708,015,780
125%
$2,355,462,548 $3,109,245,998
145%
$7,875,001,211 $9,283,196,499
175%
$2,571,543,592 $4,035,971,064
184%
$1,452,683,633 $2,163,884,692
212%
$6,690,348,005 $8,661,186,874
220%
$5,337,742,203 $7,136,331,823
383%
$3,398,647,271 $6,410,995,855
1087%
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Transitional Aid Awards since Program Inception (Millions)
Municipality
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Grand Total
$75 $65 $16 $15 $15 $12
Camden
$198
$30 $23 $26 $23 $25 $20
Trenton
$147
$24 $22 $23 $23 $25 $25
Paterson
$144
$14 $13 $12 $18 $18 $18
Union City
$93
$13 $11
$4
$4
$2
$2
Asbury Park
$35
$0
$0
$0
$0 $13 $13
Atlantic City
$26
$0
$0
$0 $10
$0 $10
Newark
$20
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
$2
Harrison
$11
$0
$0
$0
$0
$3
$2
Kearny
$4
$1
$1
$1
$1
$1
$0
Penns Grove
$4
$3
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
East Orange
$3
$2
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
Lawnside
$2
$2
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Passaic
$2
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Irvington
$1
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Bound Brook
$1
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Bridgeton
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Maurice River
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Beverly
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Salem
$1
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Mount Arlington
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Prospect Park
$1
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Plumsted
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Washington
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
North Arlington
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Chesilhurst
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Haledon
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
Sussex
$0
Grand Total
$171 $138 $85 $97 $103 $103
$697
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Transitional Aid to CMPTRA (2015)
Transitional Aid to
CMPTRA (2015)
Atlantic City
Beverly City
Camden City
Penns Grove Borough
Trenton City
Grand Total

$18,230,000
$10,000,000
$280,000
$2,500,000
$590,000
$4,860,000
$18,230,000
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Departmental v. Non-Departmental Spending Per Capita in NJUMA and Comparison
cities (2014)
Municipality
Passaic City
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Finance and Tax
Administration
Unclassified
Recreation and Culture
Education
Public Defender and Courts
Health
Economic Development and
Planning
Non-Departmental
Capital
Debt
Deferred Charges
Insurance
Reserve for Uncollected
Taxes
Reserves
Statutory Expenditures

Spend Per
Capita
$1,121
$701
$432
$113
$37
$26
$25
$20
$17
$14

Municipality
Bridgeton City
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Finance and Tax
Unclassified
Administration
Recreation and Culture
Public Defender and Courts
Economic Development and
Planning
Education
Shared Services

$12
$5

Health
Non-Departmental
Capital
Debt
Insurance
Reserve for Uncollected
Taxes
Statutory Expenditures
Transferred to Board of
Education
Unclassified

$420
$1
$32
$9
$236
$13
$5
$124
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Spend Per
Capita
$871
$578
$337
$68
$43
$43
$25
$21
$16
$8
$8
$4
$4
$293
$4
$49
$133
$10
$94
$1
$2

Municipality
Trenton City
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Administration
Finance and Tax
Unclassified
Health
Public Defender and Courts
Education
Recreation and Culture
Shared Services
Economic Development and
Planning
Non-Departmental
Capital
Debt
Deferred Charges
Insurance
Reserve for Uncollected
Taxes
Statutory Expenditures
Type I School
Unclassified

Spend Per
Capita
$2,056
$1,044
$588
$162
$87
$56
$55
$26
$25
$23
$11
$10

Municipality
Perth Amboy City
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Unclassified
Administration
Education
Recreation and Culture
Finance and Tax
Health
Public Defender and Courts
Economic Development and
Planning
Non-Departmental

$3

Capital
Debt
Insurance
Reserve for Uncollected
Taxes
Statutory Expenditures
Unclassified

$1,012
$0
$263
$1
$389
$52
$190
$68
$50
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Spend Per
Capita
$1,314
$679
$359
$126
$48
$43
$24
$22
$21
$17
$15
$3
$636
$13
$228
$243
$22
$112
$18

Municipality
Clifton City
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Education
Unclassified
Administration
Finance and Tax
Recreation and Culture
Health
Public Defender and Courts
Economic Development and
Planning
Additional Appropriations
Offset
Shared Services
Non-Departmental
Municipality
Ewing Township
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Administration
Unclassified
Health
Recreation and Culture
Finance and Tax
Public Defender and Courts
Shared Services
Economic Development and
Planning
Non-Departmental

Spend Per
Capita
$1,230
$688
$419
$112
$35
$31
$20
$19
$17
$16
$12
$4

Municipality
Metuchen Borough
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Unclassified
Education
Administration
Finance and Tax
Recreation and Culture
Public Defender and Courts
Shared Services
Health

$2

Economic Development and
Planning
Non-Departmental

$2
$542
Spend Per
Capita
$1,134
$680
$331
$150
$44
$38
$33
$28
$27
$13
$10
$7

Municipality
Wayne Township
Departmental
Public Safety
Public Works and Maint.
Education
Recreation and Culture
Administration
Unclassified
Health
Finance and Tax
Public Defender and Courts
Economic Development and
Planning
Shared Services
Non-Departmental

$454
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Spend Per
Capita
$1,153
$738
$268
$256
$52
$51
$43
$22
$17
$9
$7
$6
$5
$415

Spend Per
Capita
$1,426
$756
$346
$189
$57
$51
$33
$21
$20
$20
$8
$7
$4
$670

Municipality
Spend Per Capita
West Windsor Township
$1,314
Departmental
$798
Public Works and Maint.
$323
Public Safety
$293
Unclassified
$48
Administration
$47
Finance and Tax
$29
Health
$20
Economic Development and Planning
$16
Public Defender and Courts
$10
Shared Services
$9
Recreation and Culture
$3
Non-Departmental
$516
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Departmental v. Non-Departmental Spending (2008-2014)
Municipality

2008

%
Of

2010

%
Of

$21,608,463

2012

%
Of

$20,757,880

2014

%
Of

Bridgeton

$21,219,104

Departmental

$13,875,051

65%

$14,649,951

68%

$13,315,626

64%

$14,605,549

66%

NonDepartmental
Clifton

$7,344,053

35%

$6,958,512

32%

$7,442,254

36%

$7,407,059

34%

$105,729,898

Departmental

$67,481,352

64%

$70,767,970

62%

$64,753,987

60%

$58,239,464

56%

NonDepartmental
Ewing

$38,248,546

36%

$42,551,272

38%

$43,084,418

40%

$45,835,595

44%

Departmental

$33,324,899

67%

$24,902,856

62%

$24,557,374

60%

NonDepartmental
Metuchen

$16,222,726

33%

$15,557,266

38%

$16,396,884

40%

Departmental

$10,000,814

65%

$10,122,461

66%

$9,609,132

64%

$10,065,926

64%

NonDepartmental
Passaic

$5,480,758

35%

$5,195,685

34%

$5,452,651

36%

$5,662,841

36%

$83,072,234

Departmental

$53,543,975

64%

$56,791,873

65%

$50,315,592

61%

$49,212,829

63%

NonDepartmental
Perth Amboy

$29,528,259

36%

$30,457,410

35%

$31,912,831

39%

$29,482,253

37%

Departmental

$40,015,160

52%

$36,242,983

51%

$34,811,575

52%

NonDepartmental
Trenton

$36,391,615

48%

$34,708,098

49%

$32,606,156

48%

$199,715,358

Departmental

$116,901,165

59%

$116,746,528

59%

$90,799,282

51%

$88,366,538

51%

NonDepartmental
Wayne

$82,814,193

41%

$79,499,858

41%

$86,068,105

49%

$85,603,181

49%

Departmental

$44,391,046

57%

$46,230,496

59%

$42,613,492

55%

$41,487,852

53%

NonDepartmental
West Windsor

$32,897,979

43%

$32,755,946

41%

$35,357,567

45%

$36,750,567

47%

Departmental

$22,592,334

60%

$23,484,808

60%

$22,413,513

60%

$22,112,663

61%

NonDepartmental

$14,909,310

40%

$15,716,257

40%

$15,003,016

40%

$14,290,579

39%

$113,319,242

$22,012,608

$107,838,405

$49,547,625

$104,075,059

$40,460,121

$15,481,572

$15,318,146

$40,954,258

$15,061,783

$87,249,283

$15,728,767

$82,228,423

$76,406,775

$78,695,082

$70,951,081

$196,246,386

$77,289,025

$176,867,387

$78,986,442

$37,501,644

$173,969,718

$77,971,059

$39,201,066
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$67,417,731

$78,238,419

$37,416,529

$36,403,242

Detail of 2014 Budget Spending (Actual)
Municipality

Spend

Bridgeton City

$22,012,608

Departmental

$14,605,549

Public Safety

$8,517,359

Public Works and Maint.

% of
Total

Municipality

Spend

% of
Total

Passaic City

$78,695,082

66%

Departmental

$49,212,829

63%

58%

Public Safety

$30,308,506

62%

$1,724,767

12%

Public Works and Maint.

$7,944,900

16%

Finance and Tax

$1,087,891

7%

Finance and Tax

$2,594,057

5%

Unclassified

$1,081,933

7%

Administration

$1,837,028

4%

Administration

$629,824

4%

Unclassified

$1,778,340

4%

Recreation and Culture

$536,134

4%

Recreation and Culture

$1,410,466

3%

Public Defender and
Courts
Economic Development
and Planning
Education

$413,690

3%

Education

$1,159,551

2%

$213,370

1%

$990,337

2%

$196,928

1%

Public Defender and
Courts
Health

$816,169

2%

Shared Services

$107,342

1%

$373,475

1%

$96,310

1%

Economic Development
and Planning
Non-Departmental

$29,482,253

37%

$7,407,059

34%

Health
Non-Departmental
Municipality

Spend

Perth Amboy City

$67,417,731

Departmental

$34,811,575

Public Safety

% of
Total

Municipality

Spend

% of
Total

Trenton City

$173,969,718

52%

Departmental

$88,366,538

51%

$18,430,058

53%

Public Safety

$49,713,758

56%

Public Works and Maint.

$6,444,747

19%

Public Works and Maint.

$13,704,663

16%

Unclassified

$2,468,132

7%

Administration

$7,384,046

8%

Administration

$2,205,106

6%

Finance and Tax

$4,714,773

5%

Education

$1,210,671

3%

Unclassified

$4,631,050

5%

Recreation and Culture

$1,143,387

3%

Health

$2,191,268

2%

Finance and Tax

$1,075,162

3%

$2,101,025

2%

Health

$893,635

3%

Public Defender and
Courts
Education

$1,909,828

2%

Public Defender and
Courts
Economic Development
and Planning
Non-Departmental

$794,080

2%

Recreation and Culture

$949,453

1%

$146,598

0%

Shared Services

$815,900

1%

$32,606,156

48%

Economic Development
and Planning
Non-Departmental

$250,772

0%

$85,603,181

49%
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Select Services as % of Dept. Spend
Municipality
Passaic
West Windsor
Clifton
Trenton
Perth Amboy
Metuchen
Ewing
Wayne
Bridgeton
Partner City Avg.
Comparison City
Avg.
Municipality
Bridgeton
Wayne
Passaic
Ewing
Metuchen
Clifton
Perth Amboy
West Windsor
Trenton
Partner City Avg.
Comparison City
Avg.

Public Safety + DPW as
% of Dept. Spend
78%
77%
77%
72%
71%
71%
71%
71%
70%
73%
73%

% of Dept. Spend on
Police Functions
25%
23%
22%
22%
20%
19%
18%
17%
16%
20%
20%
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Municipality
Passaic
Clifton
Bridgeton
Trenton
Perth Amboy
Ewing
Wayne
West Windsor
Metuchen
Partner City Avg.
Comparison City
Avg.
Municipality
Clifton
Bridgeton
Trenton
Passaic
Perth Amboy
West Windsor
Ewing
Metuchen
Wayne
Partner City Avg.
Comparison City
Avg.

Public Safety as % of
Dept. Spend
62%
61%
58%
56%
53%
49%
46%
37%
36%
57%
46%

% of Dept. Spend on
Fire Functions
15%
13%
12%
12%
8%
5%
5%
3%
1%
11%
6%
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